AN
E S S A Y
ON THE
A R T o f W A R.
Translated from the French of Count TURPIN [DE CRISSÉ],
By Captain JOSEPH OTWAY.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
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LONDON,
Printed by A. HAMILTON,
For W. JOHNSTON, in Ludgate-Street,
MDCCCLXI.
Transcription © 2008
John Kenneth Rowland
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T H E
P R E L I M I N A R Y D I S C O U R S E.
IF it be true, that the dignity of sciences is more, or less in proportion to their usefulness, how apparently does the art of war claim the first place? War is a great evil, but it is inevitable, and oftentimes necessary. If he, who first reduced to rules, the art of destroying his fellow-creatures, had no end in view but to gratify the passions of princes, he was a monster, whom it would have been happy to have smothered at his birth: but if his intention was the defence of persecuted virtue, or the punishment of successful wickedness, to curb ambition, or to oppose the unjust claims of superior power, mankind ought to erect altars to his memory.
War, in the last case, is the most necessary, and useful of all the sciences: the various kinds of knowledge, which ought to furnish the mind of a soldier, are not without great difficulty to be attained. Of most other sciences the principles are fixed, or at least, they may be ascertained by the assistance of experience; there needs nothing but diligence to learn them, or a particular turn of mind to practise them. Philosophy, mathematics, architecture, and many others, are all founded upon invariable combinations. Every man, even of a narrow understanding, may remember rules, apply them properly, and sometimes draw just consequences from them: but the study of war is of another kind. Experience can so seldom be referred to rules, that nothing but a mind [ii] enlightened by diligent study can make a due application of rules to circumstances.
Most artists may join practice to theory, and make on perfect by the help of the other. The warrior has not always the like assistance; he spends part of his life in forming plans, of which humanity does not suffer him to wish the execution; and when he has an opportunity of judging from experience of the solidity of his principles, the operations are so rapid, the motions so diversified, the actions so confused, that he has scarcely time for a glimpse of those things which require the most calm and close consideration.
In learning of every kind, theory is the completion; in the study of the military science, it is only the introduction. Many a man, depending on his rules, has found that the marches, the camps, the dispositions, the manœuvres performed with exact and strict order in the closet, have not only been very difficult, but even impracticable in the field. A disposition good in a mountainous country, would be bad in an open one; a disposition proper for one open country may fail in another, for want of foreseeing that a manœuvre, which in one case may have been the cause of winning a battle, may in another occasion its loss: the circumstances of time and place almost always throw the best constructed systems out of order. It is therefore only by dint of study, and by the contemplation of cases incessantly varied, that the want of practice can be supplied, or action at least made less difficult.
A military man who would be master of his profession, has no hours to lose; in peace, he ought to study with the greatest diligence; in time of war, he will see his principles open themselves of their own accord; his ideas are then more distinct, he acts with clearness and certainty in all cases he has foreseen, and applies his rules to all those which now occur for the first time, and which till then had escaped his thoughts. Who [iii] does not know that bravery, courage, and comprehension, are useless and often fatal to a military man, who wants knowledge of his business? Having no previous helps from study, it often happens that the braver he is, the more he is liable to mistakes, and the less able to foresee or avoid them.
The science of war branches out into so many particulars, it takes in so many different parts; there are so many reflections necessary to be made, so many circumstances and cases to be brought together, that it is only by a continual application, grounded upon the love of his duty, and an inclination to his profession, that any man can attain it.
To march an army in every sort of country, whether open, woody, or mountainous; to know how to form a camp in all these countries, with which the general must be thoroughly acquainted, in order to do it with security; to make a proper disposition for a battle, whether with a view to the posture of the enemy, or to the situation of the country; to foresee events which depend, in a manner, upon chance; to be capable of making a good retreat on proper occasions; to direct the forages without fatiguing, or exposing the troops; to send out detachments with precaution; to conduct the convoys in safety; to know how to canton an army, and to settle it in winter-quarters in such a manner, that by the just disposition of all the parts, it may be able to assemble readily on the first order, though widely dispersed; to establish magazines in places, both safe and within reach of the army, so that it shall never be in want of substance; these are the great ends of the military science. The Alexanders of Parma, the Spinolas, the Gustavuses, the Weimars, the Condé, the Turennes, the Montécucullis, the Vendomes, the Marlboroughs, the Eugenes, and all the great men who have gone before us, would never have been the subject of our admiration, if they had neglected this study in any of its branches. It is by courage, genius, and [iv] capacity, by having an head always cool, and an eye at once quick and exact; by a nice knowledge of the country, by skill in the choice of officers, and by strict discipline kept up in his army, that a general is enable to take such just measures as will frustrate the designs of the enemy.
[viii] ... A quick eye is natural in some, and in them it is the effect of genius; others acquire it by study or experience; he, who knows how to command himself, and has courage enough to keep himself cool on the most urgent occasions, has the readiest and quickest eye. A quick hot-headed man, however brave, sees nothing, or if he does, it is confusedly and generally too late.
It is this quick eye which enables him to judge of an advantageous post, of a manœuvre to be made, and of a good disposition for the troops, whether with respect to that of the enemy, or to the situation and nature of the country.
There is a quickness of eye which depends upon the enemy, and another independent of him; it depends upon the enemy when he has made such a disposition, that to attack him another must be made upon the spot, which renders his defective and weak in some part; or when being advantageously posted, the general obliges him to change his position, by making him fearful of being taken in flank, or being surrounded, or when it is so contrived as to render the troops on the right useless by attacking the left, without their being able to assist it. ...
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BOOK [THE] FIRST.
C H A P. I.
Of the Knowledge of a Country.
A Campaign of which the plan is well formed, and the dispositions well concerted, may nevertheless prove unsuccessful, if the general, to whose direction they are intrusted, hath not a thorough knowledge of the country in which they are to be carried into execution. The marches, camps, convoys, forages, detachments; in short, the most important operations, will be performed with impropriety, if this knowledge is not previously acquired; events are often determined by it.
There is one knowledge of a country, which for an officer to be without, should be considered as a reproach; that of the situation of cities, towns, villages, forests, streams, rivers, which is to be acquired by studying of geographical maps. There is another branch of knowledge yet more particular, such as, of the passes, or the boundaries of the country, the situation, the nature of the ground, whether it is plain, or divided by hollows, rivulets, hills, &c. which is to be acquired by the assistance of topographical maps. In the study of these last, care must be taken, not [2] blindly to follow the marks they lay down. It very seldom happens, that topographical maps are perfectly exact: for besides the many circumstances, which may sometimes in a year alter a large extent of country, they seldom take notice of fords, bridges over the small rivulets, small hills, and hollows of little importance; neither can they mark whatever may be occasioned by recent inundations and disruptions of the earth: whereas any of there unforeseen circumstances may prove an obstruction to a great design, either by retarding the march of an army, preventing a column of troops from advancing, or leaving the enemy in possession of some passes, from which he might have been driven.
It is nevertheless impossible for a map to explain every particular: for example, an hollow way may be marked, but its depth will still remain unknown; neither can it show whether the ascent and descent of it be easy or difficult. A general, studious to avoid the imputation of negligence, ought, before he engages in an enterprize, to make himself acquainted with every particular relating to the country, and by that means make up for the deficiencies of the maps. In short, if he is desirous of fixing a camp in a position strong by situation, but unacquainted how that is to be done, or in what manner the wings can be supported, he should then get information whether there is any river by which the camp may be covered, whether this river can be passed easily, and what is the nature of its banks.
In order to avoid the errors into which a general may be drawn by maps, the safest method is to apply to the inhabitants of the country, and go over it with the most intelligent of them, and remark every obstacle, however trifling it may appear.
For marching with greater security, a general ought to form a company of guides of the peasants, be assured of their fidelity, and attach them to him by all possible methods, particularly by unbounded liberality. It is by money only that trusty spies and faithful guides can be secured; the [3] latter are less expensive, but full as necessary as the former. Parsimony should be avoided in war; for, as Vigetius observes, money should never be spared, when expence is necessary to secure possession. In proportion as an army advances into a country, great care must be taken to change the guides.
The command of this company should be given to an intelligent man, who should be perfectly acquainted with every thing relating to the country, and who should also be fully able to answer any objections started by the general or officer that accompanies him. This company of guides will be capable of informing the general of whatever may have escaped his observation; of directing him in his inquiries, by which means his discoveries will always be to be depended upon. By this manner of proceeding, neither will the position, or the distance of one place from another, nor the situation of any particular city, town, or village, nor any circumstance be unknown to a general who joins their information to what he himself already knows: he will be informed of all the pathways, of the different roads leading into the country, and what number of them terminate at the same point; he will judge what number of men, either horse or foot, can march abreast, whether the enemy can prevent his pursuing his intended route, by taking the field, and to what distance he will be able to march in safety.
The general should send out detachments along with some of there guides to examine the streams which cross the country, whether or no their mouths are at a distance, into what river they empty themselves, from whence they take their source, whether they may be easily forded, if their banks are steep or sloping, marshy or covered with bushes; other detachments should he employed in examining the woods, in order to find out whether troops can pass through them, or not.
[4] A general ought himself to examine into the truth of the reports made to him by these small detachments, or send out others more considerable, under the command of general officers: however certain a general may be of the fidelity of his spies and guides, yet he should not always rely upon their reports: mistrust, which in general is accounted a vice, may at most be esteemed a virtue in the business of war.
Furnished with there lights, a general can allot the easiest road to the artillery and baggage, the shortest to the infantry, and longest to the cavalry: he can at once judge from the nature of the ground, into how many columns the army can be divided, in order to expedite the march, and what dispositions will be necessary for the columns with regard to the enemy's position.
By the knowledge of the country, a general is informed of what camps the enemy doth, or can occupy, and of those necessary to be taken to oppose his designs; whether the enemy's detachments can easily approach, or how he can himself advance towards him, without being discovered; is there is forage in the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp, or whether he is obliged to draw it from a distance; where he hath fixed his magazines, and whether an attempt to carry them off is practicable or not; in what manner his quarters are disposed, and which of them is most exposed; what distance there is between himself and the enemy; where the enemy hath established posts, and which those are, that himself ought to occupy with regard to the situation of his own camp and quarters, and those belonging to the enemy; which is the properest road for the detachments and the patroles to keep, in order to gain intelligence; and lastly, with what degree of ease the enemy can attack the army on its march, and whether in front or flank. This knowledge is essential to a general in every kind of country; but in a woody or mountainous country, it would become more particularly dangerous, and even impossible for him to march an army, is unacquainted with it.
[5] By the maps, a general will know whether there be forests in a country; but if he does not endeavour to get a more particular information, he will be unacquainted with the nature of them; whether they are boggy, smooth, or rugged, and, consequently, whether it be possible for the troops, artillery, and baggage, to pass through them. ...
This example tends to prove, that maps are not always to be relied on. There can be no reason to doubt that the duke of Burgundy was [6] furnished with the most exact: but yet it is probable that he might not have succeeded in this enterprize, if he had neg1ected fending M. d’Alegre to survey the passes, and examine two, before he proceeded to that through which he marched.
The following is a general rule: That it is upon the ground, and not upon maps, that the roads through which an army is to march, must be examined, as well as the situation of places where camps are to be fixed, and fields of battle chosen. An army should never move before ways are opened for every column: with regard to a detachment it is different, as there may [sic] circumstances arise, which will prevent the general from foreseeing what road it may take. The command of a detachment should always be given to an intelligent officer, and one who has made his business his only study; who hath been particularly careful to acquire a knowledge of the country, and of whose genius the general should entertain no doubt. A particular choice stirs up emulation in young men, and induces them to exert their utmost endeavours to deserve so distinguishing a mark of approbation.
Into how many mistakes have even the greatest generals fallen, by not being thoroughly acquainted with a country, and by suffering themselves to be guided by general notions? M. de Feuquieres cites many examples of great enterprizes which have miscarried by it. ...
[9] ... With this company of guides, and an exact knowledge of the country, a general will be enabled to undertake an enterprize, that another with double the number of troops durst not think of attempting. These precautions will furnish him with stratagems, oftentimes more efficacious than force and courage: under the appearance of flight, a general will often get possession of an advantageous post, and decoy the enemy into one, that may prove his undoing. ...
It hath frequently happened, and will continue to do so, that a general who knows how to take advantage of the knowledge of the country, although inferior in point of force, may change a defensive, into an offensive war. ...
The knowledge of a country is still more essential in retreats: there is more art and more precaution required in a retreat, than in any other action; that operation is the conclusion of all preceding ones. If a general, obliged to retreat precipitately, hath but a superficial knowledge of the country, how will he be able to reassemble his troops, reestablish order, or march with any degree of security? ...
[13] ...The knowledge of a country is as necessary for a private officer, as for the commander in chief, because he is to execute in part, what the general performs with all the troops. When an officer, to whose conduct an expedition is intrusted, joins this knowledge, one of the chief branches of military science to practice and experience, he will, with so much the greater ease, comprehend and execute the general's intention and plan; and he will be also enabled to take the properest measures for success: if, on the contrary, he begins a march without being acquainted with the country, his mind misgiving him, will encrease the danger, by the very means he takes to avoid it : he will suppose it in places, where there is nothing to be feared, and often fall into it where he was least apprehensive of it. Thus prepossessed, he will always remain undetermined and by this prepossession his attention will be taken off from many things [14] of the greatest Importance: suppose him as brave as possible and his intention to execute the orders given him equally good, he will of course be drawn into mistakes by his over-care to avoid them. ...
C H A P. II.
Of the Preparations before taking the Field,
and the March of an Army on leaving its Quarters to go into Cantonments.
<pp 15ff>
[20]
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C H A P. III.
The March of an Army in an open Country.
