The Lost World of Eighteenth Century Military Intelligence:

The European Military Literature of Intelligence and British Military Operations in North America 

John Kenneth Rowland

Joint Military Intelligence College 

Britons at War Conference

University of Northampton, Northampton, UK

21-22 April 2006 

        Eighteenth century military intelligence has been neglected by modern historians.  Except for a few specialized studies and biographies,¹ it most often receives only passing reference in discussions of related military topics,² and these focus mainly on the product of intelligence (that is, the information contained in reports) rather than on the process of getting and analyzing that information.  In large part, the neglect is a result of three factors.  First is the allure of Napoleonic warfare and its sharp break from the past, which distracted historical attention from the preceding period.  Second is the trend of writers on the art of war starting with Clausewitz.  He treated intelligence negatively and severely criticized eighteenth century military treatises as unsystematic and untheoretical.³  Third, modern conceptions of technology-aided intelligence consider all pre-technology efforts to be part of the dark ages of the field.  In addition, some historians misuse the terminology, concepts, and standards of modern intelligence to judge the past, thereby introducing anachronisms that misconstrue earlier practices.⁴  This approach often gives the impression that intelligence techniques were constantly improvised and reinvented at the start of every war.  The military literature of the eighteenth century, however, clearly shows a continuity of intelligence techniques between wars.  It deals explicitly with both process and product in considerable detail, and it reveals a deep body of common professional knowledge concerning intelligence. 

        Today’s paper is a work in progress which demonstrates that three British generals who lost major campaigns in America – Edward Braddock in 1755, Thomas Gage in 1775, and John Burgoyne in 1777 – used the full range of intelligence techniques described in the literature but were often stymied by poor information, misleading assumptions, and shortcomings of the literature itself. 

The European Military Literature of Intelligence⁵

        The eighteenth century understanding of intelligence can be reconstructed from the vast military literature of the period published primarily in French and English.  It contains rich and explicit detail about the intelligence process, especially in treatises on the art of war,⁶ biographies,⁷ and histories.⁸  It is a unique combination of original works and translations from the classical, Renaissance,⁹ and early modern eras;¹⁰ from all of Europe¹¹ and America;¹² and eastward¹³ to India¹⁴ and China.¹⁵  Highly revealing critiques in the form of court martial proceedings, boards of inquiry,16 and criticisms of military operations also highlight intelligence issues, as do works arguing for new tactics, including the use of light forces.¹⁷ 

        Three treatises stand out because of the depth of their treatment of intelligence:  Art of War (a compilation of four French sources translated in 1707),¹⁸ Turpin de Crissé’s Essay on the Art of War (translated in 1761),¹⁹and the English 1761 Essay on the Art of War, a different work despite the same title.²⁰  Most of these treatises are explicitly didactic and were intended for the self-education of military officers.²¹  They focus on the entire range of intelligence matters: sources (including selection and motivation), collection methods and requirements, operational security, secret communications, and the commander’s predominant role in the intelligence process.  The ultimate objective was to detect enemy plans and intentions – what one work called the “Golden Key [that] opens every Lock.”²²         Despite its broad chronological and geographical coverage, the literature is highly Eurocentric and describes what one contemporary critic called “established Continental Warfare.”²³  It contains layers of assumptions derived from centuries of campaigning in the Low Countries that limited its applicability outside northwestern Europe.  It assumed, first, that generals would have reasonably accurate local maps; good roads and mail communications;  and high quality intelligence from diplomatic sources, from intercepted and deciphered diplomatic mail,24 from friendly local government officials,²⁵ and from the commander’s personal contacts in the campaign region.  Second, because of the likelihood of desertions, commanders rarely used troops except for officers to perform any intelligence functions; therefore, local inhabitants were the primary intelligence collectors, especially used for getting inside enemy camps and forts and for infiltrating the enemy government and army staff.²⁶  Such locals – called “Persons of Capacity” by one writer – were also assumed to have a high enough degree of military knowledge to estimate the size of enemy units accurately without counting their flags or tents,²⁷ and to judge the strengths and weaknesses of fortifications with accuracy.²⁸  This level of sophistication was unique in Flanders where constant warfare had created a body of militarily knowledgeable inhabitants who were available for hire.²⁹  Third, the literature assumed that all spies were motivated almost exclusively by money, and that large amounts would be readily available for that purpose.³⁰ The Duke of Marlborough, for example, argued that his many victories rested on heavy expenditures of secret service money for intelligence.³¹  The French general de Saxe declared intelligence to be “cheap at any price.”³² Frederick the Great echoed this opinion.³³ And even the French Encyclopaedia argued that it was better to sell one’s kitchen and house than to be without a spy.³⁴  There were only a few alternatives.  These ranged from providing food to making threats and taking hostages.³⁵ Torture and executions appeared only once.³⁶ The only personal self-motivators mentioned were revenge, despair,³⁷ and occasionally religious conviction.³⁸  There were very few references to political allegiance as a motivator and none to the influence of ideology.³⁹  The literature also assumed that commanding generals would be the focal point of all intelligence matters.  They were the keepers and dispensers of secret service funds.  They needed, personally, to find trustworthy agents, to establish spy credibility,⁴⁰ to send out multiple agents for the same information,⁴¹ and to confirm “the truth of the reports.”⁴²  They were urged to be fluent in at least English, French, and German to deal effectively with spies and to question prisoners and local inhabitants.⁴³  They were also expected to be aware of possible double spies in order to use them or to avoid betrayal by them.⁴⁴  Generals needed to know the topography of the campaign area and to reconnoiter it personally to supplement foot and cavalry patrols.⁴⁵  On the other hand, analysis of intelligence was the only key area not explicitly discussed by the literature, which seems to assume that each general’s basic education, military experience, and intellect would suffice.⁴⁶

        One significant critique, Thomas Molyneux’s 1757 book, Conjunct Expeditions, provides an important insight about one of these assumptions.  Based on his review of numerous British amphibious operations, he argued that most had failed largely because of poor army-navy cooperation and, equally important, because “one great Advantage is sure to be on the side of the Enemy or Invaded; which is in regard to Intelligence....  The Enemy is sure to have the truest and best of Intelligence, as the Inhabitants of the whole Country are their Friends.”⁴⁷  Because joint operations were conducted in enemy territory, the literature’s emphasis on using local inhabitants as intelligence collectors simply could not always work.  Another critique appeared in treatises on the use of light cavalry and infantry, of small unit operations, and of petite guerre (that is, irregular or guerilla warfare),⁴⁸ including works on the British encounter with wilderness fighting in America.⁴⁹ Contrary to the main dictates of the literature, the small size and detached nature of such operations resulted in a shift in overall intelligence responsibilities from the supreme army commander to the level of the local detachment and garrison leader,⁵⁰ contrary to the main dictates of the literature.

        Despite this wealth of discussion of many aspects of military intelligence, the literature never explicitly defined the topic.⁵¹  However, it does contain elements of a definition:  that is, military intelligence encompassed all significant military information and all militarily significant political information about the enemy regardless of the source or the method of acquisition.  It made no distinction between information and intelligence.  It was not limited to things that an enemy wished to keep secret or to clandestinely collected information, or to what intelligence officers did.  Because intelligence and operations were organizationally and functionally undifferentiated, there were no separate intelligence officers.⁵²  Moreover, the experience of Braddock, Gage, and Burgoyne shows that military intelligence was more than a simple matter of dispatching trusted agents to undertake clandestine missions to discover the “Golden Key” of high-grade intelligence.

Major General Edward Braddock

        When Major General Edward Braddock arrived in Virginia in 1755 as commander in chief of British forces, he had had very little experience with intelligence.  He had been selected for command more for his long association with the Coldstream Guards and his reputation as a disciplinarian than for his diplomatic⁵³ or combat leadership skills.⁵⁴  His orders required him to coordinate three punitive expeditions to evict the French from south of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River.⁵⁵  He personally led a 3000-troop expedition against Fort Duquesne in western Pennsylvania, and he planned to proceed to Fort Niagara, passing through difficult mountain ranges against expected swarms of French and Indian raiders.  His intelligence goals were relatively straightforward: to determine French intentions,⁵⁶ military strength, garrisons,⁵⁷ and dispositions.  Despite a wealth of surviving evidence, however, historians have not addressed his campaign from an intelligence perspective.  [They do deal with London’s poor information security⁵⁸ and campaign planning without adequate maps.⁵⁹  He received no written instructions on how to deal with intelligence other than to maintain good relations with provincial governors and Indian leaders.⁶⁰]

        In terms of substantive intelligence, Braddock had useful but dated reports from London about the sailing of French troops for Canada.⁶¹ He also received intelligence from colonial governors and fort commanders about Indian loyalties, French troop movements, and the status of their forts.⁶²  He lacked current information on Fort Duquesne and on his planned attack route, and he complained to London about the “difficulty of getting good Intelligence,”⁶³ although he received a copy of provincial Major Robert Stobo’s detailed drawings and description of the fort that had been smuggled out the previous year.⁶⁴  He had to depend on information from local settlers, who he distrusted,⁶⁵ from deserters,⁶⁶ from Indians who had visited the fort,⁶⁷ and from his own scouting parties.⁶⁸  His sources repeatedly indicated that it was manned by only about 300 French and a few Indians but that reinforcements were expected daily.⁶⁹  When he received what appeared to be a credible report that 500 regulars were “in full March to the Fort,”⁷⁰ he split his force and accelerated the advance of 1,200 of his best men.⁷¹  On 4 July he sent two independent scouting parties to the fort, but they reported no change in the garrison.⁷²  For whatever reasons, they missed the arrival of about 600 Indians,⁷³ which raised French strength to over 900.  On 9 July, British and French columns unexpectedly collided in mutual operational and intelligence surprise on a narrow trail where the British were at a major disadvantage.  When his enemies got the upper hand,  Braddock lost disastrously and later died of his wounds.

        Braddock’s failure has clouded perceptions of his varied intelligence activities, including his strong efforts to gather intelligence and to prevent leaks.  Warned by London about French spies in the colonies,⁷⁴ he attempted to stop disclosure of his plans by writing in cipher, using what he called “proper marks to render any letters useless which might be intercepted by the enemy.”⁷⁵  He censored provincial newspapers to keep them from “Mentioning any thing pro or con” that related to his planning conference at Alexandria, Virginia;⁷⁶ but word soon leaked out.⁷⁷  He also insisted on stringent operational security⁷⁸ – which by its nature included intelligence procedures – and his techniques were superb until the day of battle.⁷⁹  Contemporary French accounts attest to their effectiveness.  Despite the many scouting parties he sent out,⁸⁰ the commander of Fort Duquesne had very little detailed information about British strength and exact location until just a few days before the battle.⁸¹  His troops were as surprised as Braddock’s at their unexpected encounter on 9 July.

        In terms of sources, Braddock depended on limited information from local settlers, whom he distrusted;⁸² from deserters;⁸³ from Indians who scouts⁸⁴ and couriers,⁸⁵ and those who had visited the fort;⁸⁶ and from his own scouting parties.  He also used a few colonial guides whom he could “confide in.”⁸⁷  He also consulted the young George Washington for insights about his two recent diplomatic and military missions to Ohio.⁸⁸   Following the dictates of the literature, Braddock also interviewed other sources personally;⁸⁹ used multiple agents for one critical mission;⁹⁰ and sent an aide de camp to confirm reports of attack.⁹¹  He was also aware of enemy spies in his camp,⁹² including one of his own Indian scouts.⁹³  He sought all available maps of the region⁹⁴ and had a staff officer consult local “woodsmen” concerning his attack route.⁹⁵  He sent reconnaissance parties to explore the terrain, which he also viewed personally.⁹⁶

        Braddock’s one major weakness, according to most accounts, concerned the small number of Indians he employed.  He had expected hundreds⁹⁷ but ended up with only eight.⁹⁸  A board of inquiry later argued that those were far too few to provide tactical warning of the approaching French.⁹⁹   This was an easy but an unclear answer.  It does not account for the problems of topography and the fact that Braddock and his troops ignored good security only on the day of battle itself.  The answer is also not clear because there is confusion about the number of Indians needed as scouts and as bush fighters.  As skirmishers, the number was far too small, but eight were probably enough for intelligence collection.  They scouted Fort Duquesne on several occasions, and they and army flankers warded off many attempted raids¹⁰⁰ scouted the fort on several occasions.¹⁰¹  Braddock could have had more Indians, but he made significant errors based on his ethnocentrism and his assumptions about motivations that reflect the dictates of the overall military literature.  Clearly he was ignorant of the cultural universe of the Ohio Valley,¹⁰² the dynamic nature of Indian-European relations, and the independent ambitions of Indian leaders,¹⁰³ including the private goals of the leader of the eight Ohio Indians he employed.¹⁰⁴  Therefore, he saw Indians very narrowly as either friendly or unfriendly,¹⁰⁵ and he assumed that they were motivated solely by money – in the form of wampum and trade goods.¹⁰⁶  Moreover, he insulted a delegation of unallied Indian leaders by brusquely declaring that the future held no place for any Indians.¹⁰⁷  A diplomatic lie might have gotten their support.

        Overall, we see that Edward Braddock used standard European intelligence techniques,¹⁰⁸ but none of his information was definitive or timely, and personal and external constraints prevented him from making the best use of available sources.¹⁰⁹ 

Lieutenant General Thomas Gage¹¹⁰

        Lieutenant General Thomas Gage had been an aide de camp in Flanders and Scotland in the 1740s.   In America, he served first as a lieutenant colonel under Braddock and later as a regimental and brigade commander.  He became commander in chief of British forces in America starting in 1763.  When he came to Boston nine years later, he was a good peacetime general¹¹¹ but with only minimal combat intelligence experience.  Of the three generals in today’s study, however, he had the most difficult intelligence assignment.  Appointed royal governor of Massachusetts in 1774 in addition to serving as commander in chief, he had a dual mission.  Politically, Gage was charged with reforming the provincial government and with securing submission to Parliament by implementing the Coercive Acts passed as a result of the Boston Tea Party.¹¹²  Militarily, he was expected to use the five regiments he initially brought to Boston to intimidate the people into compliance, prevent violence and bloodshed, and, that failing, to overcome armed resistance.  He was required to collect both political intelligence against recalcitrant patriots, and military intelligence in case they turned from protest to armed confrontation.  He was also expected by London to report in “full & explicit” detail¹¹³ “every circumstance of intelligence respecting what passes in America.”¹¹⁴   These intelligence responsibilities fell into three phases.

        Phase one, from his arrival in Boston in May to early September 1774, saw political matters predominate, with military intelligence purely secondary and aimed at watching for signs of resistance.  Gage quickly turned to provincial political and military officers, to loyalists, possibly to feigned deserters,¹¹⁵ and to newspapers¹¹⁶ to determine patriot plans.  He sent officials to canvass opinion.¹¹⁷  He even attempted to bribe the radical patriot Sam Adams with secret service gold to turn King’s evidence against his colleagues, and possibly to become an insider intelligence source.¹¹⁸  Militarily, he kept watch over suspicious, but legal, militia arming and training.¹¹⁹  As conditions deteriorated in August, he planned to send troops inland to keep civil courts open.¹²⁰  When Gage learned that colonial towns had removed all their private stores of gunpowder from the provincial magazine near Cambridge,¹²¹ he sent a preemptive expedition on 31 August to secure the remaining government-owned stocks.¹²²  As news of this provocative mission spread, 40, 000 to 60,000 men from around New England began marching toward Boston, “prodigiously enraged,” according to one observer,¹²³ to retaliate against a rumored British naval bombardment of Boston in addition to the “theft” of the gunpowder.  No shots were fired, however, and tempers cooled quickly when the rumor was contradicted.  Despite his total operational success, Gage suffered a complete intelligence surprise because of the massive size, the rapidity, and the intensity of the patriot reaction.  This incident created a political, military, and intelligence watershed.

        Phase two, from September to April 1775, saw a reversal of intelligence priorities as civil government collapsed and the colony turned into an armed camp.  Militia arming and training accelerated and a shadow government appeared in the form of a Provincial Congress and a Committee of Safety.  Serendipitously, Dr. Benjamin Church, a member of both bodies, volunteered to report on their secret proceedings, and was compensated with secret service gold.  He gave Gage unfiltered insider intelligence for almost a year concerning patriot plans and intentions, the highest priority of all eighteenth century intelligence.¹²⁴  Church’s oral and written reports, coupled with loyalist advice and newspaper accounts, reduced many of Gage’s uncertainties in the immediate pre-war period.¹²⁵  His military reconnaissance parties tried to determine “the situation and nature of the country” for future expeditions.¹²⁶  These soldiers, however, could not disguise their accents, behavior, and the military way that they walked.¹²⁷  Based on intelligence from loyalists,¹²⁸ Gage sent expeditions to Fort Pownall in Maine,¹²⁹ and to Salem¹³⁰ and Concord¹³¹ in Massachusetts, to seize artillery and gunpowder.  Church reported that the congress decided not to react to British troop movements if they did not include artillery and baggage.¹³²  This positive intelligence seems to have led Gage to send the Concord expedition on 19 April without them.  Paradoxically, even with this clear insight, he suffered another critical intelligence surprise when patriots reacted militarily.  Church’s intelligence therefore proved useless because the congress could set policy, but it simply could not control the passions of individual patriots who ignored its commands.  The patriots also reacted quickly because of forewarning from their own spies,¹³³ one of whom may have been Gage’s American wife, Margaret.¹³⁴

        Phase three, from the start of fighting in April to Gage’s recall in October 1775, consisted militarily of the siege of Boston and the battle of Bunker Hill.  Gage continued to depend on information from loyalists and newspapers, supplemented by intelligence from patriot prisoners and deserters and from combat patrols and Royal Navy sources.  He began receiving reports from loyalist Benjamin Thompson, the scientist who later became Baron Rumford,¹³⁵ and he continued to rely on Dr. Church until his exposure and arrest in August.¹³⁶  In June, Church failed at a critical moment because he was sent to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia and was therefore not aware of, and could not warn Gage about, patriot knowledge of British plans – or of patriot countermoves to fortify the area around Bunker Hill.¹³⁷  Consequently, Gage suffered a third major intelligence surprise which contributed to defeat at the ensuing battle.  Afterwards, he complained to London about the timidity of loyalists in supporting him.¹³⁸

        Overall, Gage undertook an orthodox approach to intelligence and made use of sources and techniques described in the military literature as well as political intelligence sources.  In terms of information analysis, he was inundated with fragmentary, incomplete, and critically irrelevant intelligence.  Consequently, he suffered from information overload which obscured the true picture of his situation.  In addition, despite the high quality insider intelligence he received from Dr. Church and other sources, he could not always convert his findings into effective operational plans.  Ultimately, the three intelligence surprises at Cambridge, Concord, and Bunker Hill led to Thomas Gage’s undoing and to revolutionary war. 

Lieutenant General John Burgoyne

        Unlike Braddock and Gage, Lieutenant General John Burgoyne was the best prepared to use intelligence.  He had been a light cavalry officer.¹³⁹  He had collected and made effective use of intelligence in the field,¹⁴⁰ and he overcame its deficiencies to achieve a major victory in Portugal.¹⁴¹  He studied French military treatises¹⁴² and urged his light dragoon officers to do so as well.¹⁴³  During a private visit to Europe in 1766, he performed a clandestine but unofficial intelligence mission by disguising himself to witness an Austrian army review closed to foreign officers in order to see some new maneuvers.¹⁴⁴  In Prussia, he got a copy of an unpublished essay on strategy by Frederick the Great.¹⁴⁵  After visiting battlefields¹⁴⁶ and completing his tour in France, he wrote a lengthy intelligence report.¹⁴⁷  When he later arrived in Boston in 1775, one of his first remarks upon hearing that Gage had one spy was that he could easily have hired dozens since they were all susceptible to British gold¹⁴⁸ – an idea he likely derived from the military literature.  In addition, he quickly proposed a de facto intelligence mission to Lord North, volunteering to travel to the more southern colonies in his private capacity as a member of Parliament to determine their willingness to support the crown.¹⁴⁹

        Burgoyne’s mission in 1777 was to lead a large expedition from Canada to split New England from the other colonies and, by his understanding of the plan, to link up with troops marching north from New York.¹⁵⁰ A small diversionary expedition under General Barry St. Leger¹⁵¹ was dispatched from the west that was to link up with him at Albany.¹⁵²  Both commanders encountered significant geographical, logistical, and intelligence difficulties, leading to defeat at Saratoga and Fort Stanwix, respectively.

        Burgoyne repeatedly demonstrated his ability to collect and use military intelligence, and he clearly knew the importance of attempting to discover enemy plans, intentions, strength, and movements.  He employed many different sources, including scouts¹⁵³ and guides.¹⁵⁴ Reconnaissance parties¹⁵⁵ were composed of soldiers¹⁵⁶ and Indians who he considered to be “indispensably necessary.”¹⁵⁷  Other sources included patriot prisoners¹⁵⁸ and deserters,¹⁵⁹ as well as loyalist “country people”¹⁶⁰ and “gentlemen of confidence.”¹⁶¹  Burgoyne made good use of his secret service funds to pay spies.¹⁶²  He may have tried to bribe General Charles Lee in 1775,¹⁶³ and he supported an effort to bribe General John Sullivan in 1777.¹⁶⁴   Unlike Gage, however, he could not place an agent inside the patriot government or army staff “to obtain secret intelligence of the enemy’s counsels.”¹⁶⁵  Burgoyne sought to preserve operational secrecy¹⁶⁶ by keeping most intelligence matters to himself and his senior generals and not divulging secrets even to this staff.¹⁶⁷  He attempted to disguise his intentions¹⁶⁸ and insisted on operational security to prevent surprise.¹⁶⁹  He communicated in cipher.¹⁷⁰  His messengers, both loyalists and British officers in disguise,¹⁷¹ carried verbal and written messages,¹⁷² and they used concealment devices such as a double-sided canteen and a hollow silver bullet.¹⁷³  Several were captured and hanged as spies.¹⁷⁴  He was concerned about the unreliability of his Indians and their French-Canadian leaders.¹⁷⁵  Likewise, he was “often suspicious” of potentially bogus deserters¹⁷⁶ because they might spy on his army or give false intelligence.  This occurred at Fort Anne,¹⁷⁷ Bennington,¹⁷⁸ Fort Stanwix,¹⁷⁹ and Saratoga.¹⁸⁰  Burgoyne himself attempted to use false intelligence to confuse his enemies,¹⁸¹ and he cautioned his officers to avoid being fooled by ambiguous indicators of enemy intentions.¹⁸² 

        Although very little is recorded concerning Burgoyne’s analysis of information, he clearly knew the importance of attempting to discover enemy plans, intentions, strength,¹⁸³ and movements.¹⁸⁴  He based some operational decisions¹⁸⁵ on confirmed evidence¹⁸⁶ and his own critical thinking.  For example, he changed the mission to Bennington because of new intelligence of large stores of provisions, plus misleading reports that the numerous loyalists there were ready to support the crown.¹⁸⁷  This careful attention to intelligence, however, did not prevent him from sometimes misinterpreting what he received.  At Fort Ticonderoga, for example, he was fooled by a patriot stratagem into allowing the garrison to escape.¹⁸⁸  Moreover, his 30 July assessment of the reasons that patriots had burned the area around Fort Edward mistook deliberate denial of provisions and shelter to his army for patriot “desperation and folly.”¹⁸⁹ 

        In the end, Burgoyne complained about “the uncertainty of the intelligence”¹⁹⁰ especially the “generally contradictory, always imperfect” quality of “any other intelligence than what could be obtained by eye-sight.”¹⁹¹  His most significant intelligence failures resulted from something beyond his control – overoptimistic estimates by loyalist leaders, accepted by the ministry in London, concerning the willingness of loyalists to support the army.¹⁹²  These assessments became irrelevant because of the dynamics of political polarization and the sometimes overwhelming patriot strength in upper New York that intimidated loyalists.  Consequently, Burgoyne was often stymied.  He declared “I never saw any instance of service where it was so difficult to obtain information.  Among people speaking the same language with ourselves, and many of them professing the most favourable dispositions, scarcely any could be prevailed upon, by rewards or principle, to risk his person for the purpose of intelligence.”¹⁹³  [He blamed the defeat at Bennington on Philip Skene, a half-pay British officer¹⁹⁴ who served as a sort of political advisor and expert on loyalist intentions during that expedition,¹⁹⁵ because of his “credulity”¹⁹⁶ concerning loyalist support.  Skene’s military experience became irrelevant because of the dynamics of political polarization and the sometimes overwhelming patriot strength in upper New York.

        All of these uncertainties placed John Burgoyne in many of the same dilemmas faced by Braddock and Gage.  His experience with intelligence, in many ways reflecting the dictates of the military literature, could not overcome his inability to adapt his intelligence techniques to the realities of local conditions.¹⁹⁷ 

Conclusion

        In conclusion, Braddock, Gage, and Burgoyne employed standard European intelligence techniques,198 and each suffered critical intelligence surprises that led to stalemate or defeat.  The intelligence process itself did not fail them as much as inherent weaknesses of information collection in a hostile environment.  In particular, the eighteenth century military literature created misperceptions about what could be accomplished in regions outside Europe, and it simply provided no guidance for making adaptations for unprecedented situations, especially warfare in the American wilderness and the rapid and radical polarization of allegiance and political opinion.  In the end, therefore, the experience of Edward Braddock, Thomas Gage, and John Burgoyne substantiates the truism that good intelligence techniques and reports do not guarantee victory; that inadequacies in either area greatly contribute to failure; and that the most valuable intelligence often comes serendipitously.  It also demonstrates that the vast military literature published in Europe in the eighteenth century allows us to reconstruct what has since become a lost world of intelligence. 

NOTES 

1 Gunther Rothenberg notes in “Military Intelligence Gathering in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century, 1740-1792,” in Keith Neilson and B. J. C. McKercher, eds., Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History (Westport, Conn., 1992), 100-113, that he was surprised to discover that little work had been done on 18^th century military intelligence collection.  The following are some of the principal works dealing with British military intelligence in North America during this period:  Allen French, General Gage’s Informers: New Material upon Lexington and Concord; Benjamin Thompson as Loyalist and the Treachery of Benjamin Church, Jr. (Ann Arbor, 1932); Carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution (Garden City, 1941); Helen Augur, The Secret War of Independence (New York and Boston, 1955); John E. Bakeless, Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes (Philadelphia, 1960); Corey Ford, A Peculiar Service: A Narrative of Espionage in and around New York during the American Revolution (Boston, 1965); Jan C. Pemberton, “The British Secret Service in the Champlain Valley during the Haldimand Negotiations, 1780-1783,”Vermont History, 44 (1976), 129-140; J. Robert Maguire, “The British Secret Service and the Attempt to Kidnap General Jacob Bayley of Newbury, Vermont, 1782.” Vermont History, 44 (1976), 141-167; Roger Kaplan, “The Hidden War: British Intelligence Operations during the American Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3^rd ser., 47 (1990), 115-138; Edmund R. Thompson and Kenneth J. Campbell, “General Gage’s Spies,” in Edmund R. Thompson, ed., Secret New England: Spies of the American Revolution (1^st ed., Kennebunk, 1991), 15-31; and David H. Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride (New York, 1994).  In addition, three Internet websites provide important information: William L. Clements Library, Spy Letters of the American Revolution <www.si.umich. edu/spies>; Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence in the American Revolution, <www.odci.gov/cia/ publications/warindep/index.htm>; and National Counterintelligence Center, “The American Revolution and the Post-Revolutionary Era: A Historical Legacy,” chap.1 of Frank J. Rafalko, ed., A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution to World War II  (3 vols., National Counterintelligence Center, n.d.), <http://fas.org/irp/ops/ci/ docs/ci1/ch1a.htm>.  Biographies often examine some aspects of intelligence, e.g. for the key actors in this paper, see Lee McCardell, Ill-Starred General: Braddock of the Cold Stream Guards ([Pittsburgh], 1958); John R. Alden, General Gage in America: Being Principally a History of His Role in the American Revolution (Baton Rouge, 1948); and Gerald Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, A Biography (New York, 1979).