IF, according to the observation of Vegetius, an army is in a more dangerous situation upon a march than when it is drawn up in order of battle, because a soldier, not seeing his enemy, is not so much upon his guard, there is consequently a greater degree of precaution required in a general, that he may not be surprised by an unexpected attack, or fall into ambuscades, the likelihood of which should always make him proceed with caution.
It is upon a thorough knowledge of the country which is the seat of war, that a general should direct the march of armies; that he should [21] concert measures for conducting them in safety; and that he will be enabled to foresee the enemy’s motions. ...
<Roads in Open Country>
... it is very imprudent for a general to suppose himself entirely free from danger upon a march, for the consequences of self-security are generally fatal: the effects of negligence in any military operation are pernicious, but more particularly so upon a march; and although a general should never fear his enemy when in presence of him, he should nevertheless always apprehend the worst from him, when he is out of his sight.
<Number of Marching Columns>
[22] ... A general should never cause an army to move without having previously considered and examined the intended march of it, nor without a thorough knowledge of the enemy’s position and where he is, or without knowledge particularly [of] the ground intended to encamp on. An army ought never to move but with some design, either to seize on some advantageous post, to prevent an intended march of the enemy’s, to draw him into a disadvantageous situation, to deprive him of subsistence, or to procure some for itself....
[23] <Reconnaissance>
Before the march is planned, and the number of columns determined upon in which the army is to march, notwithstanding the general is acquainted with the country, he should send out a detachment some days before, to reconnoitre the intended route of the army, as well as the camp it is to occupy. This detachment is to be commanded by the officers of the day appointed for its setting out: they must have staff-officers and guides with them, to conduct and to inform them of the nature of whatever may prove to be an obstacle....
<Division of Army into Detachments>
<Reconnaissance of Camp Area>
... The knowledge of the situation of the camp being attained, each detachment will return by the road it came; but first, the [24] commanding officer of each detachment will make a report to the general of the roads they have passed, what discoveries they have made, and, in short, will give him a particular detail of every thing they have met with on their way, whether woods, villages, hollows, bridges, and of every thing they have done to render the road easy for the column that is to pass through it....
<March Security>
<Order of March>
[25] <Advanced and Rear Guards>
<Flank Protection>
[26] <Protection for Front Attack>
<Shifting from March to Order of Battle>
[27] <Campements>
<Flank Protection>
[29] <Leaving Camp>
C H A P. IV.
The March of an Army in a mountainous and woody Country.
<pp. 30ff>
C H A P. V.
Of Camps in offensive War.
<pp. 44ff>
CHAP VI
Of Camps in defensive War.
<pp. 51ff>
[64]
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C H A P. VII.
Of the Methods of escorting Convoys.
THE conducting of convoys is one of the most important and most difficult of all military operations....
All these considerations suppose a general to be a man whose natural parts are matured by experience, and who is sensible that, without a thorough knowledge of the country, the foundation of all conduct, it will be impossible to make a proper disposition of troops. If a general is ignorant of the places most proper to form ambuscades; of those where there are bridges and fords; of the passes which are most dangerous, [65] and those which will favour the enemy’s approach, in order to attack, and whether in head, flank, or rear, he acts but as chance directs, and his dispositions will have no meaning, either with respect to the situation of places, or the nature of the ground; the orders will be ill executed, the evolutions performed without exactness; and the disposition of the troops will be faulty; the separate bodies being, consequently, unable to sustain and assist each other, will soon be beaten and dispersed, and the convoy carried off.
Scour (Middle English scuren): 1. to move through or range over rapidly. 2. to examine minutely and rapidly. — [cf. scour (ME scouren): to rub hard, etc.]
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The general officer commanding the convoy ought, for its security, to distribute his troops after such a manner that they may be a mutual assistance to it. The choice of troops to form the escort is undetermined, as it is by the nature of the country their quality should be decided. In mountainous and woody countries, only infantry, hussars, or dragoons can be made use of; the hussars and dragoons are to march in the front and on the flanks, to scour the woods, examine the avenues, and make sure of the defiles: in an open country, the escort should be composed of infantry, cavalry, hussars, or dragoons. But whatever may be the nature of the country, the convoy ought never to advance without first sending out detachments to reconnoitre at a distance.
If the convoy marches through a mountainous country, a large body of cavalry would not only be useless, but also an embarrassment, as it would be unable to act, except with great difficulty; whereas in an open country, cavalry is very serviceable. In any kind of country a convoy can be escorted with infantry, especially when the enemy can only act with his; but as in an open country, it is necessary for the infantry to be supported, the cavalry must be used for that purpose; in a mountainous country, infantry can carry on war alone.
[66] In the last case the officer commanding the escort ought to place a body of infantry at the head, another in the center, and a third at the rear-guard; to distribute small bodies at proper distances on the right and left, and he should be particularly careful to possess himself of the heights; the hussars must be distributed to the advanced and rear-guards, and, in order to be more certain that every part hath been strictly examined, as the convoy advances, notwithstanding the hussars of the advanced guard have already scoured the avenues, woods, valleys, villages, and hollows, the hussars belonging to the rear-guard should again look into those places, to see whether any thing hath escaped the notice of the advanced guard: these precautions are never without their use, and do not in the least retard the march of the convoy. ...
[68] ... Hussars are more particularly necessary in the escorting of convoys, because they scamper about on all sides, and are very active and ready in scouring a country thoroughly; they leave no place till they have perfectly examined it, unless the thickness of the woods or any other unavoidable obstacle should prevent their penetrating as far as they would otherwise do; and even then they protect the infantry, who can with greater ease pass into those places where the hussars cannot. Whatever country the convoy passes through, there should always be hussars with it; otherwise the officer commanding the escort cannot be certain that the country is thoroughly surveyed, because for want of hussars he must employ cavalry on that service; not that there can be any doubt of the cavalry’s exposing itself to danger with as much chearfulness and courage as the hussars, but as the horses belonging to the cavalry are naturally heavier than those of the hussars, and often encumbered with forage, they cannot venture to a proper distance, without running the danger of being taken, because they cannot retire with that expedition which is requisite; on the other hand, the hussar being more active and more accustomed to reconnoitre, knows how to go over a country with proper caution and care of himself: besides, the trooper who is used always [69] to march in a body and to be under command, will have a very imperfect idea of the method of scouring a country. Altho’ the disposition of the troops should always be regulated by the nature of the country thro’ which the convoy marches, and by the nature and number of the enemy by which it is liable to be attacked, yet the general should never neglect, whatever his situation may be, to secure the head, center, and rear: before the convoy begins its march, the disposition in case of an attack should be settled; by which means the commanding officers of different corps will know where to post themselves, and after what manner to act at the time the attack is made. By the knowledge which the commanding officer ought to have of the country, he will form a judgment of those places where it is most probable he may be attacked, and of course make his dispositions accordingly. In any disposition that may happen, a general should always foresee in what manner the attack, defence, and retreat will be conducted. ...
C H A P. VIII.
Of Detachments for forming a Chain of green Forage.
<pp. 76-86>
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[87]
C H A P. IX.
Of the Detachments for forming a Chain of dry Forage.
IF there is great exactness and knowledge required in the conducting of parties for green forage, those for dry forage perhaps require more; and, in general, every thing that regards foraging parties, whether green or dry, excites a particular attention in the commander in chief; and, according to the chevalier Folard, all success in war depends upon secrecy, diligence, activity, and the thorough knowledge of the country.
[C H A P. X.]
[Typographical error in original – This Chapter number was not used]
[95]
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C H A P. XI.
The March of a Detachment of Infantry and Dragoons
in an open Country divided by Rivers.
ALTHOUGH the dispositions and operations of a detachment do not take in so many particulars as the march of an army, it is nevertheless necessary to lay down the rules which must be observed, in an accurate manner, and how they vary, according to the country through which a detachment is conducted.
A detachment is liable to be attacked upon its march, because it is impossible to be always certain, that the enemy, by their spies, have not received intelligence of it; neither can the commanding officer always foresee by what forces he will be opposed. The objects for detachments are many; they are sent either to carry assistance, to guard a communication, to prevent the enemy’s foraging too near the camp, to hinder him from raising contributions, to keep him at a distance from the army, or, in the end, to bring him to action: if the intention of a detachment is to carry assistance, it should avoid meeting the enemy as much as possible, that the march of it may not be retarded; if to guard a communication, it must also avoid the enemy, till it shall be arrived at the post it is ordered to occupy; if to hinder the enemy from raising contributions, to keep him at a distance; or to bring him to action, it ought to try every method for finding and fighting him, at the same time not neglecting such precautions as are most safe and necessary.
A detachment is much less exposed to danger in an open than in a mountainous country, because the enemy cannot so easily form ambuscades, and are sooner discovered.
[96] When the commanding office of the detachment shall have made his disposition, and considered circumstances properly, he will form small troops or parties, to march in the front, on the flanks, and in the rear, and to examine the country. These parties, of which there should be many, will scour the whole country, and send out scouts, who, although they do not keep any particular road, must nevertheless be careful not to lose sight of the troops from which they are detached, that they may join them and the gross of the detachment immediately after having discovered the enemy.
The scouts will stop at every village or hamlet that falls in their way, and endeavour to gain intelligence; and if they should chance to receive any, they will give immediate notice of it to the officer commanding the party from which they were detached, who will immediately report it to the commanding officer of the detachment. ...
[105]
C H A P. XII.
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Of the March of a Detachment of Infantry and Hussars
in a woody and mountainous Country.
ALTHOUGH there are many more particulars to be attended to in the march of an army than of a detachment sent out only on some particular occasion; nevertheless, the ability of the officer commanding it is not less conspicuous; for the strength of the latter being small in comparison to that of the former, the commanding officer hath greater occasion for multiplying precautions, and practising the stratagems of war.
It is not so difficult to conduct a detachment composed on infantry and hussars through a woody and mountainous country as through an open one; but nevertheless as the enemy can with greater ease form ambuscades in a country that is covered, the detachment can only advance slowly, and not till after having thoroughly examined the country.
The precautions necessary to be used are the same with those mentioned in the foregoing chapter, at least as far as relates to the dispositions before the beginning of the march, with this difference, that the country up front will be scoured by hussars instead of dragoons. It is unnecessary for these patroles to be strong, as they will be unable to make head in a mountainous country against the infantry that will attack them; but by being dispersed in small parties, they will easily retire to the main body of the detachment. These parties should make the strictest examinations, and endeavour to go round the mountains as much as possible, and never quit any avenue or pathway before it is thoroughly examined. If the avenues only are examined and the heights neglected, the detachment [106] will remain in a state of uncertainty; and as it will be very difficult for hussars to reach the tops of the mountains, some corps of infantry should be detached not only to examine and scour the country, but also to occupy the heights, and dispute the possession of them with the enemy.
In case the hussars who form the rear-guard are attacked by infantry, they should have orders to join that belonging to the detachment, as hath been already said with regard to the dragoons; but if they are attacked by hussars, they are upon an equality with them, and should stand their ground, and some platoons of infantry should also be distributed upon their flanks, which will certainly give them an advantage over the enemy. There is scarcely any ground whatever so narrow as not to allow a body of infantry to be posted in it sufficient to cover the hussars of the advanced and rear-guards....
If the officer commanding the detachment is thoroughly acquainted with a mountainous country, he will march with great security through it, as he will have a perfect knowledge of the places, where it is most probable ambuscades will be formed, and of those where he himself can [107] have an opportunity of attacking the enemy. It is very certain, that in a confined country the enemy cannot present a larger front than the detachment, which cannot be flanked, particularly if care has been taken to secure the heights. ...
[110] ... There is more address required to carry on war among mountains, than in a plain, although a general can never employ too much in either; if, in the former case, a general finds more opportunities of forming ambuscades, he is also more liable to be surprised; and if any precaution, however trifling, is neglected, the troops are in danger every step they take. A commanding officer should always know what is doing in his front, which knowledge if he cannot attain, either through his own means, or by means of detachments, he should endeavour to form conjectures of, which may be equivalent: the caution with which Fabius Cunctator proceeded against the Carthaginians, was never imputed to him as a crime.
[111]
C H A P. XIII.
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Of the March of a Detachment composed of Cavalry and Hussars,
in an open Country.
IT is very astonishing that the generality of authors, who have wrote upon the military art, have neglected treating upon the evolutions of cavalry, notwithstanding it, in a great measure, constitutes the strength of an army. Vegetius informs us only of the method practiced by the ancient Romans for teaching their troopers the art of riding; and the qualifications which Xenophon requires in his scouts, are more applicable to hussars than to heavy cavalry.
The moderns have regarded the evolutions of the infantry as only worthy of their attention; and as the whole bent of their instructions is to bring them to perfection, they mention the cavalry but in a very superficial manner. It is most undoubtedly true that cavalry cannot be used in all countries, but in an open one it is able to prosecute a war without assistance, and secures and covers the wings of that infantry it is capable of attacking.
It would be very dangerous to give into the opinion of the chevalier de Folard, who seems to hold cavalry in no great estimation, and who also pretends that it only serves to embarrass an army, unless he had added, that too numerous a body of cavalry would be too expensive, and would also be exposed to great inconveniences from the difficulty of procuring sufficient forage.
[123]
C H A P. XIV.
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The Retreat of a Detachment of Infantry and Dragoons,
in an open Country divided by Rivers.