2 E.g., John Shy,  “Thomas Gage: Weak Link of Empire,” in George A. Billias, ed., George Washington’s Opponents: British Generals and Admirals in the American Revolution (New York, 1969), 28; Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution (2 vols., New York, 1952); Richard M. Ketcham, Saratoga, Turning Point of the American Revolutionary War (New York, 1997). 

3 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976); other modern studies of the art of war ignore or only mention intelligence in passing, e.g., Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Urbana and Chicago, 1987); Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, vol. 4,The Dawn of the Modern Era, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Westport, Conn, 1985); Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (London, 2000); David Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York, 1971); and Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815 (New Haven and London, 1994) and Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1999). 

4 E.g., one significant academic article that deals explicitly with military intelligence in this period, Kaplan, “The Hidden War: British Intelligence Operations during the American Revolution,” takes this anachronistic approach.

5 The following material is summarized from John Kenneth Rowland, “General Thomas Gage, the Eighteenth-Century Literature of Military Intelligence, and the Transition from Peace to Revolutionary War, 1774-1775,” Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques (forthcoming).

6 In addition to the three treatises cited in the next paragraph, see, e.g., The Field of Mars: Being an Alphabetical Digestion of the Principal Naval and Military Engagements, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America...  To which is prefixed An Essay on the Art of War, and A Comprehensive System of Military and Naval Discipline (2 vols., London, 1781); and Political Instructions for the Use of Gentlemen: Or, The Art of Rising at Court.  Shewing The Best.... Together with Maxims and Reflexions of the Art of War.  Useful for all Gentlemen who do, or intend to, lead a Military Life (London, 1708). 

7 E.g., Thomas Lediard, The Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Prince of the Roman Empire; ... And a Great Number of Original Letters and Papers Never before Published (3 vols., London, 1736). 

8 E.g., John Entick, The General History of the Late War: Containing it’s Rise, Progress, and Event, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America... (5 vols.,  London, 1763-1766; 2^nd ed., 1765-1775). 

9See esp., The Works of the Famous Nicholas Machiavel, Citizen and Secretary of Florence (3^rd ed., London, 1720). 

1⁰ E.g., Henri de la Tour d’Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, Military Memoirs and Maxims of Marshal Turenne.  Interspersed With Others, taken from the best Authors and Observation, with Remarks ...  trans. Maj-Gen A. Williamson (Dublin, 1740; 2^nd ed., London, 1744); and Roger Boyle, 1st Earl of Orrery, A treatise of the Art of War: Dedicated to the Kings Most Excellent Majesty ([London], 1677). 

11E.g., Charles Emmanuel de Warnery,  Remarques sur le militaire des Turcs et des Russes; sur la façon la plus convenable de combattre les premieres; sur la marine des deux empires belligerants; sur les peuples qui ont joint leurs armées a celles de Russie (Leipzig, 1770). 

1² E.g., [Robert Rogers], Journals of Major Robert Rogers.  Containing An Account of the several Excursions he made under the Generals who commanded upon the Continent of North America, during the late War (London, 1765). 

1³A book on Tamerlane was published in 1787:  Instituts politiques et militaires de Tamerlan, proprement appellé Timour, écrits par lui-même en Mongol, & traduits en François, sur la version Persane d’Abou-Taleb-al-Hosseїni, avec la vie de ce conquérant, d’après les meilleurs auteurs Orientaux, des notes, & des tables historique, géographique, &c. par L. Langlès (Paris, 1787). 

¹⁴Works dealing with India focus on the British East India Company army, e.g., Narrative of the Operations of the British Army in India, From the 21st April to the 16th July, 1791; with a Particular Account of the Action on the 15th of May, near Seringapatam (London, 1792); and William Bolts, Considerations on India Affairs; particularly respecting the Present State of Bengal and Its Dependencies (2^nd ed.,  London, 1772). 

1⁵ The most important work on China dealing explicitly with intelligence was a summary paraphrase of Sun Tzu and other classic Chinese military thinkers in Art militaire de Chinois, ou Recueil d'anciens Traités sur la Guerre, composé avant l'Ere chrétienne, par différens généraux Chinois. Ouvrages sur les quels les aspirans aux grades militaires sont obligés de subir des examens.... (trans. Père Amiot, Paris, 1772). 

16 E.g., the following contain explicit descriptions of intelligence or criticize the lack of it:  The Report of the Proceedings and Opinion of the Board of General Officers, [concerning] Lieutenant-General Sir John Cope (London, 1749); The Report of the General Officers, appointed … to inquire into the Causes of the Failure of the Late Expedition to the Coasts of France (London, 1758); and The Proceedings of a General Court-Martial ... upon the Trial of Lieutenant-General Sir John Mordaunt ... (London, 1758). 

17One of the significant tactical debates of the 18^th century concerned the relative merits of column versus line formations for battle; some of these works have implications for intelligence.  See A. M. de Pas, Marquis de Feuquières, Memoirs of the late Marquis de Feuquières,Lieutenant-General of the French army. Written for the Instruction of his Son. Being an Account of all the Wars in Europe, from the Year 1672, to the Year 1710.  (2 vols., Paris and London, 1711); Jean Charles de Folard, Nouvelles décovertes sur la guerre, dans une dissertation sur Polybe. Ouvrage utile & neccessaire à tous les generaux, commandans & officiers d’armée (2^nd ed., Paris, 1724); Folard, Traité de la Colonne, la Manière de la Former & de Combattre dans cet Ordre (n.p., 1727); François-Jean Mensil-Durand, Projet d’un ordre françois en tactique (Paris, 1755); Karl Gottlieb Guischardt (called Quintus Icilius), Mémoires militaires, sur les Grecs et les Romains; où l’on a fidélement retabli, sur le texte de Polybe et des tacticiens grecs et latins, la plupart des ordres de bataille & des grandes opérations de la guerre, en les expliquant suivant les principes & la pratique constante des anciens, & en relévant les erreurs du chevalier de Folard, & des autres commentateurs (2 vols., La Haye, 1758); and Paul Gédéon, Joly de Maizeroy, Théorie de la guerre (Nancy, 1777).  These and others are analyzed in Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth Century France (New York, 1957). 

18 The Art of War … Written in French by Four Able Officers (London, 1707) seems to be based on the following works or extracts from them:  Sieur de Birac, “The Duties of Officers of Horse,” Art of War, 1-67, may be de Birac, Les Fonctions du Capitaine de Cavalerie, et les Principales de ses Officiers Subalternes ... (La Haye, 1688); M. de Lamont, “The Duties of all the Officers of Foot,” Art of War, 68-107, may be de Lamont, Les Fonctions de Tous les Officiers de l’infanterie ... (Paris, 1675); Lamont, “The Duties of a Soldier in General,” Art of War, 108-203, may be Devoirs de l’Homme de Guerre ... (Paris and La Haye, 1693); and Chevalier de la Valière, “The Rules and Practice of War by all Great Generals,” Art of War, 204-340, may be Chevalier de la Valière, Maximes et Practiques de la Guerre ... (Paris, 1673).  A revised version was published in 1726 in London:  The New Art of War.  Containing ... The Practice of War by all Great Generals using de la Valière’s title as its subtitle from the 1707 edition.  Most of the material on intelligence is virtually identical. 

¹⁹ Lancelot, comte Turpin de Crissé, An Essay on the Art of War, trans. Capt. Joseph Otway (2 vols., London, 1761; orig. pub. in French, Paris, 1754), I, 2-3: “For marching with greater security, a general ought to form a company of guides of the peasants, be assured of their fidelity, and attach them to him by all possible methods, particularly by unbounded liberality.  It is money only that true spies and faithful guides can be secured; the latter are less expensive, but full as necessary as the former.  Parsimony should be avoided in war.” 

20 Essay on the Art of War: In which The General Principles of All Operations of War in the Field are fully Explained (London, 1761).  It contains significant differences from Turpin de Crissé’s treatise in their treatment of intelligence. 

21 Lewis Lochée, An Essay on Military Education. By Lewis Lochée, Master of the Military Academy at Little Chelsea (London, 1773; 2^nd ed., 1776), passim, is explicit on this point.  See also Alexander Bruce, The Institutions of Military Law, Ancient and Modern (Edinburgh, 1717), 150, under the title “Of the Necessary Qualifications of a Captain General”: “Knowledge of military Business is acquired ... either by that best of School-masters, Experience; or by studying such Authors, as have written upon that Subject; but especially by diligent reading of History ancient and modern.” 

22 Essay on the Art of War, 214.  

23Thomas More Molyneux, Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been Carried on Jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a Commentary on a Littoral War (London, 1759), Part I, 249-250. 

24 Diplomatic mail was routinely intercepted in London, deciphered, and resealed in the Post Office’s “Secret Office” and the contents sent to the ministry and king, who gave these “Private & Most Secret” documents their special interest and support.  These clandestine operations worked so effectively that foreign governments were not aware of any tampering.  See K. Ellis, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1958), 62, 64, 65, 69, 76; 127-131.  See also Jeremy Black, “British Intelligence and the Mid-Eighteenth-Century Crisis,” Intelligence and National Security, 2 (1987), 209-229. 

25 Marlborough made good use of his official and personal contacts: Thomas Lediard, The Life of John, Duke of Marlborough (3 vols., London, 1736), II, 160.   See also The History of the Campaign in Germany, for the Year 1704.  Under the Command of his Grace John Duke of Marlborough, Captain General of Her Majesties Forces (London, 1705), 6:  The “Duke left the Army on a full March, and made a step to see Bon, and what condition the Fortifications were in, and in the Evening return’d to his Army again: At this time Intelligence came from Frankfort, confirming the News of the French and Bavarians having joined together at Villingen.” 

26 Essay on the Art of War, 213; Art of War (1707), 63-64; Turpin de Crissé, Essay, I, 159-160; Maurice, comte de Saxe, Reveries, or Memoirs upon the Art of War (trans., London, 1757), 156. 

27 Essay on the Art of War, 213:  “As to Spies, those you employ should be Persons of Capacity, able to know the Strength of a Fortification or Intrenchment, either from its natural Situation or from Art; what Extent of Ground a certain Number of Infantry or Cavalry occupy commonly either in Camp or on March, according to the different Fronts in which they march, and at one Glance of their Eye be able to comprehend nearly the Strength of a Camp or Post where the Enemy are lodged; and how many Cavalry or Infantry they have in their Camp or on their March, without being obliged to count the Tents or the Regiments.”  

28 Essay on the Art of War, 366:  “The General ought exactly to know the Enemy’s Forces, in what they consist, and which are those in whom he most depends; the Situation and Disposition of his Camp and his Guards; where they retire in the Night-time, and who are those who are fixed in advanced Post; the Road the Enemy’s Patroles take, the Nature of the Country between your Camp and his, the Villages, the Houses, and the Defiles, all along the Front of the Camp; if his Wings are covered by a Village, a River, a Wood; if there are Rivulets, hollow Ways, Morasses, Inclosures, Woods, Heights, Ditches, or Defiles, near his Camp, which cut off the Communication of the Brigades, or of some Part of the Army.  It is on such necessary Knowledge that an able Chief concerts and forms his Plan.”

 29 I have not found any studies dealing with this phenomenon. 

30 Turpin de Crissé, Essay, I, 2-3, 158; Essay on the Art of War, 200.  An argument can be made that the lavish use of secret service money by Marlborough and less but still large amounts by later generals could not have occurred without the benefits of the financial revolution of the late 17^th century, which is treated, e.g., by John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (New York, 1989). 

31 Lediard, The Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, III, 250-251: “And tho’ the Merit of our Successes should be least of all attributed to the General; Yet the many successful Actions, such as have surprised our own Hopes, or the Apprehensions of the Enemy, in this present War, in Flanders, to which our constant good Intelligence, has greatly contributed, must convince every Gentleman that such Advices have been obtained, and consequently that this Mony [sic] has been rightly applied.” 

32 Saxe, Reveries, 156; cf. Turpin de Crissé, Essay, I, 158; Essay on the Art of War, 31, 200.

 33 [Friedrich II, der Grosse], Military Instructions, Written by the King of Prussia, for the Generals of his Army.... Translated by an Officer (London, 1762), 70:  he considered it “necessary to be generous and even prodigal” in paying spies.   

34 [Diderot and d’Alembert], Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire Raisonné de Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers (34 vols., Paris, 1751-80), V, 971, under Espion:  “... il faut sacrifier celle de la cuisine & de la maison plûtôt que de manquer à cet article.” 

35 Essay on the Art for War, 199 (food; pay), 279 (protection; presents); Turpin de Crissé, Essay, I, 162 (threats, hostages), II, 40 (promises; or threats of imprisonment, pillaging, and burning village); M[onsieu]r de Jeney, The Partisan: or, The Art of Making War in Detachment (London, 1760), 93 (“Promises and Threats” of death and burning of villages); J. W.,  A Military Dictionary, Explaining All Difficult Terms in Martial Discipline, Fortification, and Gunnery, 4th ed. (London, [1730?]), s.v. Spies (hostages). 

36 [Friedrich II, der Grosse], Military Instructions, 70. 

37 Art of War (1707), 308; Turpin de Crissé, Essay, II, 67.

38 Essay on the Art of War, 216.   

39 Prof. Jonathan M. House, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, comment by email, 7 Mar 2006:  the “generalizations about agent motivation” mentioned in this paper  “are completely predictable – in an age where commanders like Frederick did not believe their soldiers had any nationalistic or ideological motivation, where only young upper-class officers were thought of as idealists, it makes sense that commanders would not expect higher, unselfish motivations for espionage.” 

40 Art of War (1707), 55-56, 64 (quotation); Turpin de Crissé, Essay, I, 156; and Essay on the Art of War, 215. 

41 Turpin de Crissé, Essay, II, 112; Essay on the Art of War, 277. 

42 Turpin de Crissé, Essay, I, 4 (quotation), 156-157. 

43 See, in particular, Essay on the Art of War, 23: “The Study of Languages is most useful to an Officer, and he feels the Necessity of it in Proportion as he rises to high Employments....  [H]e will often be obliged, in Point of Duty, to question Prisoners, Spies, Peasants, and others...; it is fit he learn the Language of the People who inhabit the Frontiers where War is commonly made:  Thus the German and French Languages are very necessary for an English Officer, as the French and Italian are for a German; in short, the English, Italian, German and French, are Languages very interesting for every Officer.”  See also, Lochée, An Essay on Military Education, 51-52:  “Upon this foundation ... the student may securely advance in the attainment of all necessary science: and of languages, which ought to be the earliest object of his notice, the French and German are the chief....  [T]he British Soldier ... will stand in continual need of both, for occasional intercourse with prisoners, spies and peasants, and for general consultation and converse with foreign officers, must learn them colloquially as well as with force and elegance: and if, to these, he can add the Spanish and Italian, his personal advantages will be improved, and his military usefulness much enlarged.”  

44 Turpin de Crissé, Essay, I, 3 and 159; Essay on the Art of War, 282-283; Saxe, Reveries, 157; and Henri, duc de Rohan, The Duke of Rohan’s Manual ... Containing the Whole Art of War.... Translated by a Gentleman in the Army (London, 1708), 98. 

45 Turpin de Crissé, Essay, I, 3, 264; II, 83, 84; Essay on the Art of War, 199, 283. 

46 E.g., Art of War, 50-51, declares that, lacking intelligence of enemy movements, a commander should simply “guess at it” based on his knowledge of the geography of the campaign area. 

47 Molyneux, Conjunct Expeditions, Part I, 249-250. Similarly, in a 1765 account of General Henry Bouquet’s expedition during Pontiac’s Rebellion in America, the author noted that Bouquet “advanced to the remotest verge of our settlements, where he could receive no sort of intelligence of the number, position, or motions of the enemy.”  The book then quoted from a 1763 article in the Annual Register, “This is often a very embarrassing circumstance in the conduct of a campaign in America.  The Indians had better intelligence.”  Consequently, the author urged the use of light horsemen with bloodhounds “to find out the enemies ambushes, and to follow their tracks.” An Historical Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians, in the Year1764.  Under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Esq: Colonel of Foot, and now Brigadier-General in America....  To which are annexed Military Papers Containing Reflections on the War with the Savages (Philadelphia, 1765), vii, 49 (note, “tracts” in the original).   

48 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier (Cambridge, 2005), chap 3, “Continental and British Petite Guerre, circa 1750,” 87-114, analyzes a series of works on partisan warfare:  Jean Charles de Folard, “De la Guerre des Partisans” (unpublished MSS); Armand François de la Croix, Traité de la Petite Guerre pour les Compaignes Franches (Paris, 1752); [Thomas Auguste le Roy] de Grandmaison, La Petite Guerre ou Traité du Service des Troupes Légères en campagne (n.p., 1756; transl. 1777);  Saxe, Reveries; Jeney, The Partisan; Johann von Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare (Cassel, 1785; trans. Robert A. Selig and David C. Skaggs, New York, 1991); and “Essay on Regular and Irregular Forces” in Gentleman’s Magazine, 16 (1746), 30-32, as well as others.   Turpin de Crissé, Essay on the Art of War, was written by a hussar commander from a light cavalry perspective, emphasizing the commander’s fundamental duties to know his campaign area intimately.  See also [Rogers], Journals of Major Robert Rogers. 

49 Several works focusing on British military operations in North America deal briefly with intelligence in their analysis of petite guerre:  Peter E. Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3^rd ser., 35 (l978), 629-658; Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York, 1994), 189-190; and Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier.  Other studies of the British army experience with petite guerre, are listed by Grenier, 8n:  Eric Robson, “British Light Infantry in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: The Effect of American Conditions,” The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, 43 (1952), 209-222; David E. Parker, “That Loose Flimsy Order: The Little War Meets British Military Discipline in America, 1775-1781,” M.A. Thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1985; Daniel Beattie, “The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763,” in Maarten Ultee, ed., Adapting to Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century (University, Ala, 1986), 56-83; and Rory McK. Cory, “British Light Infantry in North America in the Seven Year War,” Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 1993. 

50 Steele, Warpaths, 189-190, addresses the connection between operations and the overall European military literature but does not deal directly with intelligence.  Kaplan, “The Hidden War,” 116-118, makes the connection but rejects a connection between intelligence and operations.  He could find no detailed discussion of intelligence techniques in the portion of the military literature he examined (116) “Although an appreciation for intelligence operations can be traced back as far as Frontinus, Julius Caesar, and other writers of antiquity, the literature contained no instructions dealing with the methodology of such operations.  Instead, generations of military theorists produced no more than a collective injunction to commanders to gain intelligence by reconnaissance and espionage.  Reconnaissance involved no more than the personal inspection by the commander, his aides, or short-range cavalry patrols.  Espionage was a different matter.  Frederick the Great, Marshal de Saxe, and others stressed the need for spies, yet they offered no instructions for selecting and employing them.  Clearly, intelligence was marginally important....”  As a result, Kaplan contradicts the rich and in-depth treatment of intelligence techniques contained in the broader literature, including several of the very works he cites. 

51 E.g., J. W., A Military Dictionary; and A Military Dictionary, Explaining and Describing the Technical Terms, Phrases, Works and Machines Used in the Science of War ... with ... an Introduction to Fortification (London, 1778). 

52 Avoiding ambushes and other intelligence surprises were a major concern.  E.g., Essay on the Art of War, 308, declared “Surprizes are always dangerous”; therefore, send out parties to gather intelligence to prevent them.

53 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York, 2000), 86. 

54 William M. Fowler, Jr., Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763 (New York, 1963), 56, cites “Braddock’s lack of major command experience, ignorance of geography, and political ineptness” as major shortcomings.  Anderson, Crucible of War, 87, finds “his sense of how to prosecute the war was uninformed.”  Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America (Baltimore and London, 2003), 106, takes the extreme position that “Braddock’s orders were impossible for even the most experienced and able officer.  With Braddock in command, they were a recipe for disaster.” 

55 Lawrence H. Gipson, The Great War for Empire, vol. 6, The Years of Defeat, 1754-1757 (New York, 1946), 57. 

56 Intentions – find source. 

⁵⁷ Reports from Indians provided useful but not detailed information on French plans, including “private intelligence from one of the chiefs (much in our interest)” sent from the commander of Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario to the governor of New York on 1 Jan 1755, indicated that a French “Officer was arrived at Montreal from Ohio, who was to return back this Winter with a Reinforcement sufficient to Rout all the English from thence,” Lt Kitchen Holland to Lt Gov James DeLancey, Edmund B. O’Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, eds., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (15 vols., Albany, 1856-87), VI, 938. 

58 E.g., Fowler, Empires at War, 59, observes that “No secret could be contained in the porous bureaucracies of London and Paris.  Almost as soon as Braddock broke the seal to his orders, French secret agents hurried across the channel to Paris with news of his mission.”   

59 Gipson, Great War for Empire, VI, 59-60; Anderson, Crucible of War, 88:  “It was a madly ambitious plan approved by men studying maps in London unaware that their ignorance of American geography, politics, and military capacities had foredoomed it to failure.  Indeed it was less one plan that two, each of which contradicted the other.” 

60 Braddock’s 8^th instruction gave him discretionary authority “to engage [northern and southern Indians] to take part, & act with our forces, in such opportunities as you shall think most expedient”:  Instructions to Maj Gen Braddock, Nov 1754, Samuel Hazard, et al, eds., Pennsylvania Archives (138 vols., Harrisburg and Philadelphia, 1852-1935), 1^st ser, II, 206. 

⁶¹ Gov Horatio Sharpe to Gov Robert Dinwiddie, 22 Jun 1755, William Browne, et al., eds., Archives of Maryland  (72 vols., Baltimore, 1883-1972), VI, 226-227 (online ed.):  “A Gentⁿ arrived here this Day in less than 7 weeks from London informs me that his Majesty was gone to Germany & that [as] he was about to leave England the ministry seemed to be in some hurry on Acco^t of Intelligence that had been rec^d of 22 Sail of Ships having sailed from France toward the western Coast of Ireland upon which Admirals Hawke & Boscawen sailed after them with 12 Ships, it was reported that the French had embarked a very considerable Number of Troops with a Design of making a Descent in that Kingdom – .”  Sharpe probably forwarded this to Braddock but it likely did not arrive before the battle. 

62 Intel from governors and fort commanders – find examples. 

63 Braddock to Robert Napier, 8 Jun 1755, Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 85, 92:  “... From this Description, which is not exaggerated you conceive the difficulty of getting good Intelligence, all I have is from Indians, whose veracity is no more to be depended upon [than] that of the Borderers here; their Accounts are that the Number of French at the Fort at present is but small, but pretend to expect a great Reinforcement; this I do not entirely credit, as I am persuaded they will want their Forces to the Northward.”

⁶⁴ The drawing is reproduced in Gipson, Great War for Empire, VI, between 86 and 87.  Anderson, Crucible of War, 95, indicates that Braddock received a copy of Stobo’s letter and map from the Delaware leader Shingas in May 1755.  However, Braddock had already received copies from Gov Horatio Sharpe of Maryland:  Sharpe to Maj Gen Edward Braddock, 9 Feb 1755, Maryland Archives, VI, 167-168 (online ed.):  “I have inclosed Major Stobo’s Acco^t of Fort Du Quisne on Monongahela & the Ohio Rivers when prisoner there (he was one of the Hostages delivered to the French after the Action of the Meadows).” New York Colonial Documents, X, 311, prints a translated French document indicating that in the “lot of papers” captured from Braddock’s HQ baggage after his defeat, “... among others, [was] the plan of Fort Duquesne with its exact proportions,” i.e., Stobo’s drawing.  Stobo had hired an Indian named Moses to smuggle one of two copies of his materials out of Fort Duquesne in 1754.  Moses took his copy to George Croghan, the Indian trader and Pennsylvania’s Indian agent, who later, at the insistence of Shingas, had made several additional copies, one of which was presumably the letter that Shingas gave (or offered) to Braddock.  Croghan forwarded a copy to Gov James Hamilton, 30 Aug 1754; see Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania (10 vols., Philadelphia, 1851-52), VI, 160-163.  Without referring to the existence (or the implications) of multiple copies, Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crown, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America (New York and London, 1988), 156, argued that “Such invaluable information [given to Croghan by Shingas in 1754] established beyond doubt the validity of the offer made later by the Ohio Indians to Braddock....  With Stobo’s information in hand, he was sure he did not need more help from Indians.”  See also Robert C. Alberts, The Most Extraordinary Adventures of Major Robert Stobo (Boston, 1965), 98-105. 

⁶⁵ Braddock’s mistrust arose mainly because of their ignorance of military matters and even the geography of their region, but with some implication of military disdain for civilians.  He may have been influenced in his overall attitudes by Gov Robert Dinwiddie’s similar negativity; see, e.g., Robert A. Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758 (2 vols., Richmond, 1883-84), I, 322.  John Carlyle complained that Braddock had ignored the advice of prominent Virginians even though “We knew the numbers, etc., of the French,” W. W. Abbot, ed., “General Braddock in Alexandria: John Carlyle (a militia officer in Virginia) to George Carlyle, 15 August 1755,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 97 (1989), 209, but Braddock may have been aware that Carlyle’s information was dated and probably irrelevant in light of other reports he was receiving. 

⁶⁶ E.g., Gov Horatio Sharpe to Braddock, 9 Feb 1755, Archives of Maryland, VI, 167-168 (online ed.). 

67 Sir John St. Clair to Braddock, 10 Jun 1755, Letterbook of Sir John St. Clair, 138, quoted by Andrew J. Wahil, comp., Braddock Road Chronicles, 1755: From Diaries and Records of Members of the Braddock Expedition and Others Arranged in a Day by Day Chronology (Bowie, Md, 1999), 259. 

⁶⁸ Captain Robert Orme’s Journal, 4 Jul 1755, Winthrop Sargent, ed., The History of an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, in 1755, under Major-General Edward Braddock, Generalissimo of H. R. M. Forces in America (Philadelphia, 1855), 349. 

69 St. Clair to Braddock, 10 Jun 1755, Letterbook of Sir John St. Clair, 138, quoted by Wahil, comp., Braddock Road Chronicles, 259:  “Monocatua’s son is this moment arrived from Fort Du Quesne, he is left it on Sunday afternoon and brings accounts that he saw at that place in all 70 Indians and 100 French who were preparing to set out yesterday morning to harass [us] on our march.  That they were daily in expectation of a reinforcement of 200 more but were delayed by the water being low.” 

⁷⁰ As described in a “Letter to a Gentleman of this Town” dated 1 July and transcribed in Gov Horatio Sharpe to Gov Robert Morris, 15 Jul 1755, Archives of Maryland, VI, 249 (on-line ed.), “’Tis said this Morning the General has had Advice that 500 Regulars are in full March to the Fort, which is the Reason he is determined to be there before them.” 

71 Orme’s Journal, 3 Jul 1757, Sargent, ed., The History of an Expedition, 347-348, recounts arguments at the council of war on 3 July concerning holding the attack column to bring up Lt Col Dunbar’s troops with most of the army’s baggage and artillery:  The delays in uniting the two contingents would give “the French ... time to receive their reinforcements and provisions, and to entrench themselves, or strengthen the fort, or to avail themselves of the strongest passes to interrupt our march:  That it was conjectured they had not many Indians or great strength at the fort, as they had already permitted us to make many passes which might have been defended by a very few men.” 