THE conducting of a detachment obliged to retreat, supposes more talents and skill in the officer charged with it, than are often required in operations which, to appearance, are more important: he hath not only a superior enemy to avoid, but he must also raise the drooping courage, and dissipate the terror of his soldiers. The retreat of an army undoubtedly requires still greater knowledge in a general, because the number retreating is ore considerable, and the extent of ground which the troops occupy, greater; and, consequently, being unable at once to perceive all the motions of the enemy in such a manner as to oppose them, he must remedy that inconvenience by an unbounded activity and foresight: on the contrary, an officer leading a detachment has all his troops together immediately under his eye; he distinctly sees those belonging to the enemy, and consequently can, with greater ease, counter-act his dispositions; but nevertheless the smallness of number is a new cause for terror to the soldier, whose fear always magnifies his danger, and entirely destroys those reasons which should induce him to take fresh courage. ...
[135]
C H A P. XV.
The Retreat of a Detachment of Cavalry and Hussars,
in a woody and mountainous Country.
A |
LTHOUGH all military operations of course present difficulties, and require deep consideration in the person whose conduct they are entrusted, there are still some more difficult than others, and where the least oversight, either in the disposition of the troops, or in the exactness of the evolutions, may be productive of an entire defeat.
An officer commanding a detachment obliged to retreat from before a superior enemy, ought to be more particularly possessed of that quickness of eye by which he will be enabled to turn the mistakes of the enemy to his own advantage, and to oppose art to number, as well as great coolness in judging of the dispositions proper to be taken to avoid being deceived; and a thorough knowledge of the country, to prevent his falling into places which may retard his march, or to be drawn into any ambuscades the enemy may have prepared for him. ...
C H A P. XVI.
The Retreat of a Detachment of Cavalry in an open Country
<pp. 144-153>
____________________________________________________________________________________
[155]
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BOOK THE SECOND.
VARIOUS operations from the opening to the closing of a campaign, it may be seen, that the whole is nothing more than a series of defence, and that the fear of being attacked is the real source from whence these precautions for attacking, spring. Why does a general endeavour to surprise his enemy, or penetrate into his counsels by means of spies? Why is he watchful to draw him into ambuscades, or desirous of surprising him in his camp; of taking his convoys, and of opposing detachment to detachment? Do not all these operations naturally suppose, that the general who attacks, mistrustful of the toils which are spread for him, seeks to discover, to destroy, and defend himself against them? Even in the day of battle, the greatest part of those soldiers who are most inured to service, think not of victory, till after having recollected that the enemy’s success must prove their own destruction.
[155]
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C H A P. I.
Of Spies.
It is impossible for a general, or even for any officer, charged with the command of a detachment, to act with certainty, if they have not spies or secret intelligence dispersed about in the enemy's army; they will have the mortification to see all their designs miscarry, and all their precautions will become useless, because they will be improperly taken. Strada, Turenne, and Vauban strongly recommend having them, whatever expence they may occasion: Vauban also adds, that a general had better be in want of many particulars, however necessary, than be destitute of spies. Nothing, says M. de Puységur, should be spared to procure them; and even the promises made to them should be observed with the most inviolable integrity.
M. de Feuquieres observes, that spies are of many sorts; they are to be found in the cabinets of princes, in the closets of ministers, amongst officers of the army, and in the councils of generals; in towns belonging to the enemy, and in monasteries: some offer of themselves, others are formed by the generals, or by the ministers; but the desire of gain is what chiefly encourages and tempts them to undertake this business. Besides the spies of the cabinet, there are again others who make it their business to go from one camp to another, and give an account of all the enemy's transactions. Care should be taken that they are unacquainted with each other, and particularly that they are not known to any general [156] or officer: they should be always spoken to alone, and never be suffered to meet each other. The general should study their character, and prove them by repeated trials; he should sound them by degrees, beginning with things not difficult to be explained, and which, if discovered, will not be of great consequence; he should engage them in long conversations, thereby to form a judgment of their parts and comprehension; and he should also employ them often in bringing him intelligence.
Although a general should always be upon his guard with a spy whom he hath cause to suspect of treachery, he may nevertheless draw great advantage from him, provided he knows how to deceive him properly; because he may be very certain he will inform the enemy of all the resolutions which have been taken.
The emperor Leo, in his Tactic, advises a general, who hath reason to imagine his counsels are betrayed to the enemy, to conceal his real designs, by speaking in a manner quite opposite to them; for, fays he, in the maxims at the end of his book, an enemy must be deceived; who receives intelligence from spies or deserters directly contrary to what is actually resolved upon; and should not the enemy give credit to their reports, he will of course neglect their intelligence, and then the general may take his precautions accordingly: but should the enemy repose confidence in them, he will be deceived, and consequently fall into the snare laid for him. But, adds he, should these spies be entrusted with the general’s real intention, he should, by some alteration in his operations, endeavour to persuade the enemy they have deceived him; upon which he will grow mistrustful of them, and be obliged to look out for others, no longer daring to confide in the former.
If a spy employed by the enemy is discovered, and brought to the [157] general, he ought to take him in private, question him with mildness, speak to him with a sort of confidence, and, instead of threatening, should promise him a reward, if he will discover to him what he knows of the enemy's intentions. If the general finds him intelligent, he should endeavour to engage him in his service; and, provided he can gain him over by force of money, a thing not difficult, he may derive great advantage from him; but he should be careful how he employs him, till he hath very good reason to be assured of his fidelity.
There are many different methods of trying the veracity of a spy; if, for example, the general receives information, that, on such a day, a detachment of the enemy is to set out on some expedition, he should then send out troops to double the number of those detached by the enemy; by which means, if the spy’s intelligence is true, the enemy will not only be baulked in his design, but may also be beat by the superior detachment: if the enemy's detachment has but a trifling object in view, it will be sufficient to send just troops sufficient to examine into the truth of the spy's report. The general may also pretend to appoint a foraging within two days, and order but few troops for the chain; in which interval, if the spy is false, he will find an opportunity of giving the enemy notice of it: but, instead of the few troops publickly ordered, the general will private1y add another body to them, which will be placed in ambuscade behind the place where the pretended forage is to be made. If the enemy, in consequence of this information, should come and attack the chain, it should immediately retire, as if too inferior in number to continue the forage, toward the troops in ambuscade; when, being joined, they will fall upon the enemy on all sides, who will certainly be surprised at seeing the troops which he attacked, so prodigious1y encreased, and attacking him in flank, front, and in rear: if this attack is made with vivacity and resolution, there may be great reason to expect it will terminate in a complete victory.
[158] If, on the, contrary, the spy does not appear intelligent, or affects stupidity, the general should punish him with death, and cause him to be hanged in the sight of the whole army, in order to deter others, which may be dispersed in the camp, by his fate. It would be needless to question him concerning the enemy, because it would appear inhumane to execute a man who had given intelligence of importance, whether extorted from him by fear, force, or perhaps a promise of pardon. Spies are as necessary to a general, as arms are to an army; but it is money only that can secure their fidelity; and if a general finds himself ill served, it is because he has been too sparing of the funds intended by his sovereign for that purpose. Notwithstanding it is the duty of a good subject to manage his master’s finances as much as it is in his power, yet there are intelligences of so great importance, that it is scarcely possible to pay sufficiently for them. A man is sufficiently indemnified when, by means of the intelligence he has received, he has concerted his measures in such a manner, as to beat the enemy, gained some marches over him, or to be beforehand with him in some enterprize.
The emperor Leo, in his Sentences, says, that spies should be resolute, industrious, and active. Spies thus qualified will be exact and true in their reports; but if they are trifling, vain, and timid, it is to be feared they will never be able to relate the truth.
Spies, when discovered, should not always be punished with death; great advantage may be made of them, by pretending ignorance of their real quality, especially if they are not sufficiently disguised. Tacitus, in his Annals, says, that Vitellius’s party got information of Otho’s designs by means of his spies, who, by endeavouring to dive too minutely into their enemy's secrets, did not sufficiently conceal their own.
Vigetius’s method for discovering spies, who are suspected to be [159] ranging about in a camp, is to order all the soldiers and servants into their tents during the day, and the spies will be taken immediately.
The general should be careful that the spies are unknown to each other. Those of Pausanias occasioned the death of that great captain, because Aristides, who shared the command with him, discovering by his spies the understanding between Xerxes and Pausanias, caused the throats of all those whom the traitor sent to him, to be cut, to prevent their contrivances being known at Sparta. Such practices deservedly meet such a fate; but it would be difficult for them now to meet encouragement, the generals and officers making part of the legislative power; but, nevertheless, spies having a knowledge of each other may occasion great inconveniences, that may be very prejudicial to the schemes of a general, or any particular officer. When spies are strangers to each other, a general is better served, and he can depend with greater security upon what they say, because, by being unknown to each other, he can try the fidelity of one, by comparing what he says with the reports of others; and if they all agree in the same story, their intelligence should be looked on as certain; whereas, if they know each other, they can with ease cook up a tale among themselves, and not vary in their relation: besides, a spy conscious of being known, always fearful of being sold, acts neither with confidence or resolution.
When a general is ignorant of the enemy’s designs, he should always affect a knowledge of them; but whenever he is informed of them, he should, on the contrary, pretend to be ignorant of them; by which means the enemy, being easy with regard to his spies, will not alter his designs, or suspect the general of having any knowledge of them.
If the general can procure such spies as, by their employment, are near the person of the enemy's general; as, for example, a secretary, or any others who are near him, and who consequently can give intelligence, [160] more to be relied upon than those who are constantly passing from one army to another; and as it is very often by means of there people of consequence that common spies gain their intelligence, their service may be turned to a very great account.
If a general discovers an enemy’s spy to be one of those who, by their employment, are near his person, he can receive great advantage by forcing him to write a letter of false intelligence, thereby to divert the enemy's attention from the plan he would execute; but he should cause him to be hanged immediately after, for it would be very imprudent to use him above once. The prince of Orange, when he came to attack M. Luxemburg at Steinkirk, having discovered one of his musicians, who gave the enemy intelligence of every thing he intended, made use of this stratagem; and although it was rendered abortive by the vigilance of M. de Luxemburg, and the courage of his troops, there are nevertheless but very few instances where it hath failed: and even M. de Luxemburg would have been beaten, if he had not had timely notice given him by his advanced detachments; by which means he had time sufficient to make his dispositions, and to avoid being surprised.
There is a stratagem which may be made use of when spies are wanting, and which is less expensive; that is, to send supposititious letters by the first peasant that comes in the way, who will have nothing to fear; and so far from concealing himself, he must take a road where he will be sure of falling into the enemy’s hands: these letters should be directed to the general officers commanding a body of troops, or even to the general of the army, supposing they come from an advanced body. They should contain schemes that are good, and practicable in their execution, but quite opposite to what is intended, and will really be undertaken: it often happens that the enemy, too credulous, abandons his original designs to pursue chimerical ones, which to him appear very good, and do [161] not present any obstacle to those which the general designs to execute. Prince Eugene succeeded, by this stratagem, in raising the siege of Coni, formed by the French in 1691.
But nevertheless a general should take care that, through a fear of being deceived by supposititious letters, he does not himself too much neglect the intimations which are given him: a general ought, says Onozander, to listen to every body at all times, and upon all occasions. Alexander, when at a great distance from his own country, not being able to receive his couriers till very late, refused to give attention to a peasant, who came to inform him of a shorter route; but soon repenting of what he had done, he sent to seek after him, but in vain.
The fame reason that should make a general always have spies in the enemy's army, should also make him suspect that the enemy has some in his; therefore he should endeavour to deceive them, he should keep his intentions secret, mention them to very few, and always talk openly, contrary to what is really designed. Onozander observes, that it shews great folly in a general to mention his designs publickly, especially when they are on the eve of execution; for deserters generally go over to the enemy, at the time an action is unavoidable.
But if it is discovered that the enemy has received information, Vigetius fays, that the dispositions must be immediately changed. Polybius, on like occasions, particularly recommends silence and dissimulation; he even stretches this rule as far as the thoughts themselves, which, he says must sometimes be repressed, for fear our actions should sometimes betray and discover them. Metellus answered one of his friends, who, on an important occasion, asked him the reason of certain dispositions, “that if his shirt knew what he thought, he would burn it.”
[162] To avoid the danger of treachery, sealed orders have been used with great success, which have been sent to officers, with express orders not to open them till at such a time, and at such a place: this is an established rule at sea, and can also be practised on shore, when employed in an expedition that it is essential to conceal from the enemy. In a word, it is as impossible to conceive stratagems sufficient to discover the designs of the enemy, as it is to use precautions enough to deceive his spies.
Montecuculli, in his Memoirs, collects together, in a few words, the rules which have been now lain down. Spies are engaged and kept, says he, by force of money, but often they are false: it is therefore proper for a general to make sure of them, by having their wives and children in his possession: if they propose any enterprize, it must neither be known to the others, nor even should they be able to guess among themselves at the time of executing it: prisoners, trumpets, deserters, as well from the enemy's army as his own, peasants, couriers, soldiers in disguise, and messengers, may all be employed as spies.
There will never be any want of there sort of people; but, in, order to engage their fidelity, they must be very well paid.
[163]
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C H A P. II.
Of Ambuscades.
A General who loses a battle, says Vigetius, may attribute his ill luck to fortune, although these kind of events are generally the effects of art and skill; but he who suffers himself to be surprised, and who falls into the snares laid for him by the enemy, has no excuse to make, because, by his vigilance, and the goodness of his spies, he might have avoided them.
A design should never be formed for an attack upon marches, detachments, convoys, forages, or upon one or many quarters, without knowing the ways which are to be passed, and the places where ambuscades may be formed; whether to avoid, or whether to conceal troops in them, in order to facilitate a retreat, or to draw the enemy into it. A general, who receives information from his spies that some enterprizes are intended upon some bodies, detached from the army, upon one of his convoys, on his forage, or upon his quarters, ought also, on his side, to form ambuscades in the ways leading to it. The number of troops in ambuscade ought to be regulated by that of the detachment intended to be surprised; it should be sufficiently strong to attack the enemy on all sides, that is, in head, flank, and rear. The troops who set out to form an ambuscade should always march by night, unless it be in a country so covered, that the enemy cannot perceive them. ...