72 Orme’s Journal, 4 July 1755, Sargent, ed., The History of an Expedition, 349. 

73 Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War (Lincoln, Neb, and London, 2005), 31:  French troops were part of the Troupes de la Marine.  The commander of Fort Duquesne, Captain Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecoeur, in his report on the battle, wrote that there were 830 in his attacking party,” New York Colonial Documents, X, 304.  Historians do not agree on the troop totals:  Steele, Warpaths, 189, gives the total as 891, and Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 157, as 855 (the difference being the number for French troops, either 108 or 76).   

74 Instructions to Maj Gen Braddock, Nov 1754, Pennsylvania Archives, 1^st ser, II, 206-207: “it has been represented to Us, y^t an illegal Correspondence & Trade is frequently carried on between the French & our Subjects in y^e several Colonies, you will diligently take all possible measures to prevent the continuance of all such dangerous Practices, particularly that the French should not, upon any account whatever, be supplied with Provisions, &c^a.”  The French were aware of “frequent meetings between the Governors and deputies of the Provinces of Boston, New-York, Merylan and Pensylvania ... for the purpose of agreeing on the projected operations on the frontiers,” i.e., the Albany Congress in 1754; see Timothy J. Shannon, Crossroads of Empire: Indians, Colonists, and the Albany Congress of 1754 ([Ithaca, NY, 2000]).  Gipson, The Great War for the Empire, VI, 87, states that “alarming intelligence” had been sent in “a code letter ... by a Frenchman who went to the British colonies ostensibly to purchase cattle for the French at Cape Breton.”  Of particular significance was a letter from Messrs. de Drucour and Prévost at the fortress at Louisbourg to Marquis Duquesne (Quebec), 27 Feb 1755, in New York Colonial Documents, X, 281-284:  Prévost had received “an enigmatical letter ... from New-York, written by a man of your acquaintance....  In fine, Sir, there is every appearance, and we believe, that your new posts will be vigorously attacked in the spring; the English are desirous of making a diversion and harassing the post they may be able to reach by the rivers situated on the East of their Continent, in order to oblige you to diminish the forces you may have destined for the upper part.”  The letter, as interpreted, indicated that the “new posts will be attacked by 9000 men, and we believe that these will be distributed, by sending 1000 men to Fort St. Frederic, where, Mr. Prévost thinks, Mr de Lusignan commands, or to the River St. John, but he insists on the former interpretation; 6000 men will go to the but, which is on the Beautiful river, or the Ohio; and lastly, 2000 men will find their way by all the routes that are in the vicinity of the Chaudière falls, Beckancour....” 

75 Orme’s Journal, Sargent, ed., History of an Expedition, 306:  Orme remarked that Braddock had written to this effect to Gov William Shirley of Massachusetts, who had been designated as the expedition commander against French fortifications in Nova Scotia and ultimately against Fort Niagara, Braddock’s secondary objective. 

76Orme’s Journal, Sargent, ed., History of an Expedition, 306:  Orme remarked that Braddock had written to this effect to Gov William Shirley of Massachusetts, who had been designated as the expedition commander against French fortifications in Nova Scotia and ultimately against Fort Niagara, Braddock’s secondary objective. 

77 In mid-June, two months after the Alexandria conference, a letter concerning British military preparations was received at Louisbourg and forwarded to Quebec secretly sent from Virginia, 14 Jun 1755, M. Prévost (Louisbourg) to M. de Machault ([Quebec]), New York Colonial Documents, X, 296:  “I receive[d] letters from Virginia and Newfoundland, which have been secretly transmitted to me, and with a great deal of caution.  The one [from Virginia] confirm[s] me that our posts at the Beautiful [Ohio] river, at Crown Point, at the River St. John and at Beausejour are to be attacked by 13,000 regulars, in three divisions; ...” 

78 James Titus, The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia (Columbia, SC, 1991), 170 n78, observes that Braddock made use of light troops called rangers, but these were “not ... a party of men that had been trained and equipped for a special mission, for example, woods fighting” as were developed later in the war under Robert Rogers, but were intended more for service as flankers and reconnaissance.

 79 Braddock took the task seriously.  From late May to the morning of 9 July, he reiterated the necessity of good security, starting with stringent requirements at a council of war.  Orme’s Journal, [late May] and 16 Jun 1757, Sargent, ed., The History of an Expedition, 317, 336-351.  See also the account of Capt. Robert Chomley’s Batman, in Charles Hamilton, ed., Braddock’s Defeat:  The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley’s Batman, The Journal of a British Officer; Halkett’s Orderly Book, Edited from the Original Manuscripts (Norman, 1959), for the perspectives of other officers and non-combatants.  In conjunction with Braddock’s orderly books (in the George Washington Papers, Library of Congress), they provide a near complete perspective on these issues. Douglas E. Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1783 (New York, 1973), 364:  “Braddock was no fool and took reasonable precautions against surprise” and they were “quite effective” before 9 July. 

80 See M. de Godefroy, “Relation sur l’Action...,”  in John D. G. Shea, ed., Relations Diverses sur la Bataille du Malangueulé, Gagnè le 9 Juillet, 1755, par les françois sous M. Beaujeu (New York, 1960), 9-10, cited and summarized by Gipson, Great War for the Empire, VI, 89-92, for a description of multiple strong French and Indian raiding and scouting parties. 

81 Steven Brummel, Redcoats: The British Soldier in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge, 2000), 15, concludes that “Braddock spared no effort to secure his column from surprise, and hostile Indians who attempted to menace the flanks were baffled.”  

82 Braddock’s mistrust arose mainly because of their ignorance of military matters and even the geography of their region, but with some implication of military disdain for civilians.  He may have been influenced in his overall attitudes by Gov Robert Dinwiddie’s similar negativity; see, e.g., Robert A. Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758 (2 vols., Richmond, 1883-84), I, 322.  John Carlyle complained that Braddock had ignored the advice of prominent Virginians even though “We knew the numbers, etc., of the French,” W. W. Abbot, ed., “General Braddock in Alexandria: John Carlyle (a militia officer in Virginia) to George Carlyle, 15 August 1755,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 97 (1989), 209, but Braddock may have been aware that Carlyle’s information was dated and probably irrelevant in light of other reports he was receiving. 

83 E.g., Gov Horatio Sharpe to Braddock, 9 Feb 1755, Archives of Maryland, VI, 167-168 (online ed.). 

84 How effective these Indians were is a matter of some controversy.  While it appears from my research that they performed their intelligence mission reasonably well, Gipson, Great War for Empire, VI, 78, castigates them for being “so weak in number and so cowed in spirit that they could not be relied upon for the essential services that should have devolved upon them in a wilderness campaign.”  Gipson seems to be referring to their fighting skills rather than to intelligence gathering.  However, in May, Braddock promised a prospective group of Indian allies that he would not ask “them to do any more than to scout about & give us Notice on the Approach of the French or their Canada Indians,” Braddock Address to Pennsylvania Indians, 16 May 1755, Public Records Office (PRO) Colonial Office (CO) 5/15, f. 558, quoted in Gipson, The Great War for the Empire, VI, 78n.  Note also that Braddock in inviting these Indians to the conference had demanded that they “must be very well acquainted w^th that Country, & may be very usefull to me in the Course of this Expedition,” Braddock to Gov Robert Morris, 15 Apr 1755, Pennsylvania Archives, 1852-1935), 1^st ser, II, 290. 

85 Daniel Claus, former Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Canada, observed in 1777 that “Indians in general are fond of carrying secrets to their Superindendant [sic], which they would choose should not come thro’ the mouth of an Interpreter” to avoid unnecessary errors.  Claus to William Knox, Undersecretary of State for America, 1 Mar 1777, New York Colonial Documents, X, 700. 

86 Sir John St. Clair to Braddock, 10 Jun 1755, Letterbook of Sir John St. Clair, 138, quoted by Andrew J. Wahil, comp., Braddock Road Chronicles, 1755: From Diaries and Records of Members of the Braddock Expedition and Others Arranged in a Day by Day Chronology (Bowie, Md, 1999), 259.

87 Braddock to Robert Napier,8 Jun 1755, Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 85: Because he distrusted Indians and backcountry settlers, he declared “I shall send people for Intelligence, who I have reason to believe I can confide in.” 

88 George Washington to John Augustine Washington, 28 Jun 1755, Washington Papers, Library of Congress:  “The General before they met in council, asked my private opinion concerning the Expedition.” 

89 Capt. Chomley’s Batman, 16 Jun 1755, Hamilton, ed., Braddock’s Defeat, 21: “To day as one of our Raingers was a Shouting [shooting] he Comes up with some of our Own Indiens a Shouting dear.  He taking them for a party of the French Indiens fireing at him, he Immediately Returns to Camp, acquaints the genll.  There was Immediatly [sic] a party sent out against them.”  Also, Capt Robert Orme to Henry Fox, undated, Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 100-101:  On 8 Jul, “upon Calling all the Guides the General from the Intelligence he Could Collect” decided on the double crossing of the Monongahela. 

90 Orme’s Journal, 4 Jul 1755, Sargent, ed., The History of an Expedition, 349. 

91 Orme’s Journal, 19 Jun 1755, Sargent, ed., The History of an Expedition, 337 (19 Jun); and 354 (9 Jul). 

92 “In a Letter from the Susquehanna, dated the 31st ult. it is mentioned, that ... two men came [to Fort Cumberland], who were supposed to be spies, one of them being known to have been among the Virginia Forces on the same business before Washington’s defeat last Summer.  They own’d they came from the French Fort, and they pretended they were very numerous there,” Maryland Gazette, 5 June 1755, quoted in Wahil, comp., Braddock Road Chronicles, 290.  

93 Orme’s Journal, 25 Jun 1755, Sargent, ed., The History of an Expedition, 340:  “Three Mohawk Indians pretending friendship came to the General and told him they were just come from the French fort.  They said that some reinforcemen^ts were arrived from Montreal, and that they were in expectation of many more: that they had very little provision at the fort, and that they had been disappointed of their supplies by the dryness of the season having stopped the navigation of Buffler river.  [Ed. Note: Rivière aux Bœufs] The General caressed them, and gave them presents, but they nevertheless went off that night, and with them one of our Indians, who we had very long suspected.  This fellow had frequently endeavored to conceal himself upon the flanks on the March, but was always discovered by the flank parties.  Notwithstanding this, we could not punish him, as the Indians are so extremely jealous that we feared it would produce a general disaffection.” 

94 They received a mixed assortment of mediocre and useless maps.  According to Howard N. Eavenson, Map Maker & Indian Traders: An Account of John Patten, Trader, Arctic Explorer, and Map Maker... (Pittsburgh, 1949), one of Braddock’s maps, made by a Captain Snow and said to be based on information from Indian traders, was “largely drawn from imagination.” 

95 Sir John St. Clair to Braddock, 9 Feb 1755, in Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 62; however, he could find only one local with real geographical knowledge.  Maps came in from other sources:  see Gov Horatio Sharpe to Braddock, 9 Feb 1755, Archives of Maryland, VI, 167-168 (online ed.); Sir John St. Clair to Robert Napier, 13 Jun 1755, Pargellis, 93-95.  In Braddock to Robert Napier, 8 Jun 1755, Pargellis, 84, he complained to the ministry that “This part of the Country is absolutely unknown to the Inhabitants of the lower parts of Virginia and Maryland, their Account of the Roads and provisions utterly false.”  

96 Orme’s Journal, [late May] 1755, Sargent, ed., The History of an Expedition, 324. 

97 Braddock to Sir Thomas Robinson, 5 Jun 1755, quoted by Gipson, The Great War for the Empire, VI, 78: “When I arrived in America, I was assured that I might depend upon a great number of Indians from the Southward, but the bad conduct of the Governor of Virginia, has turned them entirely against us; in effect they [the Virginians] behaved to the Indians with so little discretion, and so much unfair dealing, that we must at present be at great expense to regain their confidence, and there is no trusting even those who have embraced our cause.”  Concerning the southern Indians, many sources cite the personal and political differences between Gov Dinwiddie of Virginia and Gov Glen of South Carolina as the reason that Catabwa and Cherokee Indians did not come to Braddock’s aid: Gipson, VI, 25-27, 65.   

98 Croghan recalled that Lt Col Innes, commander of Fort Cumberland, had cautioned Braddock “that [he] need not take above ten men [Indians] out with him, for if he took more, he would find them very troublesome on the march, and of no service; on which the General ordered me to send all the men, women and children back to my house in Pennsylvania, except eight or ten which I should keep as scouts: which I accordingly did,” Croghan’s Journal to the Ohio ...,” 18 Aug 1757, in Sargent, ed., The History of the Expedition, 408. 

99 The official “Inquiry into Behaviour of the Troops at the Monongahela,” Albany, NY, 21 Nov 1755, PRO, War Office (WO) 34/73 ff 45-46, summarized by Brummel, Redcoats, 199, concluded that there were not enough Indians for combat.  The report cited four main reasons for the bad behavior of the army and the ensuing disaster:  (1) demoralization of the troops; (2) belief by provincial soldiers that European methods were insufficient against wilderness fighting; (3) lack of Indians to provide warning to the approach of the French and Indians from Fort Duquesne; and (4) Indian fighting techniques, making them invisible in the woods.  Grenier, The First War of War, 113-114, cites another copy of the inquiry at PRO CO 5/46.  After the battle, George Croghan thought that 50 Indians would have been sufficient “to have prevented the surprise, that day of our unhappy defeat”: George Croghan’s Journal to the Ohio ...,” 18 Aug 1757, in Sargent, ed., The History of the Expedition, 408.  Leach, Arms for Empire, 353, declared that “Indian assistance would be very important,” without detailing their missions.  Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 152:  “Braddock was left with eight Indians, an altogether insufficient number.”   

100 See M. de Godefroy, “Relation sur l’Action...,”  in John D. G. Shea, ed., Relations Diverses sur la Bataille du Malangueulé, Gagnè le 9 Juillet, 1755, par les françois sous M. Beaujeu (New York, 1960), 9-10, cited and summarized by Gipson, Great War for the Empire, VI, 89-92. 

101 E.g., Orme’s Journal, 4 Jul 1755, Sargent, ed., The History of an Expedition, 349. 

102 Called the “Middle Ground” in White, Middle Ground, 95, 175-180; see also James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York, 1999).   Both contain a good examination of Indian-European relations in the Ohio Valley region and information exchange. 

103 White, The Middle Ground, Chaps 1 and 5; 240: Ohio Indians “played a complicated and ambiguous role” in English-French conflict after 1754; 245: One Delaware, Ackowanothic, argued that the Delaware needed French help to evict the too numerous British but “we can drive away the French when we please.”  Anderson, Crucible of War, 96, notes that Braddock “in his blunt, self-assured way, was too naive to understand the tensions of Indian-white relations in North America, let alone the character of relations between the various Indian nations.”  Alfred P. James, “Decision at the Forks,” in Alfred P. James and Charles M. Stotz, Drums in the Forest (Pittsburgh, 1958), 34, argues that other British and American officers did not understand Indian affairs generally.  Matthew C. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years’ War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765 (Pittsburgh, 2003), concludes that Braddock’s defeat was exacerbated by his alienation of the Ohio Indians.  

104 Anderson, Crucible of War, 106, makes the point that “Scarouady, loyal to the old and now nearly defunct idea that the valley belonged to the Iroquois, had no choice but to make common cause with Braddock if he hoped to see the French expelled.”  

105 Anderson, Crucible of War, 95, remarks that “Braddock could understand Indians only as exotics, and troublesome ones at that.” 

106 This is not to say that lavish gifts were not a legitimate means of alliance-building.  In May 1762, Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, wrote to the Earl of Egremont about the success of the French over the years in keeping Indian allegiance.  He observed, “The French ... spared no labor, or Expence to gain their friendship and Esteem, which alone enabled them to support the War in these parts so long whilst we, as either not thinking of them of Sufficient Consequence, or that we had not so much occasion for their assistance not only fell infinitely short of the Enemy in our presents &ca to the Indians, but have of late I am apprehensive been rather premature in our sudden retrenchment of some necessary Expences, to which they have been always accustomed.”  Quoted by Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York, 1991), 258, from James Sullivan et al., eds., The Papers of Sir William Johnson (14 vols., Albany, 1921-65), II, 461. 

107 Beverly W. Bond, ed., “The Captivity of Charles Stuart, 1755-57,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 13 (1926), 63:  Stuart recounted Shingas’s Nov 1755 explanation of the incident:  During the conference, “he and 5 other Cheifs [sic] of the Delaware Shawnee & Mingo Nations (Being 2 from Each Nation) had applied to Gen^l Braddock and Enquired what he intended to do with the Land [after the war]....  On w^ch Gen^l Braddock said that No Savage Shou^d  Inherit the Land.”  Returning the next day, he “repeated their Former Questions ... and Gen^l Braddock made the same reply as Formerly, on w^ch Shingas and the other Chiefs answered That if they might not have Liberty To Live on the Land they wou^d not Fight for it To w^ch Gen^l Braddock answered that he did not need their Help and had No doubt of driveing the French and their Indians away.”  An editorial note quotes the Aug 1755 comments of Scarouday from Minutes of the Executive Council of Pennsylvania, VI, 588-589:  “He is now dead; but he was a bad man when he was alive; he looked upon us as dogs, and would never hear anything that was said to him.  We often endeavoured to advise him and to tell him of the danger he was in with his Soldiers; but he never appeared pleased with us & that was the reason that a great many of our Warriors [32 of 40] left him & would not be under his command.” Note assertion is directly contradicted by George Crogan’s testimony; see Croghan’s Journal to the Ohio ...,” 18 Aug 1757, in Sargent, ed., The History of the Expedition, 408.  Whether Braddock was set up by Shingas, their leader, who had his own ambitions, is not relevant:  White, Middle Ground, 237, notes that Shingas had asked similar questions in 1752 (citing Gist’s Journal, 12 Mar 1752; see also Croghan to Gov Hamilton, Pennsylvania Archives, 1^st ser., I, 144-145).  Interestingly, While, Middle Ground, 249n, remarks that it was not until 1759 that anyone analyzed the reasons for the failure to get Delaware and Shawnee support:  Charles Thomson, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese Indians, etc., with  Notes by the Editor on Indian Customs (London, 1759). 

108 Or, as Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness,” 642-644, has noted, he was not ignorant of European tactical operational standards. 

109 Matthew C. Ward, “‘The European Method of Warring Is Not Practised Here’: The Failure of British Military Policy in the Ohio Valley, 1755-1759,” War in History, 4 (1997), 247-263, explores many of the non-intelligence issues. 

110 This section is based on John Kenneth Rowland,  “Political and Military Intelligence before the American Revolutionary War, May 1774-April 1775: Accessing the Massachusetts Information Order,” presentation to the Society for Military History, May 2003, and “General Thomas Gage, the Eighteenth-Century Literature of Military Intelligence, and the Transition from Peace to Revolutionary War.” 

111 John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, 1965), 424:  Gage was “the perfect peacetime general” who had “no talent at all for making war.” 

112 The five Coercive Acts (Boston Port Act, Massachusetts Government Act, Administration of Justice Act, and the Quartering Act) plus the Quebec Act were considered the “Intolerable Acts” by patriots.  See David Ammerman, In the Common Cause: American Response to the Coercive Acts of 1774 (Charlottesville, Va, 1974). 

113 Lord Dartmouth, Secretary of State for America, to Gage, 1 Jul 1775, in Clarence E. Carter, ed., The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage (2 vols., Ann Arbor, 1931), I, 201:  After a year of disappointing dispatches from Gage, Dartmouth scolded him because his “letters hitherto have not been so full & explicit as I wished them to be.” 

114 Lord Dartmouth to Gage, 23 Aug 1774, Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I, 172: “I take it for granted that you will have opportunity, upon the spot, of acquiring important intelligence,” especially for indicting patriot leaders. 

115 It has been suggested that Gage sent out at least one soldier pretending to be a deserter in order to gain insights about patriot military preparations.  According to Thompson and Campbell, “General Gage’s Spies,” Thompson, ed., Secret New England, 21-22, after consulting with Gage in Nov 1774, Benjamin Thompson employed Private William Bowdidge in New Hampshire as an agent. 

116 Newspapers were an important source of unfiltered political and military information.  See esp. the patriot Boston Gazette and Massachusetts Spy, and the loyalist Massachusetts Gazette and Boston Evening Post. 

117 Maj Gen William Brattle, commander of the Massachusetts provincial militia was seen by John Adams in the district of Maine in late Jun 1775, who concluded that Brattle had been sent  “to acquaint them with the State of Things, with the Views of Administration, & in order to quiet their fears, and remove their Apprehensions,” John Adams ([York]) to William Tudor (Boston), 29 Jun 1774, Robert J. Taylor, et al, eds., Papers of John Adams (10+ vols., Cambridge, Mass, 1977+), II, 104-105 at 105. 

118 In 1818, Hannah Adams Wells related a family story about an attempt by a British agent to bribe her father, Sam Adams in late June 1774.  He was a most wanted man: John Andrews, in Winthrop Sargent, ed., “Letters of John Andrews, Esq., of Boston, 1772-1775,” Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, 8 (1864-65), 340, observed that it was the “ultimate wish and desire of the high Government party ... to get Samuel Adams out of the way.” As published in William V. Wells, The Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams, being a Narrative of his Acts and Opinions, and of his Agency in Producing and Forwarding the American Revolution, with an Extract from his Correspondence, State Papers, and Political Essays (3 vols., Boston, 1865-68; 2^nd ed., Boston, 1888), II, 193, Hannah’s statement reads:  “By Colonel Fenton, who commanded one of the newly arrived regiments, the Governor sent a confidential and verbal message.  The officer, after the customary salutations, stated the object of his visit.  He said that an adjustment of the existing disputes was very desirable, as well as important to the interests of both.  That he was authorized by Governor Gage to assure him that he had been empowered to confer upon him such benefits as would be satisfactory, upon the condition that he would engage to cease in his opposition to the measures of government, and that it was the advice of Governor Gage to him not to incur the further displeasure of his Majesty; that his conduct had been such as made him liable to the penalties of an act of Henry the Eighth, by which persons could be sent to England for trial, and, by changing his course, he would not only receive great personal advantages, but would thereby make his peace with the King.  Adams listened with apparent interest to this recital, until the messenger had concluded.  Then rising, he replied, with glowing indignation:  ‘Sir, I trust I have long since made my peace with the King of kings.  No personal consideration shall induce me to abandon the righteous cause of my country.  Tell Governor Gage it is the advice of Samuel Adams to him no longer to insult the feelings of an exasperated people’.”  At II, 196, Wells notes “The fact has descended in family tradition that he was thrice tempted by British emissaries” although there is no other evidence to that effect.  There was a loyalist named John Fenton, a New Hampshire militia colonel and half-pay British officer, who had family ties and owned property in Boston who is most likely the person named in this statement.  Fenton’s career is explored in Rowland, “Political and Military Intelligence before the American Revolutionary War, May 1774-April 1775: Accessing the Massachusetts Information Order,” presentation to the Society for Military History, May 2003. 

119 Militia arming and training were not illegal unless they were conducted without proper orders from the provincial commander, Maj Gen William Brattle, and the regimental colonels, most of whom were loyalists.  By Aug 1774, the legal situation became tenuous but Gage was not in a position to attempt to stop military activity without violence.  Brattle alluded to the implications of treason resulting from potentially illegal militia exercises in late Aug 1774; see Jonas Minot Deposition, 3 Sept 1774, printed in Boston Gazette, 5 Sept 1774.  Legal issues concerning British treason laws are discussed in William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (2^nd ed., London, 1724), bk. I, chap. 17.  See also Bradley Chapin, The American Law of Treason: Revolutionary and Early National Origins (Seattle, 1964), 10-28; and John K. Rowland, “The Rise of the Revolutionary ‘New Militia,’ 1774-1776,” in Origins of the Second Amendment: The Creation of the Constitutional Rights of Militia and of Keeping and Bearing Arms.  Ph.D. Dissertation (Ohio State University, 1978), 278-315.

 120 Gage planned an expedition to Worcester; see Gage to Maj Gen Frederick Haldimand, 14 Jul 1774, Thomas Gage Papers, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich. 

121 Brattle to Gage, 27 Aug 1774, printed in Boston Gazette, 5 Sept 1774.   

122 Contemporary accounts of the expedition include Boston Gazette, 5 Sept 1774; Sargent, ed., “Letters of John Andrews,” MHS Proceedings, 8 (1864-65), 350-351; and Franklin B. Dexter, ed., The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles (3 vols., New York, 1901), I, 476-485.   The best secondary account is in Dirk Hoerder, Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765-1780 (New York, 1977), 288-290.  See also Robert P. Richmond, Powder Alarm, 1774 (Princeton, 1971).  

123 Boston Gazette, 12 Sept 1774: “all the country were prodigiously enraged, they having been informed that a party of soldiers had marched to Framingham, to seize the powder of that town, and had killed 6 of the inhabitants outright.” 

124 The best account is in French, General Gage’s Informers.  See also David J. Kiracofe, “Dr. Benjamin Church and the Dilemma of Treason in Revolutionary Massachusetts,” New England Quarterly, 70 (1997), 443-462, for Church’s earlier life, his capture, and fate.  There is some uncertainty when Church began his clandestine mission, perhaps as early as Oct 1774; this issue is discussed in Rowland, “General Thomas Gage, the Eighteenth-Century Literature of Military Intelligence, and the Transition from Peace to Revolutionary War, 1774-1775.” 

125 Shy, “Thomas Gage: Weak Link of Empire,” 28, credits Gage with “an excellent spy system” but overstates the completeness of his knowledge of “what was going on in the countryside.” 

126 Gage to Captain John Brown and Ensign Henry De Berniere, 22 Feb 1775, in Peter Force, comp. American Archives: Consisting of a Collection of Authentick Records, State Papers, Debates, and Letters of Other Notices of Publick Affairs (9 vols., Washington, 1832-1861), 4th ser., I, 1263-1268.  Gage called for officers “capable of taking sketches of the country” on 8 Jan 1775:  John Barker, “A British Officer in Boston in 1775,” The Atlantic Quarterly, 39 (Apr 1877), 394. 

127 Neil R. Stout, “The Spies Who Went Out in the Cold,” American Heritage, 23, no. 2 (Feb 1972), 100, makes the point concerning the walking style of these officers. 

128 French, General Gage’s Informers, 10-33. 

129 For the amphibious operation to Fort Pownall in mid-Apr 1775, see William Molineaux, “An Account of the Manner which the Cannon & Spare Arms were taken from Fort Pownall on the 14th April '75 by an Order from Genl Gage, directed to Thos Goldthwait Esq Commander of said Fort” (Watertown), 23 Oct 1775, in William B. Clark, et al., eds., Naval Documents of the American Revolution (10+ vols., Washington, DC, 1964+), II, 577-578; see also Colonel Thomas Goldthwaite (Fort Pownall) to Thomas Cushing, 16 Apr 1775, in Clark, I, 186.   

130 The Salem expedition took place in Feb; see James D. Phillips, “Why Colonel Leslie Came to Salem,” Essex Institute Historical Collections, 90 (1954), 313-316.  

131 For Concord on 19 Apr 1775, see John R. Alden, “Why the March Concord?” American Historical Review, 49 (1944), 446-454.  Concerning this raid, see John Shy, “The American Revolution: The Military Conflict as a Revolutionary War,” Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., Essays on the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 1973), 132:  “British intelligence of the target [Concord] was good.” 

132 Church revealed an absolutely key aspect of patriot policy, under what circumstances to react to army excursions from Boston: “Should any body of troops, w^th Artillery, and Baggage, march out of Boston,” he secretly reported, “the Country should instantly be alarmed, and called together to oppose their March, to the last extremity,” Intelligence Report to Gage, after 30 Mar 1775, Gage Papers, Clements Library. 