[166] Foresight and activity are the first steps toward great actions; a general endowed with these qualities may accomplish all, or at least a great part of whatever he undertakes. The more difficult an enterprize appears, the more should a general try his genius, to find out such expedients as may do honour to the imagination of a great soldier. A general, with a genius and a liking for his business, will find resources on every occasion: want of strength will be supplied by art, and stratagem will prevail over stratagem.
There is no country but presents some place proper for forming ambuscades; hollows, a rotten place, from which it is easy to sally, the least height, woods, hedges, ruins, vineyards, sometimes corn-fields, marches covered with reeds, all present expedients to a general, who knows how to take advantage of them; he must only be careful to place the ambuscades after such a manner that they shall not be discovered by the enemy’s parties; and that they are not themselves discovered by the inattention of any of the soldiers, by noise or by other accidents, such as have been mentioned in the chapter of marches, relative to a march made with secrecy. It has there been shewn how highly dangerous it is to have dogs, by whose barking all may be discovered.
If the ambuscade consists of hussars and dragoons, the horses must not be together, their neighings may prove very prejudicial. Even a peasant, attracted by the barking of a dog, or the neighing of a horse, may go into a wood, discover an ambuscade, and, often induced by the hope of a reward, will go and give the enemy information of the whole. Every person passing near an ambuscade should be stopped, and that without noise; the peasants should be tied to trees, and guarded by sentries. If the ambuscade is formed in a hollow-way, behind an high ground, or in any places whatever, the general must cause every body that is taken to be tied together, and well guarded.
[167] ... The least thing, as has already been said, may be the occasion of an ambuscade’s being discovered. The fire of a pipe may be seen at a great distance in the night-time: besides, however small the number of soldiers [168] who smoke may be, the wind may carry the smoak, and the smell of tobacco toward that part where the enemy patroles. The ambuscade should not be cumbered with servants, or any thing else that is unnecessary; orders should be given that the horses are tied with care, and that a profound silence is observed by every body. As it is very difficult for hussars or dragoons to march, without leaving marks behind them, by which means the road leading to the ambuscade may be discovered, they should try to enter it by some bye-way, or at least by as dry a one as possible. In order to efface the marks of the horses feet, eight or ten hussars or dragoons may tie branches of trees to their horses tails, and, by marching behind the detachment, in as large a front as the whole body, will destroy any marks that are made: as soon as they shall have entered the wood, they will close up the entrance with the same branches, or which they will make a sort of hedge. ...
... Sentries should be concealed behind bushes, [169] in the front of the ambuscade, so that they may be able to see the country and ways about them, without being seen themselves: two or three soldiers should also be made to climb into trees, in order to see at a great distance, and give notice if they perceive any troops; the same method must be observed with regard to hussars or dragoons.
Before the commanding officer enters the wood where he would form his ambuscade, he should detach two or three patroles to scour it, for fear the enemy should happen to be there in ambuscade himself;...
If the ambuscade is behind an height, or small mountain, sentries must be placed on top, laying on their bellies, and without hats: in other respects the same dispositions ought to be observed, whether on the march, or for the conducting of ambuscades, always paying a proper regard to circumstances, and the situation of the country.
There are divers methods of drawing the enemy into ambuscades. The general commanding the army or quarters sends out a detachment under the command of an intelligent officer, to form an ambuscade, at the distance of one or two leagues, more or less, according as the country is fitting for those sort of dispositions, or according to the distance of the [170] enemy. The general must acquaint this officer that two hours after he is set out, he will send out another detachment, of less force, with orders to go on the side where the enemy is, to endeavour to meet him, and at first sight to make a feint of charging him; but, as if finding him too strong, he will begin his retreat, directing it toward the place where the troops are in ambuscade: furnished with these instructions he will set out.
Then the general will send for the officer intended to command the detachment that is to go in search of the enemy, and inform him of that which is set out to form the ambuscade, and of the place where it is; he will order him to advance as near to the enemy as he can, and to draw him by a feigned retreat upon the troops in ambuscade.
The two officers should be the only persons informed of the design: but nevertheless the commandant of the detachment which is to go towards the enemy, may communicate it to the principal officers under his command; so that in case he should be taken or killed in the retreat, he that succeeds in the command may be able to act according to the general’s intentions. He must be particularly careful, that no soldier, trooper, hussar, or dragoon, penetrates into the design of the detachment, as it would then be in the power of a single deserter to make the ambuscade miscarry. ...
[173] ... An ambuscade that is successful, may cause the destruction of a whole army. The example cited by M. de Feuquieres, in his Memoirs; on that head, is striking. M. de Luxemburg, still attached to the prince, took all the baggage belonging to M. Turenne’s army, because the lieutenant-general who commanded the escort did not foresee that the enemy, shut up in his lines of circumvallation before Arras, having two armies near his camp with a design of attacking him in his lines, could think of sending out a large detachment of cavalry on an enterprize of such a sort. In the mean time M. Luxemburg, who was in ambuscade, within reach of the column of baggage, seeing that the lieutenant-general was gone on before with the head of the escort, imagining the baggage in security, marched speedily to the head of that column, whose march he stopped, and turned toward St. Pol, where he conducted the whole baggage belonging to M. Turenne’s army, without his knowing any thing of the matter. It is thus that, by the negligence of an officer, and by an ambuscade seasonably placed, an army finds itself stripped of all its baggage, and, as may be said, not in a condition of continuing the campaign.
If this lieutenant-general had been provided with spies, detachments in front and on the flanks, these detachments would have discovered the ambuscades, and, by the precautions usual on such occasions, he would have placed the baggage of the army in safety. Again, his spies would have given him notice, that a large body of cavalry was detached from the camp before Arras, consequently he would have been upon his guard; [174] instead of which, being full of a false confidence, he marched as if in a champaign country, and, by this unpardonable remissness, occasioned the loss of the whole baggage. ...
[175]
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C H A P. III.
Of the Attack of an Army on its March.
HOWEVER difficult certain operations in war may appear, they are nevertheless not impracticable, when a general knows how to take the necessary precautions for softening those difficulties. The attack of an army on its march seems to be above all reach of attempting; whereas the success of such an attempt depends only upon knowing how to take proper measures, on choosing the ground, and of seizing a favourable opportunity. It seems more difficult to surprise an army on its march, than to attack it openly: the number of the enemy’s troops; the precautions which their general shall have taken, the order, the care, the secrecy which must be observed, present obstacles almost insurmountable; but yet, by taking the bye-roads, by concealing his march from the enemy, a general may attack him in force in the rear or upon the flank, at the same time that he causes his advanced guard to be attacked by some infantry, cavalry, and even cannon, to make him the less suspicious that the attack upon the flank is the real one.
When an army would attack another upon its march, it should endeavour to be beforehand with it, and, by the means of stolen marches, come up with it, before it can know any thing of the matter: some parties should be detached, who must place themselves in ambuscade, in order to stop all the comers and goers; so that the march and designs of the army may be kept secret from the enemy.
C H A P. IV
Of the Attack of intrenched Camps
<pp. 183-191>
C H A P. V
Of the Attack of a Convoy
<pp. 192-199>
C H A P. VI
Of the Attack of green and dry Forage
<pp. 200-206>
C H A P. VII
Attack of a Detachment of Infantry and Dragoons
in an open Country divided by Rivers
<pp. 207-211>
C H A P. VIII
Attack of a Detachment of Infantry and Hussars,
in a mountainous Country
<pp. 212-216>
C H A P. IX
Of the Attack of a Detachment of Cavalry in an open Country
<pp. 217-221>
C H A P. X
Of the Passage of Rivers
<pp. 222-260>
C H A P. XI
Of Battles
<pp. 261-303>
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[VOLUME II]
______________________________________________________________________________
BOOK THE THIRD.
CHAP. I.
Of the Distribution of the Quarters and Cantonments of an Army.
<pp. 4-12>
CHAP. II.
In what the Security of the Quarters consists.
<pp. 13-20>
CHAP. III.
Of the Vigilance necessary to be observed by every commanding officer in his Quarter,
or Cantonment.
<pp. 20-23>
CHAP. IV.
Of the particular Place of Arms for every Quarter.
<pp. 23-25>\
CHAP. V.
Of the General Place of Arms for many Quarters.
<pp. 26-28>
CHAP. VI.
Of Guards of Horse and Vedets.
<pp. 29-35>
CHAP. VII.
Of advanced Detachments to secure the Quarters, or the Cantonments,
and the Roads leading to them.
<pp. 35-38>
CHAP. VIII.
Of the Distance to which Detachments may advance.
<pp. 39-41>
CHAP. IX.
Of what is necessary to be done in Case of false Alarms.
<pp. 41-43>
CHAP. X.
After what manner the Detachments and Guards of Horse belonging to a Quarter should be conducted; what Method they should take, when obliged to give way, to prevent the Enemy entering the Quarter with them.
<pp. 44-47>
CHAP. XI.
Of the Precautions to be taken by an Officer on his Arrival at a Quarter
in the Night-time that the Troops are unacquainted with.
<pp. 48-53>
CHAP. XII.
Of the Precautions to be taken by a Commander, when obliged to establish his Quarters
in a woody and mountainous Country.
<pp. 53-56>
CHAP. XIII.
Of the Precautions to be taken for securing the Quarters of Cavalry,
in a plain and open Country.
<pp. 56-58>
______________________________________________________________________________
BOOK THE FOURTH.
CHAP. I.
Of Precautions for the Attack of one or more Quarters.
<pp. 59-69>
CHAP. II.
Of the Attack of one, or many Quarters, when the Enemy has arrived in the Night, and is fatigued also by a long March.
<pp. 70-73>
CHAP. III.
The Manner of retreating after taking one or more Quarters.
<pp. 73-78>
CHAP. IV.
The Attack of a Quarter found under Arms,
and Retreat of the Troops who have not been able to force it.
<pp. 78-82>
CHAP. V.
Of the Attack of the Quarters of an Army.
<pp. 82-89>
CHAP. VI.
Of the Retreat of an Army after an unsuccessful Attack
upon the Enemy’s Quarters.
<pp. 89-97>
A PRINCIPLE
On which the Plan of a Campaign may be established.
<pp. 98-107>
______________________________________________________________________________
[109]
BOOK THE FIFTH.
|
C H A P. I.
The Necessity of having Hussars and Light Troops.
EXPERIENCE has shown, during the last wars, how useful hussars and light troops are to an army. Foreign powers have been so well convinced of the necessity of them, that the house of Austria, which at the beginning of the year 1733, had not at most three or four regiments of hussars, maintained in the last war twelve regiments, each consisting of twelve hundred men. France, which in the beginning of that campaign, had no more than two regiments, very soon found it necessary to form a third, and also raised a fourth, in the beginning of the last war, exclusive of four or five other regiments of light troops, both horse and foot. The king of Prussia hath formed eight regiments, of a thousand men each. The emperor Charles of Bavaria, two, [110] the Dutch one, besides some regiments of light troops and free companies: and the cavalry of Spain, so famed for speed and activity, was thought deficient without light horse, a regiment of which was accordingly raised, and not reduced till the peace in 1748.
It hath been to these troops, that the most warlike people have often been indebted for success; they rush into the midst of the enemy, and are in a manner sheltered from danger by their lightness and dexterity, while they serve to protect the army to which they belong; they discover the enemy’s motions, render his ambuscades useless, and also form ambuscades themselves. M. de Montesquieu observes, that the Romans, in the time of the second Punic war, would have been greatly distressed, had it not been for some entire bodies of Numidian cavalry, which came over to their aid, both in Sicily and Italy.
The first light troops mentioned in history were those formed by the Numidians. ...
The Numidians were not the only people accustomed to this method of war: the Parthians, originally sprung from the Scythians, fought much after the same manner, their cavalry were admirable, and rather besieged any army than fought it. ... [112] ...
The Huns, who according to many authors, were also descended from the Parthians, were admirable archers; in the many incursions and invasions which those barbarians made all over Europe, they proved more destructive than any regular troops whatever.
It is probable that the Hungarians, who according to many opinions, are the same people with the Huns, still retained the manner of fighting, practised by their ancestors, till they came, under the command of Attila, to settle themselves in Italy. In effect, the best light troops of the present times are those formed by the Hungarians; the services they performed in the last wars, are yet fresh in most memories, and it is on their plan, that princes formed other light troops, which at first were only useful, but are now become absolutely necessary
A general cannot make use of too many methods for receiving intelligence, or send out more detachments than are necessary, to examine the ground, and discover places capable of containing ambuscades; both which duties would be too fatiguing for either infantry or cavalry: parties of light horse, therefore, should be employed upon those services, which are familiar to them, and to which they have been for a long time accustomed; their horses also inured to fatigue, and not to be disheartened, will save the other part of the army many painful and fatiguing labours. Having shewn how necessary light horse are to an army, it will be proper to mention the occasions where they become useful, and after what manner they should be employed.
[113]
|
C H A P. II.
Of the Service, in which a General should employ Light Horse
during a Campaign.
THE necessity for light troops being once established, it is necessary to determine after what manner they may be employed to advantage. It hath been already seen, in many parts of this work, how useful these troops are for scouring outlets, forming advanced detachments, clearing of marches, covering the foraging parties, and on almost every other occasion.