133 Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride, 79, 84-95, discusses patriot intelligence activities. 

134 The case against Margaret Gage is entirely circumstantial.  She is reputed to have overheard Gage planning the final aspects of the plan for the march on Concord and alerted the local Sons of Liberty.  However, there were so many expectations of a British move sometime in the spring and physical indicators of preparations for the impeding expedition, as well as possible eavesdropping by Gage’s household servants, that Mrs. Gage’s culpability cannot be confirmed.  See Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride, 387, as well as Alden, General Gage in America, 249-250, for some of the arguments pro and con. 

135 French, General Gage’s Informers, 115-146; Thompson and Campbell, “General Gage’s Spies,” Secret New England, 19-23; and  G. I. Brown, Scientist, Soldier, Statesman, Spy; Count Rumford: The Extraordinary Life of a Scientific Genius (Thrupp, UK, 1999), 9-18; documents at 163-165.  See Clements Library, Spy Letters of the American Revolution at <www.si.umich.edu/spies/index-gallery.html> for Thompson’s 6 May 1775 letter in invisible ink. 

136 Shy, “The American Revolution,” Kurtz and Hutson, eds., Essays on the American Revolution, 132: “British intelligence ... failed in two ... critical respects.  It could not prevent the transmission of every British order and movement throughout the civilian population, and it grossly underestimated the rebel will and capability for large-scale combat.” Shy follows with the following statement from Gage to Lord Barrington, Secretary at War, 27 Jun 1775, Private, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, II, 686-687:  “These people show a spirit and conduct against us that they never showed against the French, and everybody has judged them from their former appearance and behavior, which has led many into great mistakes.”  

137 French, General Gage’s Informers, 154-157, examines the evidence that Church was in Philadelphia at this time and could not report to Gage. Alden, General Gage in America, 266, observes that Gen John “Burgoyne in particular seems to have talked freely.”  See also Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 82. 

138 Gage to Earl of Dartmouth, No. 8, 27 Jul 1774, Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I, 363: “I mention in the same Letter that I had experienced much Timidity and Backwardness; which finding in those pointed to me as staunch Friends to Government, surprised me a good deal.  I have endeavored to find out the Motives of their Timidity, and various Causes are assigned for it.” 

139 Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 13, states that Burgoyne “received a thorough grounding in everything to do with cavalry – indeed, he was to remain by temperament a cavalry officer all his life.”  This approach to military operations included reconnaissance and scouting, and it is likely that he found Turpin de Crissé’s discussion of intelligence techniques from a cavalry perspective very informative.

140 Burgoyne was commander of the 16^th Light Dragoons and led them as part of a 3000-man Anglo-Portuguese brigade, which he also led during a campaign in Portugal in 1762.  Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 39-40, describes his action after being ordered to take Valencia d’Alcántara:  he evaded a large Spanish corps, used good as well as contradictory intelligence from local guides and spies, especially concerning the routines of the town’s Spanish garrison, and pulled off a complete surprise, resulting in destruction of an enemy regiment and eliminating the Spanish communications center for the invasion.  Howson, 42-44, quotes Burgoyne’s description of actions at the Duaro River where, in the face of an overwhelming enemy force: he “had the opportunity of reconnoitring all the Avenues to his Camp” and “Upon these observations I determined to attempt a Surprise,” leading to another brilliant success.  See Burgoyne’s later comments on the campaign in [John Burgoyne], A State of the Expedition from Canada as laid before the House of Commons (2^nd ed., London, 1780), 6-7. 

141 He was deceived by his Portuguese guides concerning the distances he had to cover to reach his objective.  See Edward B. De Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes in the Latter Half of the Eighteenth Century, Derived from the Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. John Burgoyne, General, Statesman, Dramatist (London, 1876), 41. 

142 Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 10:  “His knowledge of the French language … sufficed … to enable him to make his way in foreign society, as well as to study the military literature of France, and to instruct himself generally in the science of war.”  He was a careful reader of Saxe’s Mes Révèries and one the original subscribers for the 1757 English translation, Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 14. 

143 Code of Instruction for officers of the 16^th Light Dragoons, 1759, in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 19:  Since 1743, Burgoyne wrote, “The military science, which in the course of the long peace had degenerated into the tricks of parade and the froth of discipline, has been attentively considered both in theory and practice; ….  A short space of time given to reading each day, if the books are well chosen and the subject properly digested, will furnish a great deal of instruction.  To those who do not understand French, I would recommend a serious and assiduous application till they attain it.  The best modern books upon our profession are written in that language, and in foreign service gentlemen will find themselves at the greatest loss if they do not both write and speak in readily.”  Burgoyne also recommended (Fonblanque, 20) drawing and the practice of “taking views from an eminence, and to measure distances with his eye.  This would be a talent particularly adapted to the light dragoon service.” 

144 Burgoyne to Col [Granville] Elliott, [1766], in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 60-61:  “Upon coming to this neighbourhood [Austrian army HQ, Deutsch-Brod, in Bohemia north of Vienna], I found the Emperor’s prohibition of all foreign officers, and even of those of his own generals who were not on duty, was put rigidly in execution.  To ask leave that had been refused to men of the first rank was in vain; but by a little intrigue, a good deal of perseverance, and perhaps more assurance than I ought to boast of, I have succeeded to be present incognito at the practice of the principal manœuvres….  [They] are calculated to show the Emperor all the great parts of war, and are executed with precision hardly to be conceived.  The infantry exceed everything I have seen in every branch of their business; the cavalry are very rapid….” 

145 During his visit to Berlin, a friendly Prussian officer gave him a copy of correspondence in 1758 between Frederick the Great and General Foucet containing a copy of Frederick’s unpublished essay, “Refléxions sur quelques changems dans la façon de faire la guerre,” which provided insights into his military thinking.  It is printed in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 469-482. 

146 Burgoyne to Elliott, [1766], in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 60:  “Since I left Brunswick I have had the most agreeable progress imaginable.  Every step I have taken has been to a soldier classic ground, and I have wandered over it with enthusiasm.  I have had the good fortune to go over many of the great scenes with very intelligent officers who were present in the actions; I have been assisted with the best plans, and have conversed with most of the principal actors on both sides.”   

147 “Observations and Reflections upon the Present Military State of Prussia, Austria, and France,” 1766, printed in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 62-82. 

148 Burgoyne to Lord Rochfort, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, [25 Jun 1775], in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 142-153:  Gage apparently had not informed him of Dr. Benjamin Church’s intelligence; Burgoyne complained, 149-150, concerning mismanagement of finances, that there was no excuse for being destitute “of the most important of all circumstances in war or negotiation – intelligence.  We are ignorant not only of what passes in congresses, but want spies for the hill half a mile off.  And what renders the reflection truly provoking is that there was hardly a leading man among the rebels, in council, or in the field, but at a proper time, and by proper management, might have been bought.”  Fonblanque, 150n, and others have read this complaint as an attack on the integrity of Americans; however, it is also a direct continuity from the military literature’s focus on the primary motivation for spying.  Earlier in the letter (Fonblanque, 143), he noted that “The principle of seizing arms, and thereby bringing the designs of the malcontents to a test and a decision was certainly just.  We can only wonder that it was not sooner adopted … and at the same time to have seized the persons of Adams, Hancock, and other leaders who were then within his reach, it would probably have tended to the best effects; but even then means should have been found, such as at a later time he made use of, to obtain secret intelligence of the enemy counsels; military precautions should have been used to prepare the troops for the sort of combat they were to expect, and so prevent a possibility of insult to the troops, or at least of advantage over them.”  Burgoyne described his comments in this very long letter as “intelligence collected by personal observation of men and things which those at home have not opportunity to make,” Fonblanque, 153.  Note, the letter is undated; the date is supplied by Max Mintz, The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates (New Haven and London, 1990), 245n.

 149 Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 85, calls this “a roving commission.”  Burgoyne to Lord North, 14 Jun 1775, in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 138-139:  He proposed to be officially dismissed from the army and to be taken by the navy to one of the major seaports where “I could find means to be received in those provinces where the war shall not actively have extended,” and publicly declare his intention “to inform myself of the general sentiments of the Americans – not charged with any commission or authority to treat; but as an individual member of Parliament, a friend to human nature, and a well-wisher to the united interests of the two countries, to obtain such lights as might enable me to assist the great work of conciliation.”  In another context, Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (Lincoln, Neb, and London, 1964), 108, described Burgoyne’s “fantasy-projection of himself,” which appears to apply to this proposal made before he could have gotten a sense of the real situation in America. 

150 See William B. Willcox, “Too Many Cooks: British Planning before Saratoga,” Journal of British Studies, 2 (1962), 56-90. 

151 Ward, The War of the Revolution, II, 897n, observes that there is little primary source material on the actions at the battle of Oriskany or the siege of Fort Stanwix (other than St. Leger’s letter to Burgoyne, on the British side). 

152 Burgoyne’s Narrative, State of the Expedition, 25: “Secret means” were devised to effect the juncture of St. Leger’s and Burgoyne’s columns.   

153 Journal of the Late Principal Proceedings of the Army, State of the Expedition, Appx. VII, xxxii:  On 7 Jul, Capt. Fraser’s “advanced scouts discovered the enemy’s centries.”   

154 Guides and scouts sometimes switched roles:  see Lt Col Kingston Testimony, State of the Expedition, 116, Query 139, referred to “guides who had served us very faithfully as scouts upon former occasions.” 

155 Also called “discovering-parties,” in St. Leger Account of Occurrences at Fort Stanwix, State of the Expedition, Appx. XIII, lxxviii.  Journal of the late Proceedings of the Army, 30 Jun 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. VII, xxv, explains that his three-day wait after taking Fort Ticonderoga was necessary to for logistical reasons and to send out parties to collect intelligence.  On at least one occasion, he personally rode out to view road conditions and topography, Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 183. 

156 Lt Col Sutherland, Burgoyne’s chief engineer, led a large body troops on an armed reconnaissance; see Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 227. 

157 Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 319 n20, citing PRO CO 42/36, f. 213f, indicates that at least one Indian reconnaissance party was led by an officer, Capt. Mackay.  Testimony of Earl of Harrington, 29^th Foot, State of the Expedition, 65, Query 11, ref Indians “on scout” who detected an ambush. 

158 E.g., Journal of the Late Principal Proceedings of the Army, State of the Expedition, Appx. VII, xxxii:  On 6 Jul 1777, patriot stragglers were captured who provided intelligence concerning the composition of the American rear guard. 

159 E.g., Burgoyne to Lord Germain, 19 May 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. V, xx, refers to “intelligence, from different spies and deserters.”  Journal of the Late Principal Proceedings of the Army, 6 Jul 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. VII, xxxii, refers to captured stragglers who provided intelligence.    

160 Journal of the Late Principal Proceedings of the Army, 7 Jul 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. VII, xxxiv: “The country people about Skenesborough having reported that part of the enemy were still retreating” from Fort Ticonderoga, the 9^th Foot was detached to “observe the enemy’s motions.”  Testimony of Lt Col Kingston, Adjutant General and Burgoyne’s Secretary, State of the Expedition, 135, Query 71:  “some very confidential men that were employed” as scouts. 

161 Burgoyne to Lord Germain, 20 Aug 1777, Appx. VIII, xlii, referred to “A provincial gentleman of confidence, who had been sent with the detachment [to Bennington] as knowing the country and the character of the inhabitants.”

162 Secret service funds were in the custody of Burgoyne’s secretary; see Testimony of Lt Col Kingston, State of the Expedition, 112, Queries 107-109.  Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 323 n13, states quotes from PRO Treasury 1/572, bundle 3 (“Brig Fraser’s Accounts of Contingencies”) that Fraser paid £5 13s 4d to “men who had brought an exact account of the rebel army, cannon & dispositions.” 

163 Burgoyne to Lord North, [Jun 1775], in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 174-179; while Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 81-82, interprets Burgoyne’s actions as an attempted bribe, Fonblanque, 174, rejects the attempt as not in his character.  George A. Billias, “John Burgoyne: Ambitious General,” in Billias, ed., George Washington’s Opponents, 184, accepts Burgoyne’s role. 

164 This affair is described by Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution, 43-49. The attempt was made in writing in Jun 1777 by Peter Levius (Chief Justice of Quebec and a banished New Hampshire loyalist) because he thought Sullivan’s willingness, when he was on parole after being captured, to carry an oral message from Gen William Howe, the British army commander, to the Continental Congress, was a possible indicator of Sullivan’s at least incipient loyalism.  He offered a pardon and “ample reward” for providing Burgoyne with military intelligence and, if possible, to divert patriot troops from Burgoyne’s path.  The messenger was captured carrying a British pass, an unusual amount of money, letters for various Americans, and a false-bottom canteen with Levius’s letter.  Gen Philip Schuyler devised a plan to forge a reply to dupe the British into thinking they had a military advantage.  Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 321 n24, cites Burgoyne letter, 6 Aug 1777, CO 5/94, ff. 707-712, for evidence of Burgoyne’s knowledge of the attempt.

 165 Burgoyne to Lord Rochfort, [25 Jun 1775], in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 143.  Jeremy Black, “British Intelligence and the Mid-Eighteenth-Century Crisis,” Intelligence and National Security, 2 (1987), 214, comments on the closed nature of the European national policy and strategy formulation process, which restricted access to only a few trusted individuals.  The same condition applied in America, making it virtually impossible for Burgoyne to send a penetration agent or to suborn members of the New York and Vermont provincial congresses, and provincial and local committees of safety, or the patriot militias and army. 

166 Alden, General Gage in America, 266, notes that it was probably Burgoyne who inadvertently leaded British plans that led to the battle of Bunker Hill in 1775. 

167 Testimony of Earl of Harrington, State of the Expedition, 77, Query 102:  His “situation in that army did not entitle me to receive that intelligence [from a deserter]....  My duty was to bring him to the general.”  He also testified that, even as Burgoyne’s aide de camp, “There were certain matters of intelligence which it would have been improper for him to mention to any body.”  In early 1777 just after Burgoyne’s arrival in Montreal from Quebec, he discovered that his operational plan had reached the city, “publishing the whole design of the campaign, almost as accurately as the original,” with implications of a leak.  He said that he kept his copy secret from his own staff and that Gov Carleton in Quebec probably had from his as well.  The most likely sources were British friends of the patriot cause in London who had seen the plan published in several different English newspapers and had forwarded the intelligence to America, and their letters had arrived before Burgoyne!  Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 153, citing Burgoyne to Gen Harvey, 19 May 1777 [a copy is in State of the Expedition, Appx. VII, lxvi-lxvii], which points out that he had forgotten that he told Gen Fraser about his plans and, in fact, that they had been published in several English newspapers in great detail.  In another case, according to Howson, 164 and 319 n20, some historians have accused Burgoyne of deliberately withholding intelligence from his generals at Fort Ticonderoga that the fort was significantly garrisoned far below the numbers expected; this subterfuge would allow him an easy victory that would enhance his status.  However, Howson points out that the 5 intelligence reports from loyalists and 2 from an army scouting party contained in PRO CO 42/36, ff 213f, “Intelligence Reports ...,” all indicate higher numbers. 

168 Burgoyne’s Review of Evidence, State of the Expedition, 141: “A man must indeed be void of military and political address, to put upon a paper a critical design, where surprize was in question, and every thing depended upon secrecy” – “surely there is nothing new or improbable in the idea, that a general should disguise his real intentions at the outset of an expedition, even from the officer whom he appointed to execute them, provided a communication with that officer was certain and not remote.” 

169 Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 163, cites Burgoyne’s general orders in late June 1777 requiring cleared ground around camp sites and concealed sentries to give warning of surprise attacks, caused by his recognition of the dangers of American skill in “little war.” 

170 Burgoyne to Lord Germain, 20 Oct 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. XIV, lxxxviii, concerning a “letter in cipher” from Gen Clinton; Clinton to Burgoyne, 10 Aug 1777, was a “masked letter” that required an hourglass-shaped key to reveal the relevant portions of the message.  Burgoyne had lost his key and had to reconstruct one by trial and error.  See Clements Library, Spy Letters of the American Revolution <www.si.umich.edu/spies> for a copy.  Burgoyne was apparently referring to this or another letter in cipher in his Review of the Evidence, State of the Expedition, 165, where he notes that a letter from Gen Clinton “is in my possession, but could not be produced [for the inquiry] without discovering a secret mode of conveying intelligence that it might be improper to make public,” even to Parliament.   

171 Burgoyne to Lord Germain, 20 Oct 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. XIV, lxxxviii. 

172 Burgoyne to Lord Germain, 20 Oct 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. XIV, lxxxviii; Capt Scott, 53^rd Regiment, carried an innocuous written message as well as an accurate verbal one to Gen Clinton; see Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 215; for Scott’s account of his mission, see Flonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 287-290. 

173 Canteen:  Sir William Howe to Burgoyne, 17 Jul 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. X, xlix.  Silver bullet:  Wallace Brown, The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York, 1969), 139n, quotes a Boston Gazette, 3 Nov 1777, account:  “... one Taylor, a spy was hanged at Hurley, who was detected with a letter to Burgoyne, which he had swallowed in a silver bullet, but by the assistance of a tartar emetic he discharged the same.” 

174 Burgoyne to Lord Germain, 20 Aug 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. IX, xliv: “of all the messengers I have sent, I know of two being hanged, and am ignorant whether any of the rest arrived.” 

175 Burgoyne did not entirely trust them, esp. their leaders.  See Burgoyne to Lord Germain, 11 Jul 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. VIII, xxxviii:  He remarked that the Indians were led by “M. St. Luc, a Canadian gentleman ... and one of the best partizans the French had in the last war” and “one Langlade, the very man who projected and executed, with these very nations, the defeat of General Braddock.”  In his Review of the Evidence, 130-131, he criticized these men for “their ignorance of the [Indian] language, and the very probity of their characters, rendered them of no weight in Indian councils.”  Generally, he was unhappy with “the supposed assistance of this much over-valued race for scouts and out-posts.”  See Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 155, 172, 177, 189, 190, 206 for additional comments. 

176 Burgoyne Review of Evidence, State of the Expedition, 165. 

177At Fort Anne in July, a small British force there was lured by a fake deserter into surprise by a larger patriot force.  As Burgoyne’s army proceeded south, a British sergeant later recalled that “an American soldier came from the fort; he said that he had deserted, though it was afterwards discovered that he was a spy” and exaggerated the size of the garrison; after a messenger left to deliver that (false) intelligence to Burgoyne, “the pretended deserter disappeared; he had viewed the situation and strength of the British.”  As a result, patriot forces in the area attacked the small British contingent.  Roger Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences during the late American War, from its Commencement to the Year 1783 (Dublin, 1809), 141.  See Howson, Burgoyne at Saratoga, 191. 

178 At Bennington in August, loyalist Philip Skene was deceived by fake loyalists; see, e.g., General Orders, 16 Aug 1777 General Orders, in Burgoyne, in Supplement to the State of the Expedition, 18: “The failure of the enterprise seems to be owing, in the first instance, to the credulity of those who managed the department of intelligence, who suffered great numbers of the rebels [pretending to be loyalists] to pass and repass, and perhaps to count the number of the [British] detachment.”   

179 At Fort Stanwix in August, St. Leger abandoned his expedition after being fooled into believing that overwhelming patriot reinforcements were approaching his position; Lt Col St. Leger Account of Occurrences, State of the Expedition, Appx. XIII, lxxxi.  See also Burgoyne’s Review of the Evidence, 152: “It was then also known, that by the false intelligence respecting the strength of Fort Stanwix, the infamous behaviour of the Indians, and the want of the promised co-operation of the loyal inhabitants, Lieut. Col. St. Leger had been obliged to retreat.”  While in this instance the false report came from a retarded German loyalist, one Hon Yost Schuyler, who, while awaiting execution for recruiting for the British, was duped into delivering totally false information about a large American force approaching the fort.  He  used an Indian assistant to panic St. Leger’s Indians into decamping immediately.  This left St. Leger with a difficult decision in the face of an ominous (but false) report.  See also Ward, The War of the Revolution, II, 490. 

180 Gen von Riedesel was betrayed by a feigned loyalist into losing his way in an attack on a patriot redoubt.  Burgoyne made a scathing comment concerning his gullibility, which von Riedesel never forgave.  See Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 223. 

181 Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 214:  An Indian courier was killed by the patriots who discovered two dispatches from Burgoyne to the British commander of Fort Ticonderoga.  Howson argues that Burgoyne may have “intended the letters to be intercepted to persuade Gates to keep his force concentrated near the river.” 

182 Burgoyne’s Review of the Evidence, State of the Expedition, 164:  Concerning “The questions relating to the enemy having their baggage packed, if that circumstance was meant as an indication that they meant to retreat,” he pointed out operational reasons other than retreat that would account for this action. 

183 Testimony of Sir Guy Carleton, State of the Expedition, 37, Query 53. 

184 E.g., Journal of the Late Principal Proceedings of the Army, 7 Jul 1777, A State of the Expedition, Appx. VII, xxxiv: “The country people about Skenesborough having reported that part of the enemy were still retreating,” the 9^th Foot was detached to “observe the enemy’s motions.”  General Orders, in Burgoyne, A Supplement to the State of the Expedition ... (London, 1780), 26, provides intelligence concerning patriot efforts to recapture Fort Ticonderoga. 

185 For example, Burgoyne presented intelligence findings of enemy strength and dispositions to two Councils of War, 12 and 13 Oct 1777, to give a clear picture of the threat and to reach critical operational decisions: Council Minutes, State of the Expedition, Appx. XV, xcviii; see also Burgoyne’s Narrative, 27. 

186 Burgoyne to Lord Germain, 19 May 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. V, xx: “intelligence, from different spies and deserters, confirms the design of the enemy to dispute Ticonderoga vigorously.”  Burgoyne also recognized different forms of intelligence:  “collateral information” (Burgoyne’s Narrative, 18); “strictest information” (Appx. VII, li); “positive intelligence” (Appx. III, iii); “best intelligence” (Instructions for Lt Col Baume, Appx. XII, lxvi); and “combined intelligence” (Lt Col Kingston Testimony, 99, Query 31). 

187 See Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 189: he states that the Bennington raid had been based on the need for provisions and carriages and that “intelligence reported by General Reidesel, and with all I had otherwise received” had “tended to confirm” of strength of loyalists and panic of patriots.  This assessment was reinforced by “Those who knew the country best” who were “the most sanguine.”  “Had my intelligence been worse founded,” he would not have proceeded.  However, Mackesy, The War for America, 134, argues that Burgoyne “radically altered the plan” to send Col Baum to Bennington with a mixed force on loyalist Philip Skene’s assurance of loyalist support, even though Baum spoke no English. 

188 See Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 167. 

189 Burgoyne to Lord Germain, 30 Jul 1777, Private, cited by Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 184, from PRO CO 42/36, f. 771-775. 

190 Burgoyne’s Review of the Evidence, State of the Expedition, 177.  Mackesy, The War for America, 137, notes that Burgoyne esp. at Saratoga in Oct 1777 “was ignorant of the ground and the enemy dispositions, for his Indians and scouts had been driven within his lines by American irregulars.” 

191 Burgoyne’s Review of the Evidence, State of the Expedition, 165. 

192 John Shy makes this point explicitly in “The American Revolution,” Kurtz and Hutson, eds., Essays on the American Revolution, 136:  “The campaign was a disaster, in large part because the intelligence estimates, gleaned mainly from exile sources, were much too optimistic.”  See, e.g, Maj Gen William Phillips (Crown Point) to Burgoyne, 23 Oct 1776 in Fonblanque, Political and Military Episodes, 218-219:  “deserters ... are daily giving accounts of the panic of those people [patriots].  Two men came in from Albany who report … that the Royalists are all waiting with eager impatience for assistance.”  In addition, Burgoyne’s disdain for patriot military leaders, because they had “no men of military science,” misled him throughout the campaign; quoted by Mackesy, The War for America, 131.  Many works deal with the problem of loyalism but few deal with intelligence issues. 

193 Burgoyne’s Review of the Evidence, State of the Expedition, 165. 

194 In terms of military skill, Burgoyne and his officers recognized the difficulty of collecting military information: see Testimony of Earl of Balcarras, State of the Expedition, 46, Query 77: “It requires great experience to make a computation of numbers by seeing them [marching soldiers] pass.” Brown, The Good Americans, 110:  Burgoyne’s expedition was “predicated on mass Loyalist support, confidently predicted by two well-known Tories in the North, Colonel Philip Skene and Governor [William] Tryon.”  Skene had been a captain during the Seven Years War and had served in the West Indies and in Gen Sir Jeffrey Amherst’s North American campaigns; see Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga, 159. 

195 Burgoyne’s instructions to Col Philip Skene, 14 Aug 1777, State of the Expedition, Appx. XII, lxxii:  He was to accompany Lt Col Baum and a German contingent to Bennington and “to consult with you upon all matter of intelligence,” dealing with loyalists there, and navigation of the forest.  In Burgoyne’s Review of Evidence, State of the Expedition, 135-136, he emphasized that “I undertook the expedition to Bennington upon report, strengthened by the suggestion of persons of long experience and residence in America; who had been present on the spot when the rebellion broke out; and whose information had been much respected by the administration in England; that the friends to the British cause were as five to one, and that they wanted only the appearance of a protecting force to shew themselves” (emphasis in original). 

196 In his 16 Aug 1777 General Orders, printed in Burgoyne, Supplement to the State of the Expedition, 18, Burgoyne blamed Skene, without naming him, as the main cause of the defeat at Bennington:  “The failure of the enterprise [Bennington] seems to be owing, in the first instance, to the credulity of those who managed the department of intelligence, who suffered great numbers of the rebels to pass and repass, and perhaps to count the number of the [British] detachment.”  As a leading loyalist in the region, he claimed knowledge of the willingness of loyalists around Bennington to join Burgoyne’s expedition, or at least to provide support.  His mistake in accepting the word of patriots pretending to be loyalists was the point at issue, especially since they served as double agents to provide intelligence back to the patriot forces.  F. J. Hudleston, Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne: Misadventures of an English General in the Revolution (Garden City, NY, 1927), 172-173, identifies Skene as the person responsible.  Burgoyne also blamed the departure of most of his remaining Indians after a council on 4 Aug, remarking that despite the great expense and “high expectations at home and abroad ... that indeed my own army was by no means in condition to dispense with” the Indians:  Burgoyne’s Review of Evidence, State of the Expedition, 130. 

197 See a biting critique of Burgoyne in A Brief Examination of the Plan and Conduct of the Northern Expedition in America, In 1777... (London, 1779), which challenged his lack of experience and dependence on reading:  (14) the “situation ... required all the judgment of an experienced, cool, steady, war-formed General,” but “General Burgoyne, with good parts and no judgment; great reading and little experience; very naturally supposed himself equal to any command, and as naturally failed in the performance of what he undertook.”  It concluded (15), “so critical a situation was beyond the precepts of his reading: – his experience was not extensive enough to furnish him with precedents:  nor his judgment strong enough to enable him to act decisively without them.” 

198 This continuity demonstrates that Kaplan’s conclusion in “The Hidden War,” 117, is incorrect that “although he [Clinton] could draw on the experiences of men who had fought in the colonial wars against France, among them such veterans as Thomas Gage and William Howe, these generals, under whom Clinton served during the first years of the Revolution, could offer him little advice on intelligence.”  More likely, Gage did not divulge the secret of Dr. Church and Benjamin Thompson’s clandestine reporting out of concern for the sources and Clinton’s lack of the “need to know” about them.  Those sections of State of the Expedition dealing with intelligence appear to be honest and quite revealing of continuities with Braddock and Gage as well as with the military literature.