The duty of light horse is directly what may be termed skirmishing; because they should be continually scouring about in detachments, and should always be so near the enemy, as to observe his motions, and prevent his attacking the army unawares, or turning it, in order to fall upon the convoys: they should be always in the front of the chain, on foraging days, to secure it from insult, and to enable the troops to carry off the forage unmolested; they should also be always near the enemy’s army, that he may not detach any troops, but what their general shall receive intelligence of; they should also expeditiously and exactly report to him whatever new motions they perceive among the enemy, to prevent any designs being formed against the army, or at least to render them abortive. Such is the duty of light horse, and with which the officer to whom they are entrusted, should be thoroughly acquainted. Thus, if they form a large body, they will be posted in greater or lesser parties, in the front or upon the flanks, according to circumstances, in proportion as the enemy is near, or at a distance, or as the body of light horse is more or less considerable.
[114] Altho’ it is necessary that these detachments should be continually in the neighbourhood of the enemy’s camp they should not be very numerous, because the stronger they are, the more liable they are to be discovered; ...
The general commanding this advanced body of light horse should, if possible, receive daily information from the detachments in front of what they have seen and done; which, if any way consequential, he should communicate to the commander in chief of the army.
The escorts belonging to convoys should never be suffered to march without light horse; for, as has been already observed, these escorts should always have parties both in front and flank, to examine the country, scour the woods, villages, hollows, and every place capable of concealing troops. Although these troops are indisputably more calculated for this patroling duty than cavalry, they can also retreat with more readiness, and are consequently a speedier means of conveying intelligence. ...
[115] ... It is not to be understood here that cavalry cannot sometimes carry on war without the assistance of light horse, or that they are deficient either in order, bravery, or discipline: but experience proves cavalry to be always more secure, when furnished with light horse, who clear their march and give intelligence of the enemy’s motions, the route he keeps, and whatever else they have discovered; they also give time for the cavalry to make their dispositions, in order to give the enemy a proper reception; instead of which, if cavalry is destitute of intelligence, the enemy light horse can fall upon, and surprise it, whenever they think proper. What officer could, in this situation, undertake to reconduct the detachment in safety back to the camp.
The light horse are more accustomed than any other troops to scouring a country; ...
[116] ... It is certain that if the enemy is destitute of light horse, a general may very soon make himself master of his country with troops of that nature; provided he knows how to employ them to advantage. ... His forages and convoys will be attacked, his marches foreseen, and every thing passing on the outside of his camp will be discovered, neither will any one be able to come out of it in safety; his detachments will be continually exposed or beaten, as the general to whom the light horse belong, [117] will be always informed of the time of their setting out, by which means the enemy may be prevented from making any attempts, as he will be always apprehensive of falling into ambuscades.
A general who hath light horse in his army, is not liable to be stopped or embarrassed, neither will he have reason to fear the enemy’s having got the start of him in a march, or that he hath been beforehand with him in taking possession of a post. The enemy, who is supposed to have none, or but few light horse, can receive intelligence from his spies only, who will be unable to gather information till the army is in motion, that is to say, at the time it ought to act; at which time, could the cavalry and dragoons perform the same service as the light horse, it would fatigue and render them unable to do what would be expected from them when the action became general. It is therefore impossible for a general to be too careful in providing a sufficient number of troops, thus necessary, and to place over them officers capable of conducting them, and preserving a spirit amongst them equal to the purposes for which they were instituted.
The utility of light troops hath been at all times acknowledged. ...
[118]
C H A P. III.
On the Conduct to be pursued by a General commanding
an advanced Body of Light Horse; and of advanced Detachments.
... A general who commands an advanced body, should never leave his camp without very essential reasons; such as, for example, when he has received intelligence of consequence which he should communicate to the general, and which he cannot explain sufficiently by letter, or whenever the general orders him to come to him; on these occasions, he must leave the camp after having acquainted the next in command with it; but the brigadiers, colonels, and other officers, should never leave it without his permission. Discipline and order, so essential to all bodies, seem more particularly so, to those which are advanced, because they are generally more exposed; and the officer entrusted with the command of them cannot be too attentive to their security. He should post advanced detachments, who must give him daily information of the enemy’s motions, and he should also examine into the reports made to him; it being necessary for the security of the camp that he should employ every possible means for arriving at the truth.
By way of example, let four brigades of light horse be supposed more or less in advance of the army, according to the situation of the country, the ground to be covered, or the distance of the enemy: before this [120] camp is fixed, it will be necessary to know the enemy’s position, his advanced posts, and the detached camps which he may have formed, as well as the passes by which he can come and attack, or turn the army, in order to annoy the convoys daily coming to it. The camp should not be fixed till these particulars are collected; and the general commanding the advanced body should receive information, by means of spies and detachments, of every movement made by the enemy, He should also be careful, that, through a desire of covering the army, he does not advance so far as to expose himself to the danger of being attacked and taken; for although he may be covered by advanced detachments, it may nevertheless happen, that the enemy’s round-about ways and unknown roads may have escaped their search, and may fall upon the advanced body when least expected; and that, being at so great a distance from the army, it will be very difficult to preserve the communication, and retreat to it. In order, therefore, to avoid these inconveniencies, when circumstances require this body to be very much in advance, the commanding officer should at sunset cause the piquets to mount, and post them in the most exposed parts, and by which it is most probable the enemy would march. The piquets should send patroles into the front, during the night, who will stop from time to time to find whether there is any thing stirring during the night; also the guards should remain at the posts assigned them, and be very attentive. The general commanding the advanced body should be particularly careful to secure his communication with the army. ....
[121] ... The general commanding the advanced body should every day go round the camp, and visit every post, of which he should avoid having too great a number, in order that the troops which are in the camp should not be too much fatigued; the troops on duty being generally sufficient to secure it, without posting unnecessary guards. As it is always necessary to have a proper number of fresh troops to replace those who return from detachment, the strength and the number of detachments sent out to examine the country, should be both fixed. Those sent out to gain intelligence concerning the enemy, to learn whether he hath decamped, whether he hath built an bridges, and other things of the same nature, of which the general must necessarily be informed, should have a day fixed for their return. There are other detachments, which should be sent out under the command of intelligent officers, and which should never lose sight of the enemy, in order to send in daily intelligence, to attack small convoys and baggage, to pick up marauders, and to harrass the advanced guards: there should be no time fixed for the return of these detachments, neither should they be confined to particular places; they should, notwithstanding, return to the camp at the expiration of eight or ten days at farthest. The inconvenience arising from confining these detachments to a particular time would perhaps [122] be, that the very day appointed for their return would be that, on which they might have the fairest opportunity of learning intelligence of the enemy; and therefore being forced to return, their having been sent out will answer no purpose. ...
C H A P. IV.
The Manner of employing Light Horse on a day of Battle.
<pp. 125-130>
C H A P. V.
Of the Service light Infantry should be employed in, during a Campaign,
and where they should be posted in a general Engagement.
<pp. 130-138>
|
The End of the Fifth and Last Book.
[FINIS]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Captain James Anderson]
E S S A Y
ON THE
A R T O F W A R:
IN WHICH
The GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF
All the Operations of WAR in the FIELD
Are fully Explained.
The Whole
Collected from the Opinions of the best Authors.
LONDON:
Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand.
M.DCC.LXI.
Transcription © 2008
John Kenneth Rowland
___________________________________________________________________________
Of Honour.
___________________________________________________________________________
Of Valour. ___________________________________________________________________________
Of War.
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the Art of War.
___________________________________________________________________________
Of Levying Troops.
___________________________________________________________________________
[21]
|
Of the Qualities of an Officer.
ALMOST every Parent breeds up his Children in a Profession according to his own Caprice, without the least Attention to whether Nature has given the Child the Talents necessary for the Profession or not. Professions, merely mechanical, it is true, may be acquired by Application and Exercise; but there are others which require Sense, Parts, Judgment, and Courage; and, to succeed in Arts or Sciences, it is necessary that Nature has given the Children certain Talents, which Parents ought to consult, before they destine them to any particular Profession. But now-a-days they chuse Employments for them at Random, and, without examining their natural Bent and Inclination, often chuse for them those which neither suit their Character nor Constitution: From hence it comes, that we see one, a Churchman, who would have made an excellent Captain of Dragoons; and another serving in the Army, who was born for Tranquility and Retirement. There are plain honest Men, who think ill enough of the Army to believe, that those are only fit for it who are good for nothing else: This Child, say they, is fit for nothing; he’s a Drunkard, a Debauchee, or a lazy indolent Fellow; what can I do with him? Why make him an Officer. This is really doing little Honour to the military State. But let the World judge from what we are going to say, how much these honest weak Men are mistaken.
[23] ... The Study of Languages is most useful to an Officer, and he feels the Necessity of it in Proportion as he rises to high Employments. We take it for granted, that a young Man, who has received a tolerable Education, has a Tincture of Latin; but as all the World do not speak Latin, and that he will often be obliged, in Point of Duty, to question Prisoners, Spies, Peasants, and others who are ignorant of that Language; it is fit he learn the Language of the People who inhabit the Frontiers where War is commonly made: Thus the German and French Languages are very necessary for an English Officer, as the French and Italian are for a German; in short, the English, Italian, German and French, are Languages very interesting for every Officer.
Many People may think this is requiring too much, and that it is very difficult for one Man to acquire so much Knowledge; we confess, were he to possess every Branch in Perfection, the Life of a Man would scarce suffice to be perfect in them; but it is necessary for an Officer to have a general Notion of the whole: Practice, and the Reflections he will make in Time of War on the Necessity of applying them, will insensibly perfect the first Knowledge he has acquired, especially if he has the noble Ambition of being willing to distinguish and raise himself by his Knowledge. ...
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the General of an Army.
THE General of an Army is the Officer in Chief, to whom the Prince has judged proper to intrust the Command of his Troops; and this whether he is known by the Name of Captain General, as in England and Spain, Feldt Mareschal as in Germany, or Mareschal as in France.
The natural qualities of the General of an Army, ought to be a martial Genius, a solid Judgment, a healthy robust Constitution, Intrepidity and Presence of Mind on critical Occasions, Indefatigability in Business, Goodness of Heart, Liberality, Birth, the more illustrious it is, the more it commands Respect; a reasonable Age; if too, young, he may want Experience and Prudence; if too old, he may not have Vivacity enough; an uniform Conduct, an affable Humour, but inflexible in maintaining the Police and Discipline of the Army.
The acquired Qualities of a General are, Secrecy, Justice, Sobriety, Temperance, Knowlege of the Art of War from Theory and Practice, the Art of commanding, and speaking with Precision and Exactness, great Attention to preserve the Lives [30] and supply the Wants of the Soldiers, and a constant Study of the Characters of the Officers of his Army, that he may employ them according to their Talents. He must in Person, exposing himself as little as Possible, reconnoitre the Position of the Enemy’s Army, the interesting Posts which he would attack, an advantageous Camp which he would occupy, and the Nature of the Country, that he may regulate critical Marches, or cover Foragers or Convoys. The exact Knowlege of the Situation of Places, of the Passes and Roads in and out of a Country, is essential for the General of an Army. “It is that Knowledge, says Machiavel in his Prince, that teaches him properly to conduct his Army, to encamp them, to surprize the Enemy, and give Battle with Advantage.” Philopemen, Prince of Achaia, is praised by all the Greek Historians, because, in Time of Peace, his Thoughts were always on War: Travelling with his Friends, he would often stop and confider the Ground, and then ask them, If the Enemy were on that Hill, and we here, who would have the Advantage? How should we properly march to them, and attack them in Form? If we were to retire, how ought we to do it? If they retire, how ought we to pursue them? And they having given their Opinion, gave his, with his Reasons for it: So that, when employed in War, he never met with any thing new.
The General of an Army should have no other Passion, but to render himself useful to his Master; he should despise Flatterers, and listen to those who speak Truth; it is more necessary that he should be loved than feared; and he never should forget that he is placed as an Example to his Army. ...
A General should spare no Trouble or Expence to be well informed of every Thing that passes with the Enemy, either by Means of Parties, or of Spies whom he should pay well, if he would be well served: Nothing is more absolutely necessary or more useful than Spies, whom Strada, with Reason, calls the Eyes and Ears of Princes: We see in the Scripture, that God himself commanded Moses to send out Spies to the Land of Promise, and all the Instructions a General can possibly give to the Spies [32] he employs, are to be found in the thirteenth Chapter of Numbers. ...
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the Lieutenant-general.
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the Major-general.
___________________________________________________________________________
|
Of the Staff of the Army.
THE Staff properly exits only in Time of War. The Quarter-Master General may be reckoned the first Person belonging to it. He works with the General on whatever regards the Marches of the Army; and, the Evening before they are to move, he gives to each General Officer, who is to conduct a Column, a Copy of what regards him, and to the General Officers of the Day a Copy of the whole Order of that Day, that they [37] may know how to cause every thing to be executed which is ordered by the General. He also keeps a Roll of the General Officers, and makes them be advertised when there is any thing new, which regards their Tour to march. He marches to the new Camp with the Major-General of the Day, and distributes the Ground which the Major-General has marked out to be occupied by the Army; he makes the Fourier mark the Head-Quarters, and the Quarters of the other General Officers; he visits the Avenues of the Camp, reconnoitres the Country round about, and makes the Inhabitants give him exact Information; and, on the Report he makes the General, he receives his Orders for regulating the Marches of the Army, in the Manner the General intends they should be executed. It is he who delivers to each of the General Officers a Copy of the Order of Battle; and he signs and distributes all the Orders for Foraging, and commonly reconnoitres the Quarters where the Army can forage. In short, though he has no direct Authority over the Troops, as he is continually with the General, whore Orders almost always pass through his Hand, and as he necessarily possesses the Secret of the Movements of the Army, this Employment gives very great Consideration to him who exercises it, and requires an intelligent Officer, well versed in the great Parts of War: He has commonly three or four Assistants, to ease him in his Functions, and they are commonly gratified, at the End of some Campaigns, with a Colonel’s Rank. The Quarter-Master General, in a Day of Action, stays close by the General, and on every other Day he goes to receive the Parole from the Major-General of the Day; but, when necessarily employed, he sends one of his Assistants to receive the Parole, and fetch it to him.
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the Commandants of Artillery, and Engineers.
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the Aides-de-Camp.
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the Composition of Troops.
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the Duty of Particular Officers
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the Exercise of Troops
___________________________________________________________________________
Of Discipline and Punishments
___________________________________________________________________________
Of Rewards
___________________________________________________________________________
Of the Greek and Roman Militia
___________________________________________________________________________
The Greek and Roman Arms and Orders of Battle,
compared from Polybius
___________________________________________________________________________
The Legion recommended by Mareschal Saxe
___________________________________________________________________________
|
[161]
Of Plans of War.
THE most sublime Part of the Art Military, says the Mareschal Puyssegur, is to know how to form the Plan of a War. From this [162] general Plan, results particular Plans of Operations, relative to the different Countries where we would sustain or carry on the War. It is true, few arrive at the great Knowledge necessary to form the general Plan of War; but it is also true, that it is not necessary that every one should arrive at it: It is however absolutely necessary, that all those should possess this Knowledge, who wish to rise to the first Military Ranks.
However great Alexander is represented to us in his Battles, where he seems to do the Whole himself, he appears to me still much greater, says the Mareschal, in his general Plan for the Conquest of Asia, which he carried through and sustained in that Country, with the greatest Conduct, Knowledge, and Prudence.
Gaining a Battle does not depend entirely on the Chief; he can only contribute to it in Part: But to form the general Plan of a War properly, carry it through, and execute it well, the Honour is entirely due to him who commands, and who planned it. ...
___________________________________________________________________________
[174]
Of the different Kinds of War
|
THERE are five different Kinds of War, each of which is to be conducted differently the one from the other: The Offensive; the Defensive; that between equal Powers; the Auxiliary, which is carried on out of our own Territories to succour a Prince our Ally, or to assist a weaker whom a more powerful Prince has attacked; and the Civil War. ...
___________________________________________________________________________
|
[187]
Of the Particulars or Detail of an Army
THE Plan of the War being determined, and communicated to the General intrusted with
the Command of the Army, the Number of Battalions and Squadrons he is to have under his Command is determined relatively to the Kind of War he is to carry on, and the Nature of the Country where he is to act. ...
[188] <Commissary-General>
[190] <Captain of Guides>
The next Person is the Captain of the Guides, who must have Intelligence, and a perfect Knowledge of the Country. He is always lodged near the Quarter-Master General of the Army, to whom he is subordinate. He provides himself with Guides, and those who know the Country, and furnishes them not only to the General Officers charged with any Expedition, but to particular Officers sent on any Command, or to Skirmishing Parties, as well as to Escorts and Convoys. His Judgment will lead him to chuse fit People of the Country round where the Army is, and have them always ready when wanted. He accompanies the Quarter-Master General, when he goes to prepare or reconnoitre the Routs for the March, and distributes the proper Guides to each Column. Frequent Conversations with the Peasants whom he has taken for Guides, serve him to acquire a perfect Knowledge of the Country through which the Army is to march, and from this Knowledge particular Dispositions may be formed for the March. If he is a Man of Penetration and Capacity, he will, in his frequent Conversations with his Guides, try to discover those who have Dexterity and Capacity for the dangerous Employment of a Spy; but this must be done with great Circumspection, and by talking with them separately and secretly, that the one Guide may never know the other is employed in this Way; that when these Guides are become useless and dismissed to make Way for others of another Part of the Country, [191] the first may not be able to inform against those of their Companions employed as Spies. He must always be ready to furnish Guides, either on Foot or on Horseback, as they are required of him, and Horses are kept for this Purpose, or prest in the Neighbourhood of his Camp. As often as the General goes to reconnoitre, the Captain accompanies him, with such of the Guides as know that Side of the Country where he goes, that the General maybe exactly informed of whatever he wants to know.
<Waggon-Master General>
<Fourier of the Army>
<Cavalry>
<General Officers>
<Ammunition>
<Artillery>
<Subsistence>
<Forage>
<Water>
<Straw>
<Wood>
<Bread>
<Butcher’s Meat>
<Wine, Brandy, Beer>
<Military Chest>
<Hospitals>
<Baggage>
[199] <Waggons for Artillery and Provisions>
<Guides>
Guides ought to be well fed and paid. The Captain of the Guides ought to be allowed a competent Number of Horses to mount his Guides, when it is necessary to send them out on Horseback. They ought to be guarded, especially after they have been interrogated with regard to their Knowledge of any particular Part of the Country where you have not yet penetrated, that they may not have it in their Power to give Intelligence of what has been asked them.
These Guides ought to be renewed, according as you advance into the Enemy’s Country. Each Column in the March ought to have at least one Guide at its Head, who must be guarded, that he may not escape, especially in Night Marches, and leave you where you do not know your Way. It is necessary in these Cases to have two Guides in case of Accidents, and have them guarded, and [200] march them separately. If you expect to meet the Enemy, it is necessary even to bind the Guides, as it is natural to suppose the Fear of Danger will force them to try every Means to escape.
<Secret Expenses>
Secret Expences, properly applied, are of the utmost Importance, and every Sovereign, well instructed in the Use of them, will leave the General absolutely Master, to carry them as high as the thinks proper. These Expences commonly regard Spies, as well as every other Particular which contributes to the Advancement of Affairs, and Good of the Service. And surely, the Prince will never approve of a General, who, from a wrong-headed Œconomy, has neglected the Means of procuring certain Advantages, or has exposed the Troops, fearing to make too great an Expence, in order to be instructed of every thing which passes in the Enemy’s Army.
<Safe-Guard>
<Passports>
<Contributions of Subsistence, Money, &c.>
[207] <Secret Correspondence>
Secret Correspondence is carried on either by Cyphers, or certain Compositions used in place of Ink. One of the best of these Compositions is made of distilled Vinegar, in which is boiled Silver Litharge, about an Ounce of Litharge to an English Pint of Vinegar. When settled, decant off the Vinegar from the Grounds, and it is clear as Rock Water. This may be made Use of to write between the Lines of a Letter on any different Subject, on Paper which serves to wrap up any thing, on the blank Leaves which are commonly at the Beginning or End of Books, or on the Margins of the Leaves of a Book. When dry, it is not possible to perceive the least Impression of the Characters traced with this Liquor. In order to make them appear, you must make Use of Water, in which has been dissolved quick Lime mixed with Orpiment. This Water, when decanted, is as clear as the other. The Way [208] to use it, is to rub it gently on a Leaf of clean Paper, which you apply to what has been wrote with the first Composition. This second Composition is so penetrating, that when applied to the Writing, if you fix several Leaves of Paper above it, the Writing will immediately distinctly appear through the Whole: Even a Leaf of Paper wet with this Composition, and applied to the Boards of the Book, on the Leaves of which the Writing is, it will appear through the Boards; so strong is the Effect of the second Water. These two Compositions, especially the second, must be kept in Bottles carefully cooked, that it may not evaporate, and it is necessary to renew it as often as you can perceive it grows weak: The Writing should be neat and proper, free from Blots, nor must the Leaf be turned, or rubbed with your Hands, till the Writing is perfectly Dry.
Another Way is, to have a Table made like that here annexed, composed of the ordinary Letters of the Alphabet, arranged in a certain Manner. The Use of it for Writing in Cypher is excellent, and not be decyphered even by those who know how to use it; because the Key to this Table, either for writing the Letter or decyphering it, consists in a certain private Word, agreed on betwixt the two Persons in Correspondence, without the Knowledge of which Word it is impossible either to write or decypher the Writing. You must however have agreed with him with whom you correspond, whether, when you have begun the first Letter of the Word agreed on, you are to continue to follow all the rest, to the last of that Word; or when you have wrote one Word of the Letter, you are to begin again at the first Letter of the Word agreed on.
For Example: If I want to write these Words: Be on your Guard, the Enemy march to attack you. I put on Paper the Words I intend to write, and [209] on the Side I write the Watch-word agreed on: Let us suppose this Watch-word to be Constantinople: Having already agreed, which is essential, that having once begun the first Letter of this Word Constantinople, I continue the Letters to the End of the Word: Having then my Table before me, looking at it I say, what does C, the first Letter of the Word Constantinople, give to B, the first Letter of the Word Be, I look to the first Column of my Table for the capital letter C, and the Square opposite to it where is a b, and below it I find n; so I place n in the Letter I intend to send: Then I say, what does O, the second Letter of the Word Constantinople, give to e, the second Letter of the Word Be? and I seek, opposite to the capital Letter O of the first Column, for the Letter e, and I find under it y, which I write at the Side of the n, the first Letter I have wrote, as you see on the Table here annexed. I then look for the capital Letter N, being the third of the Word Constantinople, and see what it gives to o being the first Letter of the Word on, and I find it below the Letter b, which I place in my Letter, because I can take indifferently the Squares above or below, that are shut in by two Lines, and separated only by Points. I then look what S, the fourth Letter of the Word Constantinople, gives to the Letter n, the second Letter of the Word on, and I find I, which I place <no para>
| A B
| a .. .. n | b .. .. o | c .. .. p | d .. .. q | e .. .. r | f .. .. s | g .. .. t | h .. .. u | i .. .. w | k .. .. x | l .. .. y | m .. .. z |
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
C D
| a .. .. z | b .. .. n | c .. .. o | d .. .. p | e .. .. q | f .. .. r | g .. .. s | h .. .. t | i .. .. u | k .. .. w | l .. .. x | m .. .. y |
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| E F
| a .. .. y | b .. .. z | c .. .. n | d .. .. o | e .. .. p | f .. .. q | g .. .. r | h .. .. s | i .. .. t | k .. .. u | l .. .. w | m .. .. x |
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| G H
| a .. .. x | b .. .. y | c .. .. z | d .. .. n | e .. .. o | f .. .. p | g .. .. q | h .. .. r | i .. .. s | k .. .. t | l .. .. u | m .. .. w | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| I K
| a .. .. w | b .. .. x | c .. .. y | d .. .. z | e .. .. n | f .. .. o | g .. .. p | h .. .. q | i .. .. r | k .. .. s | l .. .. t | m .. .. u | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| L M
| a .. .. u | b .. .. w | c .. .. x | d .. .. y | e .. .. z | f .. .. n | g .. .. o | h .. .. p | i .. .. q | k .. .. r | l .. .. s | m .. .. t | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| N O
| a .. .. t | b .. .. u | c .. .. w | d .. .. x | e .. .. y | f .. .. z | g .. .. n | h .. .. o | i .. .. p | k .. .. q | l .. .. r | m .. .. s | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| P Q
| a .. .. s | b .. .. t | c .. .. u | d .. .. w | e .. .. x | f .. .. y | g .. .. z | h .. .. n | i .. .. o | k .. .. p | l .. .. q | m .. .. r | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| R S
| a .. .. r | b .. .. s | c .. .. t | d .. .. u | e .. .. w | f .. .. x | g .. .. y | h .. .. z | i .. .. n | k .. .. o | l .. .. p | m .. .. q | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| T U
| a .. .. q | b .. .. r | c .. .. s | d .. .. t | e .. .. u | f .. .. w | g .. .. x | h .. .. y | i .. .. z | k .. .. n | l .. .. o | m .. .. p | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| W X
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To face Page 209
C O N S T A N T I N O P L E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Be on your guard, the enemy march to attack you. ny hi hbbb pbtmy, ity yiuze pwlwn md zaarsx elm.
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C O N S T A N T I N O P L E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 ny hi hbbb pbtmy, ity yiuze pwlwn md zaarsx elm. Be on your guard, the enemy march to attack you.
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next to h, and so on all the rest of the Letters and Words; taking Care only to separate the Words by a Point, a Comma, or placing them at the ordinary Distance, as we have agreed or judged proper. But however it is, when the whole Letters of the Word Constantinople are done, which happens here at the second Letter of the Word the, and again at the Beginning of the Word attack, you begin the Word again, and always continue to the End, except you have agreed otherways, and begin the Word Constantinople with the Beginning of each [210] Word in your Letter. In short, having gone thro’ the Whole of the Words proposed to be wrote, they stand thus:
ny hi hbbb pbtmy, ity yiuze pwlwn md zaarsx elm.
Be on your guard, the enemy march to attack you.
And now the Question is, how he who receives this Billet or other Letters wrote in this Manner, goes about to decypher them. He must then have an exact Copy of the Table, he must know the Word agreed on, and that, having begun the Watch-word, the whole Letters follow to the End; after which the Word begins again.
Supposing then he knows all this, and wants to decypher what is wrote, he will begin thus, What does C, the first Letter of the Word Constantinople, give to n, the first Letter of the Cypher? And he will find that C gives to n, B, which he writes apart; after which he says, what does O give to y? and he finds e, which he writes down next B, already wrote. In fine, he continues till he has gone through the whole Letters of the Word Constantinople, and then begins it again and again, till he has decyphered the whole Writing. To do it methodically and with Facility, you should write the Watch-word agree on in capital Letters, distant the one from the other; you may even Number them for the more Security: And in Proportion as you decypher the Letter you ought to write either above or below the Word the Cypher signifies; as is marked on the Table. The same Method should be practised for writing in Cypher, and the Cypher alone copied out afterwards, when you have wrote the Whole you intend to say. The great Affair, either in writing the Cypher or Decyphering, is to be perfectly exact in copying out the Letters.
The Water already mentioned may be made Use of for writing in Cypher between the Lines of a [211] Letter on any indifferent Subject; which will entirely deceive the Enemy; for suppose your Spy is taken, as he is not found charged with any suspected Writing, he will probably be set at Liberty; but he is suspected, and his Papers rubbed with the second Composition, which makes the Writing appear, you then only risk your Spy, but not your Secret.
It is true this Method is tedious, and requires much Attention; but when once accustomed to it, it goes much quicker, and there is seldom Occasion to write long Letters on these Subjects. The Excellence of this Method is, that it cannot possibly be decyphered, without getting the Watch-word, which can only be discovered by the Persons immediately in Correspondence. The Watch-word may be in any Language whatever, without any regard to the Language you write in. There are also infinite Ways of concealing Letters.
<Ways to Conceal Secret Letters>
For Example: Let the Person who carries them have a Staff, neither better nor worse than People of his Condition, whatever that may be, commonly use: Let this Staff be made hollow for an Inch or two above the Crampet: Having neatly folded up his Letter, let him place it there, and fix the Campet.
He may also carry a Letter divided into several small Scraps of Paper, which being neatly rolled up, one can be placed in each of the Moulds of his Coat Buttons, which have been made hollow for that Purpose, and then covered with old or new Cloth, exactly according to the Coat. Each of these Scraps may contain one Line or two of Writing, and be numbered so, that he who receives them can immediately place them together and read them.
One of the best and surest Methods of concealing a Letter, is to put it into the Barrel of a Fowling [212] Piece, immediately above the Powder, and force down a Ball above it with an Iron Rammer: For though the Bearer, who we suppose intitled to carry a Fowling Piece, may be suspected, and his Piece examined, unless they think of unscrewing the Breech, they never will find the Letter; for it is impossible to draw a Ball thus forced in; and if they fire off the Shot, the Letter will be so torn and burned that it is impossible to read it, or know more about it, than that it served for Wadding to the Charge. But there are two Precautions necessary here; one is, that the Piece should have a poor Appearance, lest any Soldier take a Fancy to it and keep it, without in the least suspecting the Bearer to be [a] Spy. The other is, that it is better the Bearer be a Soldier; and if, in Spite of the Precautions he has taken to keep bye Roads, he should meet any of the Enemy’s Parties from whom he is not sure of escaping, he ought not to attempt it; on the contrary, he ought to fire his Piece in the Air, and making a Sign to the Enemy with his Cravat, or any thing that is white, go to meet them, as if he was a Deserter. It is probable in this Case, the Enemy will not suspect him of being a Spy; but if they should, it is impossible for them to prove it, the Letter being burned and nothing suspicious found about him. As to his being found in a bye Road, he can answer it was owing to the Fear of meeting Parties of the Army from which he deserted. In short, there are numberless Ways of concealing Letters; those we have mentioned are only to give an Idea of it, not doubting but those who apply themselves to it will find other and better Means. But it is much better when your Emissary is intelligent and faithful enough to deliver his Message by Word of Mouth, having only a Watch-word or Credential to the Person with whom you are in Correspondence.
<Spies>
As to Spies, those you employ should be Persons of Capacity, able to know the Strength of a Fortification or Intrenchment, either from its natural Situation or from Art; what Extent of Ground a certain Number of Infantry or Cavalry occupy commonly either in Camp or on March, according to the different Fronts in which they march, and at one Glance of their Eye be able to comprehend nearly the Strength of a Camp or Post where the Enemy are lodged; and how many Cavalry or Infantry they have in their Camp or on their March, without being obliged to count the Tents or the Regiments.
The Subjects of a neutral Prince are those who run the least Risk in serving as Spies; for under Pretence of Travelling or Traffic they can pass unsuspected from one Country to the other.
You may also have some Officer in the Enemy’s Camp, or other Person of Ability in the Neighbourhood, who informs you of what you want to know. As often as you write to him, you can use the Cypher and Composition mentioned, letting nothing appear but a few Lines on any indifferent Subject, and subscribing the Letter with the Name of a Relation, Countryman, or Friend, of the Person intrusted; so that if it is intercepted nothing appears, but one Friend writing to another on indifferent Subjects, or Family Affairs.
You will have warned the Person intrusted, that if the Enemy send out a small Detachment, or try an Expedition of little Importance, he need not advise you of it; that you may not expose your Spies for Trifles. You may also have Spies among the Enemy, by making ten or twelve of your own Soldiers desert, chusing those in whom you can trust, and who possess something in their Country, or leave their Wives or Children as Pledges of their Fidelity: Name to each the particular Regiment in [214] which he shall inlist, and let him know, that whenever a Person shall give him a Watch-word agreed on, he shall directly bring to you the Letter or any Intelligence that Person shall give him. These Soldiers should not know each other, and ought each to have a different Watch-word; so that if one is taken or proves unfaithful, the rest may not be in Danger. Neither should you name the Person of the Enemy’s Army with whom you are in Intelligence, nor give him any Mark to know him by. It is sufficient they have Orders to return when their Watch-word is given them. After having taken these Precautions, you write to the Person intrusted, that in such a Regiment there is such a Man whom you have sent there, whom he may know by such a Mark, Name, or Watch-word; and describing in the same Manner the rest who have deserted for that Purpose. If your Correspondent has only a Letter to send you, it is not necessary he discover himself by giving it with his own Hand: But having exactly observed the Marks by which the Solder is to be known, he can send him the Watch-word and Letter by another trusty Person: Of if the Case admits of it without Inconvenience, he can wait till Night, and when it is dark, in Disguise, passing by the Soldier, give the Watch-word and Letter. We only mention this Sort of Spies not to omit any thing; though it appears to be extremely difficult to have certain Intelligence by Means so complicated.
It is of great Importance to gain some of those employed in the Enemy’s Secretary of State’s Office, in that of the Secretary at War, or of the General in Chief, who give you Intelligence of the Resolutions taken. There are different Ways to succeed in this, needless here to mention. A Golden Key opens every Lock.
[215] In general you must endeavour to draw Intelligence and Instructions from the Spies by every possible Means, but never open yourself to them. You should employ several of them for the same Subject, who are absolutely ignorant of each other, never see them but in private; make them talk on different Subjects; let them speak a great deal, but say you little, in order to discover their Character, and what they are fit to be employed in; then set other Spies on them, to discover if they are not employed on both Sides.
If you would execute an Enterprize, after believing from the concurrent Reports of several Spies, that they have gold Truth, carry them however along with you separately. You may also gain Intelligence from the People of the Country, whom Traffic or their own private Affairs draw to the Camp, or the Towns, who sometimes become Spies without knowing it, as do the Prisoners, from whom also you may artfully draw Intelligence in general Conversation. The first of these, the People of the Country, should never be questioned; but artful sensible People should be employed, who, without any seeming Curiosity, lead them to talk on different Subjects, and insensibly draw from them those things you want to be informed of.
When you would know from a Prisoner what passes in the Army or Country he belongs to, send before-hand to the same Ward, in the Prison where he is confined, a Person in whom you can trust, who speaks the Enemy’s Language, is drest in their Manner, and who in every respect bears the Marks of a Prisoner. If there are several Prisoners, they must be separated in different Wards, in each of which there should be such a Person, who will draw from the Prisoners whatever you want to know, and thus you will also know how far they all agree in what they say. But it is [216] proper to have questioned the Prisoners before Hand, of what Regiment, Town, or Province they are, that the supposed Prisoner may not announce himself to be of the same, and so be discovered; for it is certain, that if the Prisoner believes the other to be really in the same Situation with himself, a very few Hours Conversation serves to draw from him every thing he knows with regard to the Army or Place where he served.
The Spies you may have from the Monasteries in Catholic Countries are the best and surest. The Government of Consciences is a secret Empire which none can penetrate, and which penetrates every where. The Employment of this sort of Spies is infallible, where a Town is occupied by a Prince of a different Religion, or in a Country which has changed its Sovereign. The Employment of this sort of Spies is infallible where a Town is occupied by a Prince of a different Religion, or in a Country which has changed its Sovereign. Women are also serviceable either to get into a Camp, or to carry Letters, because they are less suspected than Men.
You may also, in order to discover in Part what passes in the Enemy’s Country, make a Soldier desert who has Address, and in whom you can trust; who enters at one Part of the Enemy’s Frontier, and demands of the first Party of the Enemy’s Troops he meets, a Pass to take Service in any Regiment of the Army, or of an Detachment, which he knows at that time to be at the other Extremity of this Frontier, in order to observe exactly during his March all that passes, and after having arrived at the Army, and narrowly and at his Ease examined every thing, he shall again desert to your Country.
You may also be informed of the Disposition of the Enemy’s Camp, or such other Particulars as it is important for you to be instructed in, by feigning some Pretence to send an Officer to confer with the Enemy’s General, who shall be accompanied by [217] intelligent Persons, drest like Servants, who, while their pretended Master is in Conference with the General, on those Affairs for which he seems to be sent, shall carefully, though seemingly with Indifference, observe those things you want to be informed of. Titus Livius tells us, it was in this Manner that Scipio Africanus informed himself of the Situation of Syphax the King of Numidia’s Camp.
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Of Assembling an Army
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The Investing of Maestrict by Mareschal De Saxe
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The Investing of Maestrict under Louis XIV
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Of Camps
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[250]
Of Convoys
... As Armies cannot subsist without a constant Supply of what they daily consume, Magazines of Ammunition and Provisions are commonly provided and lodged in the Towns in the Rear, but as near the Army as possible; and when the General has Need of them, he give his Orders for their being transported with Safety to the Camp.
<[Avoiding Ambush]>
... In the next Place, when there is some Appearance the Convoy may be attacked, you send Detachments to mask the Defiles through which the Enemy must pass, and to occupy those through which the Convoy must pass: The Officer who commands the Escort, is at the same time informed of those Dispositions, that in case of Attack he may order these Detachments to join and reunite his Forces to resist the Enemy....
[251] ... The Commandant of the Escort should not neglect to have Parties of Light Horse, detached [252] between him and the Enemy’s Army or Towns, in order to bring him timely Notice, that he may make his Disposition before he is attacked. ...
The Command of a Convoy should be given to an intelligent Officer, and who is perfectly acquainted with the Country he is to pass thro’: For it is certain such a one will make better Dispositions than another who has not that Knowledge. ...
[254] ... When you are obliged to march tho’ a narrow Pass, or any other Defile, whose Sides are bordered with Mountains, it is absolutely necessary that your Infantry march along the Heights, if they are not inaccessible; because then they are equally so to the [255] Enemy. And in that Case having nothing to fear for your Flanks, you can strengthen your Front or Rear, as the only Parts which can be attacked. If the Country thro’ which you pass is in some Places plain and open, in others the contrary, you must proportion your Dispositions to the one or other Situation, as often as they change. These Changes are not difficult for an Officer who is Master of his Business.
<Attacking Convoys>
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[267]
Of Foraging
<Protecting Foraging Parties>
[270] ... The Major-General of the Day is commonly charged with the Command of the Foraging Party. Sometimes it is the Lieutenant-General of the Day who commands it, especially if the Foraging is to be near the Enemy; which ever of the two it is, he ought first to reconnoitre the Ground, in order to see what Quantity of Troops will be necessary for the Protection of the Foragers, and to examine the different Posts where he ought to place them. And it is according to the Plan he then presents to the General that the necessary Troops are ordered. This Plan, were the different Posts are marked, saves much Time on the Day of Foraging. ...
[271] ... The General Officer who commands has commonly the Precaution to send out small Parties towards the Enemy, that he may in time be advertised of their March and their Number: So that, if they are too considerable, he may give his Orders in Time for the Foragers to retire. And may then form his own Retreat without Precipitation, or receiving any Check. ...
[276] ... The General Officer who commands the Foraging must take the greatest Care not to be deceived, if the Enemy attack him: For very frequently, when the Extent of Ground to be foraged is great, the Enemy makes a false Attack on one Side, in order to make you draw your Troops, or the best Part of them there, while they fall with their chief Force on the other Side, that is left unprovided; by which Stratagem a great Number of the Foragers are taken. This Inconvenience can be avoided, as we have said, by Means of small Parties sent towards the Enemy, who give Advice of their Motions. The Troops who form the Chain are also ordered not to quit their Posts without express Orders: And the General Officer commanding ought to march to the Place attacked with only a Part of the Reserve; or if he marches with the Whole, it should only be when he is well informed, and convinced it is the Enemy’s real Attack, and where they want to penetrate.
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[277]
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Of Parties.
An Army can never be informed of the Enemy’s Motions in too many different Ways: And as to Spies, as some may be discovered, others prevented from getting Intelligence in Time, it is very necessary to have Parties continually patrolling without, composed according to the Nature of the Country into which they can penetrate, and by whom the General is informed of every thing which passes, within a reasonable Distance of his Camp
Parties, as well Soldiers as Officers, are often commanded by their Tour in the Roster: Often also the General chuses particular volunteer Officers to command them, who are well acquainted [278] the Country they are sent into, and capable of examining narrowly, and giving a distinct Account to the General of every thing he wants to be informed of. It is better too the Men should be Volunteers, and approved of; for, if they are taken by the Roll, a Malingerer or bad Marcher may be found among them; besides, they should be Men of Resolution and known Courage.
The general Object of Parties is, to be informed of every thing that passes in the Country, and to hinder those of the Enemy from knowing what they are doing, or what they intend to do. But it is not an easy thing to conduct a Party properly; and we see very few capable of acquitting themselves of it. This proceeds no doubt from their not applying to this Part of the Service when young, which is however of great Use on many Occasions, and in which consequently all Officers ought to be instructed. A young Man, who wishes to be a Proficient in the Military Business, and would make his Way quickly, can never use more certain Means to accomplish it, than attended an experienced Partisan, and endeavouring, by his Example, to become capable of leading a Party: It is in this Way he will in a short Time see many Stratagems and many Actions: And this is the Road which leads to his being often employed himself, and often gives him the Opportunity of doing some great Service to the General in Chief.
A General Officer is often detached with a considerable Body of Troops, when the General wants to be informed of the Enemy’s Situation, to watch their Motions, or to harrass them.
Often also a private Officer is detached with a small Party of Infantry or Cavalry, either for the same Purposes, or to carry off Forage, make Prisoners, or even to inform the General of something [279] he wants to know, previous to the undertaking some Enterprize.
The Officers who command a Party ought to be perfectly acquainted with the Country, the Roads, the Fords or Bridges over Rivers, the Defiles, Woods, Villages, Farm houses, or Hamlets, in the Neighbourhood where they are to pass: They ought to make Acquaintance with the Mayors and Bailiffs, and other Magistrates there, and endeavour to have private Intelligence from them. For this Purpose, let him behave to them with Generosity, make them Presents; never permit any Harm to be done their Towns and Villages, and carefully protect every thing which belongs to them. A Partizan who has taken these Precautions will always march with Safety, and never can be surprized, for he will be exactly instructed of the smallest Parties the Enemy can send out, either from their Garrison or their Army.
A Party composed only of Infantry should never march but through a covered Country, and never expose themselves in a Plain in the Day-time. By this Precaution, which is essential for their Safety, they are at the same time less subject to be discovered, and may the more easily execute what they are ordered. The Partisan ought also to use all Sorts of Stratagems, by Marches and Counter-marches, to arrive at the Place he has in view, and return in the same Manner. He ought to be capable of resolving quickly, and at one Glance of his Eye to determine whether to engage or retreat, according to Times and Occasions. He must know, when weak, how to post himself to Advantage; how to dress an Ambuscade properly; and how to avoid falling into those of the Enemy: He must preserve his Ammunition, and take particular Care that his Men’s Arms are always in Order. He must, in short, keep his Troop in the most exact Discipline, [280] and make them even observe strict Silence, which is absolutely necessary for Parties.
Let him give great Attention never to halt in Villages, Farm-houses, or Gentlemen’s Seats: If his Soldiers need Refreshments, let him send an intelligent sagacious Soldier to the nearest Village to seek them, and, when brought out of the Village, detach one or two to fetch them to the Place he has chosen for his Halt, which should be proper for concealing his Men, which prevents the Peasants seeing or counting his Men, and fit for Defence if he is then attacked. He ought also to shun passing near Villages, Castles, &c. whether he marches by Day or Night, that he may not be discovered by the Barking of the Dogs, or seen by the Peasants, who may inform the Enemy; neither should he in the Day-time keep the high Roads, or march through a very open Country.
It is fit he should carry a Watch, Pen, Ink, and Paper with him, that he may be able to march to the General, the Hour he sends him any Report, mentioning what has happened to him, or what he has discovered that is of Importance. The Soldier he sends with his written Report ought to be privately instructed by him, where he will find the General if the Army has marched, concealing from the rest the Motions of the Army, whether it has made or is to make any, so that the Enemy can never be informed by those who may desert from him. If he wants to inform the General of something of very great Consequence, he ought to detach two or three Soldiers, who must take different Routes; so that one may arrive safe, in case the rest by Malice or Misfortune fall into the Enemy’s Hands.
If two equal Parties engage in an open Field, it is the Courage and Hardiness of the Partizan which decides the Success: If to form an Ambuscade in a [281] close covered Country, and then surprize the Enemy, who for Want of proper Precaution has fallen into it, he owes his Success to his Judgment and Sagacity: If he takes any Prize or Booty, let him distribute it with the utmost Equality. Other Rules for the Conduct of a Partisan would be needless: He must find them in his own Capacity and Experience.
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[281]
Of Ambuscades.
AMBUSCADES are Snares set for the Enemy, either to surprize them when marching without Precaution, or by posting yourself advantageously, and drawing them there by different Stratagems to attack them with superior Force.
An active and vigilant General oftener employs Stratagem than open Force in War, and, by multiplying small Advantages, procures at length a decisive one. Ambuscades are the surest Means procuring these small Successes: They are of two Kinds, great and small. It is very seldom the first Kind can be practised against an able cautious General; they may even be extremely dangerous if discovered by the Enemy, an therefore, though we speak of the Manner of employing them successfully, we insist less on the Necessity of them than of small Ambuscades, which are frequently employed and with little Risk. These small Ambuscades have different Objects in View: They serve to carry off Magistrates or Hostages, for the Payment of Contributions; Merchants, who transport Provisions to the Enemy, &c.
A Partisan may also form an Ambuscade, when he is well assured by good Spies of the Day and Road one of the Enemy’s Convoys is to pass, whether with young Horses to remount the Cavalry, [282] Recruits, Provisions, or Ammunition, and that the Escort is weaker than his Party. The Advice he receives from Spies or Friends who give him Intelligence, gives him often the Facility of taking by an Ambuscade one of the Enemy’s Generals, detached to reconnoitre some particular Place, to be cured of his Wounds, to receive some Person of Distinction, or otherways.
When you have a Spy intriguing enough to be instructed, and to give Advice of the Day and Road the Enemy are to go a Foraging, an Ambuscade may be formed near the Road to carry off some of the Horses or Foragers: You may also lie in Ambuscade within the Chain of Forage, and fall on the Foragers when dispersed; but you must observe to plant your Ambuscade, in both these Cases, in a Place distant from the Enemy’s Troops who form the Chain, that is to say, behind the Center of the Foragers, and have sure Retreat as soon as you have struck your Stroke.
You may also plant small Parties of Light Troops in Ambuscade in distant Places, without the Chain of Escort, who, as soon as the Foragers disband, give the Alarm at the different Posts, so that the Enemy, not knowing on what Side the real Attack is, are obliged to re-assemble the Escort: And as much Time is lost in this Way, Night comes on before the Foraging is completed, and the Cavalry are fatigued, weakened, and insensibly destroyed. Ambuscades may also be placed to carry off the Men or Equipages who remain behind, when the Army disperses to go to Quarters; or when the Troops who are to compose it are assembling in the Spring.
Ambuscades are drest to carry off Prisoners, or Inhabitants of the Country, in order to gain Intelligence: In this Case, the Prisoners should not be [283] allowed to remain or talk together, lest they concert some false Intelligence to deceive you.
In short, Ambuscades may be employed to carry off Couriers, or small Convoys of the Enemy, who pass between their Army and their great Towns: But in all these Cases of Parties who form them must be attended by good Guides, who know all the Bridges, Rivulets, Fords, Passes, Marshes, Foot-paths through the Woods, or over Mountains; that they may retire through Roads unknown to the Enemy.
[287] ... You may also draw the Enemy into your Ambuscade, by bribing their Guides, who, in Concert with you, may propose a Road where you shall be in Ambush; or may draw them there by giving [288] false Advice of the Force of your Party, or of your Project. They may also be drawn into an Ambuscade, by detaching a Party to carry off Cattle, or make some Prisoners hard by the Enemy. In such a Case this Party must be sent out before any of the Soldiers who compose it can suspect your Design; so that if any one should desert he can never inform the Enemy of your intended Enterprize: The Officers of. the Party must alone be informed of your Intentions, and you must mention the exact Hour at which they shall begin to shew themselves, lest the Enemy following them, should arrive at the Place of Ambuscade before you are posted. ...
[293] ... And having given our Ideas on this Subject, we shall end it with observing, that with the Quantity of Light Troops now in use, and who are continually patrolling the Country, it is very difficult to surprize an Enemy with a great Ambuscade: The small ones only can succeed, and such particularly as are conducted by an able Partisan, who has good Intelligence, and who understands the Petite Guerre. We shall, however, as is already said, speak farther of the Means of employing great Ambuscades with some Hopes of Success, in the Chapter on Surprizes of Armies, and that of Battles.
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Of Skirmishes.
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[300]
Of Marches.
THE Marches of Armies are, of all the Operations of War, the most delicate and the most difficult, because they must not only be directed on the Objects you have in View, but according to the Movements the Enemy may make.
When the General has resolved to decamp, the Order is given the Evening before to the General Officers of the Day. The Quarter-Master General then dictates to the General Staff of the Army, both for Infantry and Cavalry, the Order of March wrote by him, and approved of by the General. The Order of Battle in which the General has disposed his Troops at the Opening of the Campaign, serves as a Rule for the Order of March: that is to say, the Wing on that Side, by which they are to march, forms the Head of the March. The Troops marching commonly the one behind the other, nearly in the same Order they encamped, and as many Columns are formed as’ they are to march by different Roads.
It is necessary, before the Disposition for the Order of the March is made, that the General inform the Quarter-Master General of the Army of the Enemy’s Situation; if they are on Right or Left, in Front or Rear of the Army; that, in his Plan, he may follow the Combinations and Precautions necessary for the Security of the March.
The Quarter-Master General of the Army ought also to be perfectly instructed in the Nature of the Country through which they are to march, if it is covered with Wood, traversed by Hedges, Ditches, Marshes, or Rivers, or if they are to march through Plains or over Mountains: He ought also to know the Number of Defiles, the shortest and [301] plainest Road for the Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, heavy Baggage, that he may be able, in Consequence of all these Particulars, to regulate the March of the Troops. He acquires this Sort of Knowledge either by his own Observation, or that of his Aides, from the Captain of the Guides, or from the Magistrates and Inhabitants of the Country where the Army is.
In whatever Manner they march, the Road should be so well distributed, that one Column never crosses another on the March.
The Army being in Order of Battle at the Front of the Camp they are to quit, the Baggage Waggons loaded and assembled at their Rendevous, as well as those of the Ammunition and Provisions, and also the Artillery, the Army begin their March at the Hour appointed by the General.
Great Armies march commonly in three Columns: ... There is no fear that halting to open or mend a Pass will retard the March of the Army; one Defile wasting much more Time than is required to repair the Road: And those who conduct the Columns cannot give too much Attention to this. Some Detachments are commonly commanded to escort the Artillery, Provisions, and heavy Baggage. Sometimes also the Baggage is sent before or kept behind, or is placed at the Front or Rear of the Column: The Situation of the Enemy determines [302] this. If they are far from the Enemy, the Baggage marches before, or behind, or is sent by a particular Road, if there is any. An Army in such a Case cannot march in too many Columns. But when they march towards the Enemy, all the Baggage is absolutely in the Rear, and the whole Artillery forms the Center Column, except some Brigades, f which one marches at the Head of each Column, preceded by a Detachment for their Safety.
When the Enemy are in a Condition to march forward to the Heads of your Columns, the best Disposition for the March is in three Columns, of which that of the Center for the Artillery, and the two others for the Right and Left of the Army....
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Of the Passage of Rivers
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Of the Defence of a River
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[365]
Of Surprizes of Armies
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CTIONS of Surprize may be attempted on retrenched Forts, on Lines, on an Army on March, or who forage on a Town, or on the Enemy’s Quarters. Some of these have been already treated of in the Chapter of Ambuscades; and others will be treated of hereafter: But in this Chapter we mean only to speak of such Surprizes, as may be practised by one Army encamped against another, also encamped near it. And after having mentioned what is necessary to be. done, in order to surprize the Enemy in his Camp, we shall treat of the different Steps to be taken by him who is thus surprized.
The Art of suprizing Armies, is one of the Parts of the Science of War, which Authors have least [366] treated of: What the Antients may have Wrote on the Subject has not been transmitted to us; and modern Authorities have handled it very superficially.
Such Enterprizes require great Courage, much Hardiness and Promptitude in the Execution, Subtilty and Stratagem, great Penetration, an exact Knowlege of the Country, much Precaution, and Foresight; in a Word, a perfect Knowlege of War. They are subject to a thousand fortuitous Chances and Incidents, which can only be avoided by good Conduct, by Secrecy, and by the Celerity of an unexpected and well concerted March. You must prevent all Intelligence from Spies, from Deserters, or from the Enemy’s Parties. He must: know you are come, but be ignorant of your coming. He must find himself caught in the Snare, without having either feared or suspected it. ...
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Of Retrenched Camps
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Of Orders of Battle
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[502]
Of Battles.
THERE is no Action in War more brilliant than that of Battles. Their Success sometimes decides the Fate of Kingdoms. It is by this Action a General acquires his Reputation. It is in Battle that his Valour, his Force of Genius, and his Prudence, appear in their full Extent; and where especially he has Occasion for that Firmness of Mind, without which the most able General will hardly succeed. ...
We take it for granted, that the General knows perfectly the Ground which is between the Enemy’s Army and his; the Rivulets, Woods, Morasses, hollow Ways, and Heights, and for that Purpose has [505] visited them himself: We also suppose that he has gone near enough the Enemy’s Camp to know its Situation, and to regulate in consequence his Order of March and Attack. If the General resolves to march to the Enemy, he gives his Orders as secretly as possible, both for the Distribution of Ammunition, and for the March of the Troops. ...
[516] The General takes care to conceal his Instructions, Plans, Letters, or Cyphers, the Orders of the Minister of State, the State of the Troops of the Army, or of the fortified Towns; in short, all Papers which may give any Light to the Enemy....
You should endeavour to make some Prisoners, to be informed by them of the Situation of the Enemy’s Army, which the General should himself have reconnoitred as near at he could, and alone, or with as few Attendants as possible, without risking his Person.
You ought to occupy the advantageous Posts, such as Passes, Heights, Causeways; make a prodigious Fire with your Artillery, attack with your best Troops, and amuse the Enemy at his weakest Part, but not attack him first on that Side, or seem to make Use of the Advantages of the Ground there: ...
[517] ... Make few Prisoners at first, but strive to take, if possible, the Enemy’s General, and for that Purpose endeavour to discover what Cloaths he wears, and the Colour of the Horse he mounts.
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Of Retreats.
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Of Cantonments.
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Of Winter Quarters.
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T H E E N D.